Right Hand of Command: Use and Disuse of Personal Staffs in the American Civil War by Jones, Robert Steven
THE RIGHT HAND OF COMMAND: USE AND 
DISUSE OF PERSONAL STAFFS IN THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
By 
ROBERT STEVEN JONES 
Bachelor of Arts 
Northwestern Oklahoma State University 
Alva, Oklahoma 
1988 
Master of Arts 
Oklahoma State University 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 
1990 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
May, 1997 
-r~e':Ji~ 
)99 -, f) 
J1~Y 
THE RIGHT HAND OF COMMAND: USE AND 
DISUSE OF PERSONAL STAFFS IN THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
Thesis Approved: 
Dean of the Graduate College 
ii 
PREFACE 
On July 20, 1861, Union Major General Irvin McDowell 
needed help. Under pressure from President Abraham Lincoln 
to attack Confederate troops near Washington D. C. and 
fight the one big battle that most Northerners thought 
would end the Southern rebellion, McDowell had 34,000 
troops, most of them poorly trained ninety-day volunteers, 
struggling through the muggy Virginia heat toward a creek 
known as Bull Run. McDowell's plan to attack General 
l?.G.T. Beauregard's 25,000 rebels was a sound one, he 
thought, but it involved feints and flank attacks, and he 
wondered if his green troops and commanders were up to it. 
They had already taken four days to march little more than 
twenty miles, supplies stretched along the line of march, 
and the unseasoned soldiers were exhausted before they had 
even fired a shot. Worse yet, with the enemy now nearby, 
two artillery batteries were lost. With no aide-de-camp at 
hand to find them, the beleaguered McDowell rode off to do 
it himself. English newspaper journalist William Howard 
Russell, in America to cover the civil conflict, spotted 
McDowell and commented on the general's menial task. 
McDowell replied that his staff was so small that he had to 
do the work himself. Russell reported, ''The worst served 
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English general has always a young fellow or two about him 
who can fly across the country, draw a rough sketch map, 
ride like a foxhunter, and find something out about the 
enemy and their position, understand and convey orders, and 
obey them. I look about for these types in vain.'' 1 
McDowell's predicament mirrored one that field 
commanders shared throughout the Civil War--they needed 
competent assistants to help them with not only the 
particulars of campaigning but also the day-to-day routines 
of running large armies. Military historian John M. 
Vermillion says army commanders have so many 
responsibilities, from handling paperwork at headquarters 
to fighting, that they cannot be successful without ''a 
close circle of functional assistants.'' He calls that 
need for help the ''corporate nature of leadership. 112 
On paper, Civil War commanders had the organization at 
hand to give them the help they sorely needed~-the military 
staff. Civil War historians Herman Hattaway and Archer 
Jones call the military staff a commander's ''management 
team,'' assigned to make the general's job easier. 3 Staff 
systems in both North and South were alike, for the 
Confederate Army copied the United States Army's staff 
organization. Every general with a field command had a 
staff, sometimes called a ''general staff,'' sometimes a 
''field staff.'' That staff was divided in two. One half 
was the special staff, which handled the problems of supply 
and transportation for the command, be it division, corps, 
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or army. The other half was the ''personal staff,'' which 
kept the records of the army and sent orders to combat 
units. 
A brief note about terminology. While staffs in the 
field were sometimes known as general staffs, European 
armies often called special staffs ''general staffs.'' 
Consequently, that usage spilled into American army 
vernacular. To make matters more confusing, by the time of 
the American Civil War, European armies had developed 
national ''general staffs'' to make operational plans and 
train staff officers for field duty. Also, during the 
course of the Civil War, the United States set up what was 
known as a ''general staff'' in Washington, but as it 
coordinated transportation and supply, albeit for all 
armies in the field, it was in reality a special staff. To 
avoid unnecessary confusion, this study will avoid the use 
of the term ''general staff'' as much as possible, 
reverting to it only to explain staff developments in 
Europe which provide context for American staff work. In 
all other instances, the umbrella term for both staff units 
operating in the field will be ''headquarters staff.'' 
Individually, the two halves will be called ''personal'' 
and ''special'' staffs. 
The United States Army had used special staffs since 
the days of the Revolution, and by the start of the Civil 
War their duties were clear. Special staffs included a 
chief of engineers, chief of ordnance, quartermaster 
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general and assistant quartermaster general, chief and 
assistant chief of commissaries, provost marshal and 
assistant provost marshal, chief surgeon, and chaplain. 
Answerable to the commander, these men did not exercise 
line authority but did control men in their own department. 
For example, the chief engineer directed all the engineers 
attached to the particular army. Likewise the chief of 
ordnance oversaw soldiers handling artillery pieces and 
their ammunition, the quartermaster and commissary generals 
directed soldiers who tended to supplies and their 
transportation. At higher level headquarters the chief 
surgeon and any medical officers under him established 
field hospitals and evacuated sick and wounded soldiers. 
The duties of staff chaplain are equally obvious. As the 
jobs of special staff officers are self-explanatory, and 
because officers well understood their usage by 1861, this 
study will not deal with special staff usage. Some special 
staff officers, however, are sources for other 
information.• 
Of interest to this study is the second subunit of the 
headquarters staff--the personal staff. An act which the 
United states Congress passed on June 22, 1861, allowed 
each brigade commander one assistant adjutant general and 
two aides-de-camp on his personal staff. The number of 
staff officers increased at higher command levels. 
Generals often took as many staffers as the War Department 
would approve, with the assistant adjutant general acting 
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as the commander's main assistant. As the war progressed, 
generals commanding independent armies usually had one 
chief of staff (acting as the main assistant instead of the 
assistant adjutant general), two military secretaries, up 
to seven aides-de-camp, two assistant adjutants general, 
and one inspector general.& 
A personal staff could be of great help to a commander. 
in carrying out a campaign. A·Jl..- .. efficient personal staff 
could collect information, prepare plans, translate 
decisions and plans into orders, send those orders to lower 
echelons, see that orders were properly executed, and give 
opinions to commanders.• Yet traditional usage in the 
United States army, and perhaps a commander's uncertainty 
about what to do with his personal staff, often relegated 
staffers to roles of office clerks or couriers. 
Guidelines for personal staff usage did exist in 1861, 
and they came _J_~om Europe, largely France and Prussia, 
where the Napoleonic Wars had swelled the size of armies 
and, necessarily, advanced the duties and the functions of 
the staff. The French Revolution, which began in 1789, 
swept away that country's old hereditary monarchy and 
bestowed upon all French people the egalitarian title of 
''citizen.'' The term carried certain responsibilities, 
however. Revolutionary leaders expected all French men to 
support and protect the gains of the Revolution with 
military service, and they made it mandatory in 1793 with 
the levee en masse, a national conscription law. 7 Such 
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nationalistic impulses ballooned revolutionary and 
Napoleonic armies. Other European armies consequently 
expanded to counter French armies trying to spread the 
revolution across Europe. When French and Prussians fought 
the battles of Jena and Auerstadt, October 14, 1806, 
Napoleon had 180,000 troops at his command; Prussian 
commanders could field 171,000. When the same armies met 
at Ligny, June 16, 1815, French troops numbered 123,000, 
while Prussians totaled 115,000. Napoleon fought Waterloo 
two days later with 105,000 men, while allies fielded 
157,000 troops against him. 8 Such massive armies required 
improvements in special and personal staff work to insure 
smooth operations. 
Military theorists in France and Prussia wrote about 
staff duties and organization, and some translations of 
their work were in the United states and available for 
Civil War generals to use. Their writings revealed that 
modern headquarters staffs had three elements: clearly 
defined organization and duties; well-educated staff 
officers; and chiefs of staff who played key roles in the 
function of the staff. France and Prussia also developed 
national entities--the Staff Corps in the former, the Great 
General Staff in the latter--that trained staff officers 
then assigned them to field commanders. Those national 
staffs also developed wartime strategies and policies which 
staff officers used as guidelines when assisting army 
commanders. 
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With no national general staff to help them, and with 
few War Department guidelines for staff work beyond the 
proper form for filling out reports, Civil War personal 
staff officers were adrift. Instead of reflecting a 
national standard, staffs usually reflected the character 
of their commanding general and did as much--or as little--
as he expected of them. They were often curious mixtures 
of West Point-trained soldiers and inexperienced civilians. 
They might be composed of neighbors from the general's 
hometown, members of his family, or friends of a political 
sponsor. The staff officer learned his duties on the job. 
Some men became excellent staff officers, others never rose 
above inefficiency.· 
Because every army, corps, division, brigade, and 
regimental commander had a staff, no study of limited scope 
can explore the workings of each headquarters. Instead, 
this dissertation targets four generals who, by reputation, 
might have gone beyond the limited help that officers' 
manuals offered in composing and using personal staffs. 
Each man was a West Point graduate, a central player in the 
war, and had a chance to expand the boundaries of American 
staff work. They are George B. McClellan, Robert E. Lee, 
Ulysses S. Grant, and William T. Sherman. McClellan, while 
timid on the battlefield, was a learned soldier, superb 
organizer, and had seen firsthand Prussian staff advances 
as an observer of the Crimean War in 1854. Lee was the 
South's legendary campaigner. During the Civil War he 
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commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for more than three 
years, racking up victory after victory whether on the 
offensive or defensive. Even though few staff advances for 
the United States Army might be expected to come out of a 
southern command, Lee's thoughts on staff work reflect 
ideas of the old American army. Grant was the Union's most 
victorious general, campaigning in three theaters and 
ultimately forcing Lee to surrender. With four full years 
of independent army command, and ascending to the rank of 
lieutenant general in 1864, Grant had the most opportunity 
to advance staff work. Sherman gained an independent army 
command only in 1863, but he became known as one of the 
fathers of modern warfare when he made war on the civilian 
populace of Georgia and the Carolinas in 1864 and 1865. 
Becoming general in chief of all United States armies in 
1869, Sherman helped set military policy, including that 
affecting staffs, for thirteen years. 
This study will answer a variety of questions about 
the personal staffs of the four generals. How did the 
generals select their staff officers? Did they look for 
military experience that might help with operations, or 
business experience to guide them around the headquarters 
office? Or did they cater to family or political 
favorites? What did the generals expect of their staffs? 
Did they want help with intelligence and writing orders, or 
did they simply want someone to keep track of the many 
boxes of records at the headquarters tent? Did the 
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generals seek a level of professionalization within their 
staff? Did they show evidence that they knew of or 
understood staff developments in Europe? Did they in any 
way expand staff usage beyond the bounds of their officers' 
manuals? What factors caused them to use their staffs the 
way they did: the nature of their theater, exigencies of 
war, or simply their personalities? Perhaps most 
importantly, for it could color the work of the entire 
staff, what was each general's relationship with his chief 
of staff? Did he trust the man's opinions and welcome his 
advice, or did he immerse himself in the minutiae of 
headquarters, lessening his own concentration on operations 
and negating the value of his chief? Likewise, how did the 
chief and other staffers feel about their commanding 
general? The general and his staff were essentially a 
family in the field, and friendship, loyalty, and 
confidence in each other could do much to enhance staff 
work. 
This study will also look at Civil War personal staff 
work in the larger scope of United states Army 
modernization. Military historians frequently call the 
American Civil War the first ''modern war,'' citing 
technological advances, such as weaponry and telegraphy, 
and the willingness of Union generals to make war on the 
southern populace, not just southern armies. By World War 
I, the United States Army had a personal staff system that 
resembled European staffs, but did the Civil War directly 
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influence this development, or, amid advances in other 
fields, was it a backwater of staff work? Also, in an age 
of industrialization, did personal staff work borrow any 
expertise from railroads, the only American industry by 
1860 to have started a rudimentary modernization plan in 
its administrative staffing?' 
Army size may also have played a role in staff 
development. In the early stages of the war nationalist 
fervor, and later, national conscription swelled Union 
armies; the Army of the Potomac, for instance, boasted 
100,000 men or more for most of the war, and Sherman's 
combined Georgia invasion force numbered 120,000 in 1864. 
One might expect the same type of personal staff 
advancements in these armies as in Napoleon's armies fifty 
years earlier. Conversely, such improvements might be 
absent in Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, which 
never topped 90,000 men and frequently fought with 60,000 
troops or less. 
In the end, it seems that size was but one factor in a 
three-part equation for personal staff advancement. When a 
general sought personal staff improvements, the three 
combined factors usually encouraged him to do so. The 
first factor was indeed army size~ Simply, the larger the 
force under his command, the more a general might seek 
staff help controlling it. The second factor was 
cooperative operations--separate columns or armies working 
toward a mutual objective. That may have involved 
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separating an army for a two- or three-prong thrust in a 
single battle, or having two or three independent armies 
work in concert for a single campaign. The last, and most 
important factor, was the commander's willingness to 
improve staff work. If a general saw no real benefit in 
staff work, then neither the presence of a large army nor a 
plan calling for cooperative operations could encourage him 
to improve personal staff work.-· 
Historical writing about Civil War personal staff work 
is sparse. Writers such as Russell Weigley, in Towards an 
American Army and History of the United States Army, and 
Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski in For the Common 
Defense: A Military History of the United States, have 
well chronicled the rise of the United States Army's 
national general staff. Their discussions, however, center 
on developments in the special staff bureaus, not personal 
staffs in the __ f.ield. Likewise Walter Millis, in American 
Military Thought, confines his discussion of staff work to 
early twentieth-century special staff reforms. Edward 
Hagerman, in The American Civil War and the Origins of 
Modern Warfare devotes some copy to staff development, but 
his discussion of the topic_ is unsatisfactory. Hagerman 
lumps all staff work--both personal and special--together, 
and he concentrates on the latter. While he veers at times 
toward discussing personal staff work, the main thrust of 
his staff study (which, indeed, is only a small part of his 
book) is the coordination of special staff bureau work in 
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Washington and among field commands. The Civil War saw 
great advances in special staff work, but Hagerman answers 
no substantial questions about personal staff work. 
Neither do T. Harry Williams in Lincoln and His Generals or 
Fred Shannon in the two-volume The Organization and 
Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1862. Allan Nevins, 
in his The War for the Union series, gives personal staff 
work equally short shrift. Indeed, overt mention of any 
staff developments is hard to find in the final four books 
of the series, The Improvised War, 1861-1862; War Becomes 
Revolution, 1862-1863; The Organized War, 1863-1864; and 
The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865. 10 
In the late 1940s, historian James Donald Hittle wrote 
the classic of staff work, The Military Staff: Its History 
and Development. Hittle charted the course of staff work 
in Europe and the United States through World War II. 
While his book is indispensable to any study of military 
staffs, Hittle's section on the American Civil War does 
little more than point out deficiencies in staff work. 
Civil War historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, in 
How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War, 
acknowledge the paucity of research in personal staff work 
and recommend it as an area of study. Yet Jones later 
ignores the topic in Civil War Command and Strategy. 11 
A spate of other Civil War narratives, micro-
histories, and biographies of the four generals in this 
study give sporadic clues to their personal staff usage, 
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but none specifically deal with the topic. Those include 
Shelby Foote's three-volume The Civil War: A Narrative and 
Bruce Catton's many narratives, especially Hr. Lincoln's 
Army, A Stillness at Appomattox, and Grant Moves South.i 2 
Other books are biographies of the generals in question or 
specific histories of their campaigns. About Grant they 
include William McFeely, Grant: A Biography; Brooks D. 
Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses s. Grant and the 
Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868; J. F. c. 
Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses s. Grant; and Albert 
Richardson, Personal History of Ulysses s. Grant.i 3 
Many books well chronicle George McClellan's campaigns 
and military career, but none examine his staff 
relationships.i 4 In a 1975 article, ''The 
Professionalization of George B. McClellan and Early Civil 
War Command: An Institutional Perspective,'' Edward 
Hagerman criticizes Little Mac for failing to adopt a 
Prussian staff system, even after seeing it first-hand on a 
tour of Europe, and doing little with the staff he had. 
''There are no indications ... [McClellan's] thoughts on 
staff went beyond his actions,'' writes Hagerman,i& but the 
author makes no full study of McClellan's staff, and he 
misses instances where McClellan took hesitant steps toward 
expanded staff work. 
Classic works about Sherman, B. H. Liddell Hart's 
Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American, and Lloyd Lewis' 
Sherman: Fighting Prophet, do not examine the general's 
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personal staff system. Neither do recent books, such as 
John F. Marszalek's Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for 
Order, and Albert Castel's Decision in the West: The 
Atlanta Campaign of 1864, a 665-page study of that 
campaign. When Castel does mention Sherman's chief of 
staff, Joseph D. Webster, he incorrectly calls him 
''John. 1116 
Classics about Lee are also largely void of staff 
consideration. They include Douglas Southall Freeman's 
Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command and R. E. Lee: A 
Biography, and Clifford Dowdey's, Lee's Last Campaign: The 
Story of Lee and His Hen Against Grant--1864. 17 Dowdey's 
1965 biography Lee briefly examines Lee's personal staff. 
While Dowdey captures the small nature of Lee's staff and 
criticizes the general for not having an ''operations 
officer,''--someone to ''maintain knowledge of the 
movements of every unit in his own army and, in cooperation 
with intelligence . , [those of] the enemy's forces''--
he devotes only a few pages to the topic and does not fully 
explain Lee's staff expectations. 18 In Robert E. Lee, the 
best and most readable new work on Lee, author Emory Thomas 
provides anecdotes about Lee's staff and uses the officers 
as primary sources, but he does not venture an in-depth 
analysis of their headquarters work. 19 In short, no major-
-or minor--writer has attempted a detailed study of the 
personal staffs of Grant, McClellan, Sherman, or Lee. 
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Like all historical topics, the information has always 
existed, waiting for someone to apply the right questions 
to it and do the required digging. Until now, no one has. 
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, known simply 
as the O.R., forms the backbone of this research. The 
methodology of the work was simple, yet time consuming. 
This researcher first identified every man who served on 
the staffs of the four generals, then tracked them through 
each volume of the O.R. That revealed the tasks they 
performed at headquarters, and shed light on the generals' 
expectations of staff officers. Some of the players 
involved left manuscript collections, but those papers 
frequently did not deal with their wartime staff 
experiences. More often the individuals, obscure by any 
standard, left no papers; the O.R. is the only evidence of 
their staff position. It remained, then, to extrapolate 
from the pages of the o. R. what staff duty was like, 
filling in gaps with available memoirs and manuscripts. 
The results are in some ways surprising. Lee, a 
former staff officer himself, made the least use of his 
staff of any of the four men. To achieve so much in his 
three years of command would almost mandate an efficient 
staff with clarity of purpose. In truth, Lee had few 
staffers and delegated to them few responsibilities beyond 
the pre-war norms. Lee also made limited and ill-defined 
use of his chief of staff, General Robert H. Chilton. 
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Sherman, with a philosophy of staff work that was 
almost the antithesis of European staff usage, drastically 
limited the value of his staff. on his most famous 
campaigns, Atlanta, the march to Savannah, and the march 
through the Carolinas, he left half of his staff and his 
chief, Joseph Dana Webster, behind. McClellan showed 
flashes of insight in his staff usage. and he picked his 
father-in-la~, the capable frontier soldier Randolph B. 
Marcy, to be his chief of staff. McClellan's tenure in 
command was brief, though, and he tempered any staff 
advances he might have made with the same hesitancy that 
marred his campaigns. 
Grant, renowned as perhaps the greatest general of the 
war, earns yet another military honor as the most 
progressive of the four in his conception of staff work. 
With an able chief, John Aaron Rawlins, and a willingness 
to listen to the opinions of his staffers, Grant molded his 
staff from a ragged collection of civilians with little 
military knowledge into a professional body functioning, 
albeit crudely and briefly, after the fashion of both a 
Prussian headquarters staff and Prussia's Great General 
Staff. Grant's staff advances were exigencies of war which 
the increasing size of his armies triggered. He did not 
study staff progress in Prussia or intend to mirror his 
staff after any foreign army. But, with each of Grant's 
victories his command grew, and, like commanders in France 
and Prussia, he needed a more efficient, professional staff 
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at headquarters to help him manage his armies. Grant saw a 
need and created a staff to fill it. 
Writing is a solitary pursuit, yet no author can write 
without much help. In the completion of this work, and the 
associated course of study, I owe a debt to many people 
which I can never repay. A word of thanks here must 
suffice. First, I want to thank my major advisor, Dr. 
James L. Huston, for seeing me through masters and Ph.D. 
programs. He has tolerated military topics from me, even 
though that is not his special interest. He has given me 
encouragement at just the right times and helped me mold 
this work from a skeletal idea into, .I hope, a viable 
historical work. I also want to thank the other members of 
my Ph.D. committee, Drs. George Jewsbury, Joseph A. Stout, 
and Elizabeth Williams, and John B. Phillips. 
To John Phillips I owe a double portion of thanks. As 
head of the government documents section of the Oklahoma 
State University Library, he has directed me to many 
valuable resources, provided my wife, Judi, with a 
wonderful work place for the past seven years, and been a 
good friend to my family. Many thanks, John. Thank you 
also to the many staff members of the documents department; 
you have been a second family for us. 
I also want to thank the men who taught me how to 
write and edit. I learned much of the writer's trade at a 
small newspaper in Northwest Oklahoma, then, at 
Northwestern Oklahoma State University in Alva, my 
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bachelor's degree advisor, Wayne Lane, helped me refine my 
skill. In Stillwater, I had the true blessing of working 
as assistant editor of True West and Old West magazines for 
five years. There, editor John Joerschke taught me the 
fine points of editing copy, and he gave me plenty of 
opportunity to do so. Each month we would edit or rewrite 
fifteen or more western history articles. The job was a 
crash course in rapid, effective editing, and I will 
treasure the experience forever. I also want to thank Dr. 
Richard C. Rohrs, instructor of OSU's historical methods 
course. The class was like a ''boot camp'' of historical 
research and writing, quite painful at times, but very 
valuable for all Dr. Rohrs taught. 
I mentioned True West magazine above, and I want to 
thank publisher Steven K. Gragert-for the opportunity to 
work for him. My original term of employment, secured 
through the history department, was for only one year. 
Each year I asked Steve if I could stay on longer, each 
year he said yes, and the original term stretched to five 
years. 
Every author has a complex network of friends and 
family who support and encourage him, and tolerate his 
silences while writing. I am no exception. I want to 
thank Jack and Patsy Ruth Miller, who have supported and 
encouraged me in a variety of ways since I was born, and 
Rodney and Marsha Bronniman--Rodney, whom I've known since 
the first grade, and Marsha, since they got married fifteen 
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years ago. Their friendship is worth more to me than I can 
tell them. Also, many thanks to my good friend Rodney 
Donley. our friendship was born in the glory days of the 
Oklahoma oil boom, and has survived good days and bad. 
Rodney has always been there for me, just like a brother. 
In Stillwater, Judi and I have also made other close 
friends, all of whom have encouraged me in the writing 
process. Many thanks to Phillip, Marilyn, Aaron, Joe, and 
Ben Gates; Bill and Faye Burton; Tina, Bill, Monica, and 
Anthony Lynsky; Charlotte McKey; and Betsy Schrock. 
Special thanks also go to Sherry and Dave Wallace, who have 
done more for us than they will ever know. 
To our families in Woodward, Oklahoma, I owe more than 
I can say. Thanks to my father- and mother-in-law, R. V. 
and Wanda Austin; to Grammy; Terry Austin; Haven, Donna, 
Amanda, Megan, and Roy Rader--you've given me a wonderful 
second family. To my dad, Bob, thanks for a million 
things--support, encouragement, cars, money, and love. To 
Marjorie, thanks for the friendship and for watching out 
for Bob. I want to also remember my mother, Pat, who died 
in 1992. No one has ever been a better cheerleader; she 
always knew I could do it. A special thanks to her for 
teaching me how to work. 
Most of all I want to thank my wife, Judi, and my son, 
Evan, for their help in all ways. Through a bachelor's 
degree, master's degree, and now a Ph.D., Judi has given me 
endless encouragement, and she had faith in my efforts in 
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the many times I was ready to quit. She has endured more 
than she bargained for, I know, and I appreciate it very 
much. Evan, while only a few months old, proved to be an 
able research assistant, playing in his playpen or napping 
while I plodded through the Official Records. More 
recently he has shown patience hard to find in an adult, 
let alone a two-year-old boy, while I spent night after 
night working at the word processor, unable to play with 
him. They are my good friends; this work is for them and 
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American Civil War generals were uncertain about using 
their staffs, but French and Prussian generals had a better 
idea of a personal staff's worth. The Napoleonic Wars in 
the early nineteenth century saw the advent of mass armies 
of frequently more than 100,000 troops and a fluid, rapid 
movement that characterized Napoleon's campaigns. The need 
to quickly and efficiently move large armies necessitated 
improvements in both the special and personal staffs of 
Napoleon's armies. After losing to Napoleon at Jena in 
1806, Prussian army officers realized they, too, had to 
improve their staff systems. The resulting changes in 
personal staff work created models of staff 
professionalism. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
information on the form and function of those European 
personal staffs was available to any American army officer 
who wanted to read it. The United states Army, however, 
failed to recognize the need for personal staff 
improvement, and by the start of the American Civil War, 
generals and their staff officers were without official 
policy or guidance. 
1 
2 
European armies had had rudimentary staffs Since the 
early 1600s, 1 but the French and Prussian headquarters 
staffs that grew from the Napoleonic era were much 
advanced. They had three things in common. First, all had 
clearly organized sections or departments, each with well-
defined duties. Second, the staffs consisted of highly 
educated officers. Third, each had a well-trained and 
experienced chief of staff assisting the commanding general 
and overseeing staff functions; the success or failure of a 
campaign often reflected the relationship between a general 
and his chief. 
Napoleon did not set out to advance staff 
organization, yet progress came from his campaigns. Staff 
historian James D. Hittle says Napoleon's military genius 
may have caused him to rely less on a staff than other 
officers, but ''staff functioning .•. [played) an important 
part in .•. [his) scheme of war.'' Hittle says Napoleon did 
not specifically advance staff developments himself, but he 
created an atmosphere in which they could grow. 2 
Napoleon's ''Great General Headquarters Staff'' 
differed from most headquarters staffs in that it served 
two functions--one, the supreme military staff for all of 
France, and two, a combat field staff. Still, it shows how 
Napoleon used his staff to assist him with command. His 
staff varied from time to time, but the one in place in 
1813 appears indicative of his staff throughout the First 
Empire. It consisted of two groups, the maison, which was 
3 
Napoleon's personal staff, and the Imperial Headquarters, 
which Napoleon's able chief of staff Louis Alexandre 
Berthier oversaw. The maison was a complete staff in 
itself and answered only to Napoleon. It had three 
sections: Napoleon's aides, all high-ranking officers who 
received assignments ranging from diplomatic missions to 
special commands; officers d'ordonnance, lower ranking 
officers who issued orders or r-e·ceived special missions 
that required no command decisions; and Napoleon's 
''cabinet.'' The last section had three bureaus: a bureau 
of intelligence, which consolidated and presented all enemy 
intelligence to Napoleon; a topographic bureau, which 
entered information about enemy positions on a topographic 
map; and a secretarial bureau of three or four men who 
wrote out Napoleon's orders and directives. 3 
The Imperial Headquarters under Berthier was also 
divided in hal._f_.. The first half was Berthier 's private 
staff, some assistants who helped him carry out his own 
duties. The second, although called a ''general staff,'' 
was a special staff, overseeing engineers, artillery, 
supplies, a military post office, billeting, evacuation of 
wounded soldiers, and furnishing maps to subordinate 
officers ... 
Trying to match staff work to the speed and mobility 
of Napoleon's warfare, Berthier broke the special staff's 
responsibilities into four units. One handled staff 
records, inspections, and reports and dealt with prisoners 
4 
of war and deserters; another kept an official journal and 
supervised artillery, engineers, hospitals, and police; a 
third oversaw reconnaissance, operational plans, and 
communications; and the last established and organized the 
headquarters. An adjutant general, answerable to Berthier, 
commanded each unit. Berthier outlined this plan of 
organization in his Document sur le Service de L'Etat-Hajor 
General a l'Armee des Alpes, which he wrote in 1796. 5 
Swiss military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini, who 
campaigned as a staff officer with Napoleon .and spent his 
later life codifying many of the Emperor's techniques of 
war, gives another view of duties at a French army 
headquarters. In his 1838 book The Art oE War, Jomini 
gives a lengthy list of staff responsibilities. It 
includes: preparing orders and itineraries to set an army 
in motion; drawing up the commanding general's orders; 
working with the chiefs of engineers and artillery to 
secure posts and depots; directing reconnaissance of enemy 
positions; insuring proper execution of movements and 
arranging marching orders for orderly marches; providing 
guidance for advance and rear guards, flankers, and other 
detached units; providing general instructions for troop 
deployment before battle; indicating assembly points for 
advance units in case of attack; keeping supply, baggage, 
and munition trains away from marching columns; providing 
for successive arrival of convoys and supplies; 
establishing camps and setting regulations for their safety 
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and order; organizing lines of communication and supply and 
keeping them open for detached bodies; organizing 
hospitals; keeping accurate records of all detachments; 
organizing units to round up isolated men or small 
detachments; organizing and supervising troops in siege 
trenches; preserving order during retreats; and, in camp, 
assigning positions to different units and indicating 
places of assembly in case of attack.• 
While much of staff work dealt with combat situations, 
it also dealt with the mundane clerical routines of the 
headquarters office. In French armies, staffers kept 
meticulous records and wrote detailed reports. In 1800, 
Paul Thiebault, an adjutant general in the French Army, 
wrote Manuel des Adjutants Generaux et des Adjoints 
Employes dans les Etats-Hajors Divisionairs des Armees, 
which was the first compilation of staff theory and 
practice. Thiebault outlined staff organization (along 
Berthier's four-unit plan) and wrote instructions for staff 
officers. He also penned detailed instructions for writing 
reports. Thiebault told staff officers how to write 
reports of various types, whether for inspections or combat 
engagements, and specifically how to arrange information in 
each report. Thiebault commented that every staff officer 
should strive to render reports ''precise, accurate, and 
complete.' ' 7 
Napoleon caused changes in Prussian headquarters 
staffs as well. After the French emperor wrecked their 
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army at the Battle of Jena in 1806, Prussian generals 
completely rethought their command structure. Advances at 
field headquarters could not take place, however, until 
reformers had retooled Prussia's central General Staff. 
Prussian militarists, following generals Gerhard 
Johann Scharnhorst and August Wilhelm von Gneisenau, began 
the army's reformation by reorganizing the national general 
staff. That body dated back to the Quartermaster-General's 
Staff, which performed technical surveys and made 
operational plans for King Frederick William in the 1650s. 
In 1758 Frederick the Great expanded the Quartermaster-
General's Staff duties to include laying out camps, 
building village defenses, and reconnoitering landscape for 
troop placement. In 1802, Colonel Christian von Massenbach 
recommended to King Frederick William III that the General 
Staff (as the body was simply known by then) function in 
peacetime to prepare for all possible wartime scenarios. 
The king ordered it so the next year. 8 
The General Staff was ill-prepared, however, to face 
Napoleon. Before Jena, Scharnhorst, an officer on the 
General Staff, drafted a battle plan that would have massed 
Prussian forces to meet Napoleon's army at either the Rhine 
or Main rivers. Other planners, however, dispersed 
Prussian forces to cover wide expanses of territory, 
weakening the army so that Napoleon was able to flank one 
part of it and cut off the other. 9 
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In the post-Jena reorganization, Prussians divided 
their General Staff. Part of it, the ··Great General 
Staff,'' stayed in Berlin to work on operational plans for 
the entire army. The other part, the Truppengeneralstab, 
or operational general staff, was distributed among field 
commands. It directly affected personal staffs at 
headquarters because the officers from the general staff 
became chiefs of staff to field commanders. They used 
instructions that Scharnhorst himself had written in an 
effort to clarify the duties of staff officers. 10 
In 1828, the Prussian Army formalized the composition 
of combat headquarters staffs. A directive divided the 
staff--perhaps showing a French influence--into four 
sections: a general staff, routine staff, legal staff, and 
departmental staff. Each section had clear duties. Hittle 
says this .definite organization gave the Prussian staff 
system one of the true markings of a modern staff. 11 
Education was the second characteristic of post-
Napoleonic European staffs. Better education systems for 
both French and Prussian officers had begun in the late 
eighteenth century, but the Napoleonic Wars again focused 
the need for a highly-educated officer cadre. Both 
countries had seen the need for better education during the 
Seven Years War, 1756-1763. In France, Pierre de Bourcet, 
who had proven himself an able staff officer in the war, 
became director of the Grenoble Staff College in 1764 and 
personally taught young officers. In Prussia the next 
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year, Frederick the Great opened the Academie des Nobles, a 
military school for young nobles about to become·army 
officers. Frederick tapped some of the knowledge Bourcet 
was imparting in France by staffing his school with French 
instructors. 12 
French officer education took another step after 
Napoleon. Although the Emperor did not make any 
educational advances himself, his campaigns again stirred 
interest in a more learned officer corps. In 1818, 
Minister of War Marshal Gouvion Saint-Cyr, who had 
witnessed staff officer incompetence on the field, 
established the Ecole d'Application d'Etat-Major in Paris. 
Eight years later the French Army mandated that graduates 
of the school serve regular tours on the line, and that 
captains on the staff had to serve in regiments before 
receiving a promotion. Officers reached a position on the 
staff corps through a competition which insured capable 
officers on the staff. 13 
By the time the Civil War erupted in the United 
States, the French Army had also improved its selection 
process for staff candidates. Sub-lieutenants interested 
in applying for the staff corps submitted their names to 
the French war minister, who selected candidates based on-
their previous educational backgrounds for entry to the 
school of application of the staff corps. Graduates of the 
school then had to serve a year in a regiment before they 
could become an adjutant on a headquarters staff, and then 
only after an inspector-general deemed them ready for the 
job. :i.. .. 
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In Prussia, Frederick the Great's educational 
standards died with him in 1786; that was one reason the 
General Staff was so ill-prepared to fight Napoleon twenty 
years later. Scharnhorst, however, quickly targeted 
officer education in the post-Jena reforms. He established 
three mi 1 i tary schools to ensur·e·· scientific training for 
officers, and he created a Hilitarakademie for officers in 
Berlin. Scharnhorst required a nine-month course of 
instruction for officer candidates, and he selected 
officers for a three-year course at the academy in Berlin. 
Only officers in the top one-third of their class were 
eligible for a spot on the General staff. 15 The effect of 
all this was that now field commanders had chiefs of staff, 
sent from the Great General Staff in Berlin, who were 
scientifically:_ . .trained and versed in national policy and 
war objectives. 
The third key element of the post-Napoleonic French 
and Prussian staffs was the primacy at headquarters of the 
chief of staff. Writing in The Art of War, Jomini 
explained that, with the geographical scope and rapidly 
changing battlefield situations characteristic of 
Napoleonic campaigns, chiefs of staff, who had previously 
only supervised special staff bureaus, became all important 
to their commanders. Suddenly a chief had to supply his 
general the proper information he required to make 
10 
decisions; help him turn his strategic or tactical ideas 
into orders; draft and deliver them promptly to every 
commander in the theater; and insure their proper 
execution. The chief had a hand in all aspects of the 
campaign. ''To be a good chief of staff ... a man should be 
acquainted with all the various branches of the art of 
war,'' Jomini writes. Napoleon's chief, Berthier, called 
the chief of staff simply, ''the central pivot of all 
[staff] operations.'' 
What's more, if a general should have a keen 
scientific ability to lay out a campaign but lack the flash 
and boldness to execute it, his chief should provide the 
spark needed for victory. Likewise, if a general was full 
of blood and thunder but lacked the skill to lay out a 
I 
fundamentally sound plan, the chief should have been able 
to fill that deficiency as well. Jomini writes, ''the 
greatness of a commander-in-chief will be always manifested 
in his plans; but if the general lacks ability, the chief 
of staff should supply it as far as he can .... '' In 
effect, the fortunes of a commanding general and his chief 
were tied together. Jomini understood that and cautioned, 
''woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in 
concert! 1116 
In France, Napoleon and Berthier set many precedents 
for the duties of a chief of staff in combat, but their 
relationship was often strained. In fact, Napoleon, such a 
military genius himself that he frequently acted as his own 
11 
chief, may not have recognized Berthier's value until it 
was too late. Berthier did not possess a keen military 
mind. Staff historian Hittle says, along with an 
''unadmirable personality,'' Berthier had an ''incapacity 
for independent command.'' Chiefs of staff at the time 
were authorized to make troop dispositions if needed. 
Jomini, Marshal Ney's chief in battle against Russians and 
Prussians at Bautzen in 1813, averted disaster when, with 
Napoleon's orders delayed, he devised a plan of battle for 
Ney. But battle plans befuddled Berthier. Once, at 
Ratisbon, Austria, Berthier positioned forces so strangely 
that he confounded rrench field marshals. Luckily, 
Napoleon arrived to fix matters before Austrian troops 
attacked, but he wrote to Berthier later that, ''What you 
have done appears so strange, that if I was not aware of 
your friendship I should think that you were betraying 
me.'' 17 
Nevertheless, Berthier became one of the classic 
chiefs of staff in history. Thanks to what Hittle calls 
his ''methodical mind and .•. administrative genius,'' 
Berthier was peculiarly suited to run Napoleon's staff. 
For years Berthier controlled the staff, oversaw the 
finances of the army, took care of the Emperor's 
appointments, and saw that Napoleon's orders arrived 
clearly and promptly in the hands of his commanders. In 
Berthier, writes Hittle, ''the chief of staff finally found 
his true place in military organization.'' 18 
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In his latter campaigns, however, Napoleon began to 
mistrust Berthier. Perhaps the Emperor was so fully 
confident of his own abilities he thought he did not need a 
chief of staff, or perhaps Berthier's ineptitude at making 
field dispositions soured Napoleon on his chief's other, 
more valuable, skills. Napoleon issued orders that all 
intelligence coming into headquarters bypass Berthier and 
come directly to him, something that violated Thiebault's 
recent recommendations. Napoleon began openly rebuking 
Berthier, and once he referred to his chief as simply a 
clerk. 19 
Napoleon's treatment of Berthier may have changed 
history. Perhaps in despair over his commander's 
disregard, Berthier killed himself on June 1, 1815, as 
Napoleon's army headed for Waterloo. Napoleon substituted 
a corps commander, Nicolas Soult, for Berthier. 
Unaccustomed to the massive job, Soult made several 
mistakes issuing Napoleon's orders. Napoleon, of course, 
lost waterloo, and during the battle he reportedly said, 
''If only Berthier was here, then my orders would have been 
carried out.' 120 Napoleon had realized the true value of 
his chief too late. 
Prussian militarists, on the other hand, knew full 
well the value of a good chief of staff, and military 
reformer Scharnhorst played a key role in creating the 
Prussian chief-of-staff system. Born in Hanover in 1755, 
Scharnhorst had attended military school, fought in 
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Belgium's revolutionary wars, and served as a chief of 
staff in the Hanoverian army before he joined the Prussian 
Army in 1801. In the fighting at Jena, Scharnhorst was 
wounded but joined other troops retreating from the 
battlefield. On the march Scharnhorst fell in with Field 
Marshal G. L. von Blucher, whom Prussian historian Walter 
Goerlitz describes as a ''rough, thoroughly ill-educated 
man, who was nevertheless endowed with an excellent natural 
intelligence.'' Blucher recognized Scharnhorst's talent and 
made him his impromptu chief of staff. Working together 
they regrouped their forces and fought a masterly 
retrograde action as they crossed the Harz Mountains, 
diverting several French forces from occupation duty in 
eastern Prussia. Scharnhorst's and Blucher's cooperation 
was the first example of what would become the hallmark of 
Prussian personal staff work--a trained chief of staff 
advising a field commander. 21 
While Napoleon dealt his chief out of operational 
matters, the Prussians fully immersed their headquarters 
chiefs in operational decisions. Scharnhorst had, in 
effect, been the role model for the Prussian system when he 
aided Blucher. He began to formalize the chief's role at 
headquarters when he wrote down instructions for staff 
operations after the formation of the Truppengeneralstab. 
No longer would a chief simply coordinate activities of 
subordinate staff departments. No longer would he be only 
a conduit for the commanding general's orders. He would, 
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in effect, be a junior partner in command decisions. When 
Scharnhorst died of blood poisoning during the allied wars 
against Napoleon in 1813, August Wilhelm von Gneisenau took 
over the general staff and further cemented the roles of 
chiefs of staff by making them jointly responsible for 
their commanders' decisions. 22 Before Jena such a role for 
the chief would have been not only impossible but 
inadvisable; staff officers simply did not have the 
knowledge or experience to act in such a fashion. The 
reforms in officer education after the wreck of the army 
made the new command relationship not only possible, but 
advantageous for the field commander as his aide would 
possess proven scientific knowledge and speak with the 
authority of the Great General Staff. 
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, France and 
Prussia had virtually set the standards for the era's best 
headquarters staffs. They had clearly defined structures, 
with the duties of each staff division well delineated. 
Staffs had well-educated officers to execute those duties. 
And, chiefs of staff were developing strong working 
relationships with their commanding generals and taking 
larger roles in operational planning. 
The Napoleonic Wars also affected British headquarters 
staffs, but not like they did those of France and Prussia. 
Having no staff to work with, General Arthur Wellesley--the 
Duke of Wellington--crafted his own. His success in the 
Peninsular War, 1808 to 1814, in which England, Spain, and 
15 
Portugal opposed France shows that he did an adequate job. 
But Wellington, primarily concerned with logistics and 
supply routes, worried most about creating special staff 
departments to handle those problems. While he had a 
personal staff, Wellington did not give primacy to a chief 
of staff, as did his French and Prussian counterparts. Any 
advances Great Britain made with headquarters staffs 
stagnated after Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 
1815. By 1854, when Great Britain, France, and Turkey 
allied against Russia in the Black Sea region during the 
Crimean War, 1854-1856, the British Army had established no 
schools for staff officers. Only when that conflict 
pointed out the need for more efficient staffers did the 
army create a system of staff education. 23 
American staff work proceeded haltingly after the 
American Army was born in 1775. Soon after taking command 
of the Continental Army, General George Washington realized 
he needed help with administration of the force so he could 
concentrate on campaigning. Envisioning a type of national 
staff, largely to help with supply problems, Washington 
asked Congress in 1776 to create a ··war office.'' 
Congress responded with a Board of War, but it was not what 
Washington wanted. The general had political enemies in 
Congress, men who thought Washington was doing nothing to 
win the war. They designed the Board of War to watch over 
Washington and made it the Continental Army's top military 
entity, outranking even Washington. Worse yet, when 
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Washington asked for an inspector general to help him 
establish a training system for his men, Congress complied 
but gave the job to another of Washington's enemies, Thomas 
Conway. He was answerable to the War Board, not 
Washington. Conway, an Irish-Frenchman who had been in 
Frederick the Great's army, had served briefly with 
Washington and considered the general a fool for not 
promoting him. Conway secured the inspector general's job 
by insinuating himself among Washington's enemies. When 
Washington realized that Congress had ignored his wishes on 
staff reform and Conway was to be at his headquarters, he 
became so angry he refused to work with Conway. The 
general's coolness drove Conway away. 24 
Soon, however, Washington had on hand the right man to 
help him build a headquarters sta-ff. While serving in 
Paris as American minister to France, Benjamin Franklin 
became acquainted with Baron Frederick von Steuben, a 
former Prussian staff officer. Franklin sent Steuben to 
offer his services to the Continental Army, and wrote a 
letter of introduction inflating Steuben's rank from 
captain to general to make him acceptable to the 
Continental Congress. Regardless of his true rank, Steuben 
had fought in the Seven Years' War and attended one of 
Frederick the Great's first staff schools; he became 
perhaps the only trained staff officer in the Continental 
Army. Washington welcomed Steuben and gave him the 
inspector general's job. In that capacity von Steuben 
acted as chief of staff for personnel, intelligence, 
operations, and supply. Unfortunately, few beyond a few 
top American generals realized the value of Steuben's 
headquarters reforms, which lasted only during the war. 25 
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Following the Revolution, the American Army made no 
attempt to standardize personal staff usage. As historian 
Hittle says, ''The wars from 1812 to the Mexican [War] 
produced some good brush-warfare tacticians and 
accomplished Indian exterminators,'' but no body of staff 
theory or cadre of experienced staff officers. The army 
based its rudimentary staff systems on the British model, 
the least progressive of those in Europe. During the 
Mexican War, General Winfield Scott had an efficient staff, 
but its composition had nothing to do with War Department 
guidelines and everything to do with Scott's ability to 
surround himself with capable men. 26 
In 1862 the United states did, in fact, form a 
''General Staff,'' but that was a misnomer. Including the 
chiefs of the quartermaster, commissary, adjutant 
general's, engineer, and ordnance departments, and with 
Major General Henry Halleck coordinating them under the 
title ''chief of staff,'' the body was actually only a 
special staff. To be sure, the staff was quite effective, 
tackling the massive supply and transportation job that the 
North had to master to win the war. Nevertheless, that was 
only half of what national general staffs in France and 
Prussia were doing. The staff in Washington did nothing to 
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make operational plans for field generals or supply them 
with trained, experienced staff officers, such as the 
Prussian Great General Staff would do in wartime. A staff 
similar to the Union's also appeared in Richmond, but it 
lacked a chief to concentrate its efforts. 27 
The United States Military Academy at West Point 
offered no guidance on personal staff use; graduates knew 
little about staff thought--or strategy and tactics for 
that matter. When President Thomas Jefferson approved West 
Point in 1802, he wanted graduates to be more than just 
soldiers. Like most of his fellow revolutionaries, 
Jefferson feared large, professional standing armies, and 
he could see no reason to educate a class of men with no 
skill other than warmaking. Jefferson insisted that West 
Pointers be civil engineers first, soldiers second. West 
Point curricula reflected that desire. Basics included 
mathematics, heavy on geometry and calculus, and science, 
which included geology and mineralogy, all of which 
prepared cadets for engineering careers. Army instruction 
took second place. While cadets learned army field 
maneuvers and artillery procedures early in their studies, 
tactics did not appear until the cadets' last year, and 
then in a course called ''Military and Civil Engineering 
and the Science of War.'' Instructor Dennis Hart Mahan, 
who had graduated first in the class of 1824, based his 
military lectures on French military thought. Mahan had 
studied in France for four years after graduating from West 
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Point and, in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, American 
officers considered France the seat of military knowledge. 
Indeed, West Point emphasized French as a foreign language. 
Still, the amount of time Mahan devoted to strategy and 
tactics was brief; only one week out of the one-year 
course. The rest of the time he talked about civil 
engineering, architecture, and building fortifications. In 
short, if any of the West Pointers who would command Civil 
War armies wanted to know mid-nineteenth century staff 
theory, they were going to have to learn it on their own. 28 
If an American general was inclined to such study, the 
information was available. Thiebault's staff manual was 
widely translated, and in fact Prussians had used it in 
making their own staff reforms. In 1809 Thiebault's 
compilation crossed the Atlantic and appeared in The 
American Military Library. Jomini's The Art of War was 
also widely circulated. In 1846, Henry Halleck published 
Elements of Military Art and Science; or, Course of 
Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battles 
&c; Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, 
Artillery, and Engineers. While he mainly recounted staff 
developments in Europe rather than recommend staff 
improvements for the United States Army, he did suggest 
more than twenty books treating staff work. The books on 
the list, which included Thiebault, Jomini, and 
Scharnhorst's Handbuch fur offiziere, were all foreign and 
therefore may have been little help to all but the most 
linguistically adept of American officers. 29 
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Soon after the Civil War began, however, American 
commanders had available some specific information, in 
English, about staff function. Captain G. H. Mendell, of 
the United States corps of topographical engineers, and 
Lieutenant William P. Craighill, an assistant professor of 
engineering at West Point, translated Jomini's The Art of 
War and published it in early 1862. That same year 
Craighill published Army Officer's Pocket Companion, which 
he intended to perform the same function for American 
officers as the handbook Aide-memoire did for French 
officers. Indeed, Craighill based his lengthy section on 
staff usage entirely on the French model. With the duties 
of personal staffs uncodified, and with no equivalent to 
the French Staff Corps or the Prussian Great General Staff 
to provide guidelines, Craighill included a lengthy chapter 
detailing the organization and duties of French staffs 
circa 1860. He hoped field commanders would see the value 
in copying the French system. Craighill listed the duties 
of chiefs of staff, which varied little from Berthier's 
day; he included items which required staff attention, and 
he explained the duties of French staffers in camp and in 
battle. Emphasizing the clerical side of personal staff 
work, Craighill told American staffers exactly how to keep 
headquarters records and draft orders and correspondence. 30 
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So, by the start of the American Civil War, an 
alternative existed to personal staff officers who were 
nothing more than office clerics. The French and Prussian 
armies had expanded the roles of personal staffers decades 
earlier. In those countries national general staffs 
trained staff officers in government warmaking policy and 
objectives. Those personal staff officers then became 
partners in battle with army Ct>'ml1\anders. The United States 
War Department embraced none of the European personal staff 
improvements; neither did the Confederate war Department, 
for that matter, for the South based its staff systems on 
the North's. Still, all Civil War generals had personal 
staffs. The information about European staff usage was 
available to them, if they chose to read it. In truth, 
though, with no government guidelines, the character and 
quality of personal staff work in an American Civil War 
army depended-.. ent irely on its commander. 
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CHAPTER II 
McCLELLAN: HESITATION 
Perhaps more than any other American Civil War 
commander, Major General George B. McClellan was the best 
prospect for expanding the duties of his personal staff. 
An able West Point student, McClellan was a bright officer, 
and he gave the Army of the Potomac, the Union's main 
eastern army, the efficient organizational structure that 
carried it through more than three years of war. Before 
that, on a tour of Europe during the Crimean War, McClellan 
saw many of the modern European military staffs in action. 
Staff historian James Hittle says such a background should 
have made McClellan an American staff innovator, and he 
blames McClellan, along with his predecessors in high 
command, for not introducing ''a staff system that at least 
reflected some of the progressive thought of the 
Prussians.'' Historian Edward Hagerman also condemns 
McClellan for the oversight. 1 But they are too hasty, for 
in fact, a glimmer of progressive thought .shows through 
McClellan's staff usage. Hesitation marks that 




George Brinton McClellan was born December 3, 1826, to 
a prominent Philadelphia doctor, George McClellan, and his 
wife Elizabeth. Young George attended private schools, 
where he became conversant in Latin and French. By the 
time he was eleven, George entered the University of 
Pennsylvania's preparatory school, and two years later he 
entered the university to study law. The boy lost interest 
in that profession, however, an.d .. George's father secured 
him an appointment to West Point. He entered the academy 
in 1842 at the age of fifteen, one of the school's youngest 
cadets. McClellan was an able student, but he was 
frequently lazy in his studies. One professor described 
him as ''well educated, and, when he chose to be, 
brilliant.'' McClellan chose to be just brilliant enough 
to graduate second in his West Point class of 1846. 
McClellan habitually studied military topics after his 
graduation, but __ the extent to which he read the available 
literature on staff theory is impossible to know. 2 
More than any other future general from West Point, 
McClellan had an excellent chance to learn about modern 
staff work from its practicing masters, the Europeans. 
After graduation, McClellan served in the Mexican War. 
Then, making the army his career, he accompanied an 
exploration party searching for the mouth of the Red River, 
and he served briefly on the West Coast. In April 1855, 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis appointed McClellan, now a 
cavalry captain, to a three-man military commission that 
would observe European armies fighting in the Crimea. 
McClellan's traveling companions would be Major Richard 
Delafield, of the West Point class of 1818, and Major 
Alfred Mordecai, class of 1823; the party became· known as 
the ''Delafield Commission,'' for the senior major. 3 
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By the time the commission left the United States, 
allied British, French, and Turkish armies were besieging 
Russian troops at the Black Sea port of Sevastopol. The 
officers hoped to visit the positions of all the 
combatants, and British authorities in London readily gave 
their consent. French officials in Paris, however, fearing 
the Americans would divulge information, refused them 
access to French works unless they promised not to visit 
the Russian lines. The commission refused and journeyed to 
St. Petersburg hoping to get better terms from the 
Russians. Instead they got delays, and while waiting for 
an answer McClellan and his companions travelled through 
Russia and Prussia, getting a first-hand look at the 
military organizations of those countries. The Americans 
finally got word that, like France, Russia would not allow 
them access to their lines if they intended to then visit 
the allies. The Americans gave up and decided to visit 
only allied works, but by the time they reached Sevastopol 
the siege was over. Some fighting continued, and the 
Delafield commission got a chance to see not only the 
Allied troops in action, but the evacuated Russian works as 
well. Following the war, the Delafield Commission 
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travelled back across Europe inspecting Austrian, Prussian, 
French, and British fortifications. 4 
Back home, in 1856, McClellan wrote his report of the 
Delafield Commission's trip. It included a detailed 
account of the siege of Sevastopol, accounts of European 
army organizations, and a proposal for an American cavalry 
manual, which McClellan had adapted from a Russian manual. 
McClellan also included his recommendation for a light 
cavalry saddle, which the army adopted and used well into 
the twentieth century. 5 
McClellan, however, did not discuss the nature of 
European staff work. He briefly listed the numbers of 
officers on the general staffs of the various armies he 
visited, but he did not comment on staff operations. 5 If 
McClellan had given any thought to staff usage, he gave no 
hint of it in his Delafield Commission report. 
In early 1857, McClellan left the army and accepted an 
executive position with the Illinois Central railroad; 
McClellan apparently used little military organizational 
expertise in the job, which itself did not affect his later 
army staff organization. By the late 1850s, large American 
railroads were realizing that operations ran better when a 
central headquarters staff controlled them. But railroads 
charted their own paths toward staff organization and 
usually did not borrow expertise from outside 
organizations, such as the United States Army. Historian 
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., notes that, ''Of the pioneers in 
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the new managerial methods, only two--[George W.] Whistle:r 
and McClellan--had military experience, and they were the 
least innovative of the lot.'' Chandler reports, though, 
that centralized staff management did not become standard 
among :railroads until the 1880s, and most small railroads 
operated effectively until then without it. 7 McClellan 
might, then, be excused for not taking staff oiganizational 
skills back to the army with him. 
When the Civil War began in April 1861, McClellan 
again offered his services to the United States Army. On 
April 23, McClellan accepted command of volunteers in Ohio; 
on May 3 the War Department gave McClellan command of the 
Department of the Ohio, which included Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, and later parts of Pennsylvania, western 
Virginia, and Missouri. Within two weeks McClellan 
received another honor when his political sponsor, Ohio 
politician and secretary of the treasury Salmon P. Chase, 
secured for him a major generalship in the regular army. 8 
One of McClellan's first tasks was building his 
personal staff. McClellan told Brevet Lieutenant General 
Winfield Scott, general-in-chief of all United States 
armies, that he needed ··a first rate Adjutant General and 
two good Aides de Camp.'' For the first position, 
McClellan wanted his friend Major Fitz-John Porter, who had 
graduated from West Point a year before McClellan, or, as a 
second choice, Captain Seth Williams, a West Point graduate 
in 1842. For the aide spots, McClellan requested recent 
West Point graduates First Lieutenant William A. Webb and 
Second Lieutenant Henry W. Kingsbury.' 
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In an episode which caused McClellan's first 
disagreement with army high command, Winfield Scott allowed 
McClellan to have only Seth Williams out of the men he 
requested. McClellan could be satisfied with Williams, for 
they had been friends since serving in the Mexican War 
together. Williams had made a career for himself in the 
adjutant-general's department of the small peacetime 
army.io A native of Maine, Williams was a devout Yankee 
Christian who disliked talking about things military on 
Sunday. He talked with a lisp and added an extra ''r'' to 
words in the New England style; he pronounced his general's 
name ''Merklellan.'' Williams would prove an able 
adjutant. He remained at the headquarters of the Army of 
the Potomac long after McClellan left, and he ultimately 
took a spot on Ulysses s. Grant's special staff late in the 
war.ii 
McClellan specifically wanted regular army Colonel 
Randolph B. Marcy for his chief of staff, and he bypassed 
Winfield Scott, appealing directly to President Abraham 
Lincoln to get him. McClellan won his request, and he was 
quite happy, for he had a special reason for wanting Marcy-
-he was McClellan's father-in-law. McClellan had met the 
colonel in early 1852 when Marcy led the Red River 
exploratory expedition. McClellan met Marcy's daughter, 
Mary Ellen (often called Nell), after the expedition and 
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began a long courtship. They were married May 22, 1860, in 
New York; McClellan's future adjutant Seth Williams was a 
groomsman. 12 
But McClellan's selection of Marcy as his chief was 
not simply nepotism. Marcy, a West Point graduate in 1832, 
was a respected and capable officer. After the Red River 
expedition, Marcy had led other exploratory marches in the 
West. In 1857 he commanded a column in the so-called 
''Mormon War.'' The column had become snowbound in the 
Rocky Mountains, but Marcy's cool persistence kept his men 
from freezing to death. By 1859, Marcy had become such an 
expert on the West that the War Department requested him to 
write a guidebook for westward travelers. The result, The 
Prairie Traveler, became a classic of the era, not only 
detailing western routes but describing the hardships of 
travel in the West. 13 
Historians Hagerman and Hittle say one of McClellan's 
true staff improvements was to appoint a chief of staff. 
Hagerman comments that, ''McClellan ... modified 
prevailing staff procedures with the appointment of a chief 
of staff ..• , a concession to continental staff theory 
not included in his pre-war writing. Whether European 
precedent or common sense influenced this decision is open 
to question.'' Hittle writes that this started ''some 
semblance of staff functioning . as all orders were 
usually issued by the chief of staff.'' 14 Those writers 
ignore one thing, however--all Civil War commanders at 
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corps level and above had chiefs of staff; the position was 
nothing new in 1861. Any improvement would be in how 
McClellan used Marcy as his chief. 
By the time McClellan was ready to take his army into 
the field in July 1861, he had his first personal staff 
established. In addition to Marcy--acting as an inspector 
general, his appointment as chief of staff not yet 
official--and Seth Williams, Mc...C1ellan had as aides-de-camp 
Captain Lawrence A. Williams, West Point class of 1852 and 
presently of the Tenth Infantry, and Colonel Thomas M. Key. 
McClellan often referred to Key as ''Judge Key,'' for he 
was a former Cincinnati commercial court judge. 1 s 
McClellan first took his army into western Virginia to 
push Confederate troops from that unionist area. From the 
field near Buckhannon, Virginia, on July 7, 1861, McClellan 
described briefly camp life for his wife. He said 
headquarters was on a hill just outside of town. ''Your 
father and I share the same tent,'' McClellan said. ''Seth 
has one nearby as an office. Lawrence Williams another as 
office and mess tent. Marcy, the two Williams, Judge Key, 
and [Brigadier General Frederick W.] Lander [of McClellan's 
special staff] mess with me. [Lieutenant Orlando M.] Poe 
[also of the special staff] and the rest of the youngsters 
are in tents near by.'' 16 
McClellan's first engagement of the war was July 11 at 
Rich Mountain in western Virginia. Trying to get 
Confederate General Roberts. Garnett's small army out of 
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that hill country, McClellan sent Brigadier General William 
s. Rosecrans and 2,000 men to smash into a detachment of 
Garnett's army. Rosecrans succeeded, forcing the surrender 
of 555 Rebels two days later. Judge Key helped arrange the 
surrender. McClellan was supposed to follow up with an 
attack toward Beverly, Virginia, but failed to do so. 
Nevertheless, he occupied Beverly the next day, and, on 
July 13, detachments of his army killed Garnett and drove 
Rebels out of the area. McClellan's campaign gave the 
Union control of western Virginia and its important rivers 
and rail lines. Even though the combat victories actually 
belonged to Rosecrans and Brigadier General T. A. Morris, 
another McClellan subaltern, McClellan took all the 
credit. 17 
After the Battle of Rich Mountain, McClellan hinted at 
one of the ways he intended to use Colonel Marcy--as a 
liaison who could make sure authorities in Washington 
understood his wants. McClellan sent Marcy to the capital 
to deliver captured Confederate battle flags and visit with 
General-in-Chief Winfield Scott. In a letter of 
introduction, McClellan explained that Marcy was in ''full 
possession of my views and [can] communicate them better 
orally than I can on paper.'' Marcy told Scott that 
McClellan thought a campaign through Kentucky, Western 
Tennessee, and northern Alabama would be ''decisive of the 
war.'' Marcy also visited Colonel E. D. Townsend, 
assistant adjutant general, and gave him McClellan's report 
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of operations. Then Marcy told Townsend that McClellan 
wanted another brigade of regular infantry and some 
companies of regular cavalry to continue his operations in 
the field. Asking authorities for more troops would become 
a hallmark of Marcy's work for McClellan. 1 • 
McClellan's victory in western Virginia impressed 
Abraham Lincoln enough that, within a month, the p~esident 
had brought McClellan to Washington D.C. to command the 
Army of the Potomac. The army had fallen into 
disorganization and demoralization after Brigadier General 
Irvin McDowell led it to defeat at the Battle of Bull Run 
on July 21. Lincoln supposed McClellan might be the man to 
whip it back into shape. 
McClellan took with him personal staff officers Marcy, 
Seth Williams, Lawrence Williams, and Judge Key. He soon 
added others. Captain Albert V. Colburn became McClellan's 
second assistant adjutant general, and Captain Nelson B. 
Sweitzer, of the First Cavalry, and Captain Edward McKee 
Hudson, Fourteenth Infantry, became aides de camp. 19 
Hudson, Sweitzer, and Colburn were all West Point graduates 
from the classes of 1849, 1853, and 1855 respectively. 20 
Even though the war was young, some of the new men on 
McClellan's staff were experienced. Colburn, an adjutant 
in the First Cavalry, had gotten his first assignment even 
before the war started. In March 1861, the War Department 
dispatched the First Cavalry to forts Cobb, Arbuckle, and 
Washita in Indian Territory to protect loyal Indians. 
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Colburn had charge of the regiment's records. At Bull Run, 
by then a captain, Colburn commanded a two-company squadron 
of cavalry. 21 Lieutenant Edward McKee Hudson had been part 
of a 200-man relief expedition under former Navy officer 
Captain G. V. Fox that Abraham Lincoln intended to relieve 
Fort Sumter in April. Events, of course, precluded that 
expedition. Later, in July, Hudson command.ed a section of 
artillery that clashed with rebels near a ford of the 
Potomac River. 22 
If the men of McClellan's personal staff helped the 
general rebuild the Army of the Potomac, there is little 
evidence. McClellan's correspondence in neither the 
Official Records nor his papers mentions his personal staff 
officers in late summer 1861. To be sure, the staffers had 
jobs to do, and no doubt it dealt with army organization. 
In September, McClellan made Marcy's appointment as chief 
of staff official, saying European armies fully recognized 
the importance of the office, but American militarists 
virtually ignored it. He said, vaguely, that Marcy 
''entered upon service immediately, discharging the various 
and important duties with great fidelity, industry, and 
ability. 1123 The bulk of reshaping the Army of the Potomac 
and establishing Washington's defenses, however, probably 
proceeded by dint of McClellan's will. 
Soon McClellan got another jump in command. Since 
arriving in Washington, McClellan had clashed with Winfield 
Scott. McClellan, coveting Scott's job as general-in-
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chief, insisted the hero of both the War of 1812 and the 
Mexican War was too old now to command. McClellan would 
not cooperate with Scott, and he refused to update Scott on 
developments within the Army of the Potomac. McClellan's 
opponents insisted he prosecute the war more vigorously, 
but McClellan said Scott stood in his way. McClellan's own 
troops came to believe that, and rumors abounded that the 
army would turn on Washington if McClellan did not replace 
Scott. Finally, in October, Scott submitted his 
resignation; McClellan, not yet thirty-five, would ·become 
general-in-chief on November 1, 1861. 24 
If McClellan had intended to copy a European style of 
staff usage, it would soon have become evident. As 
general-in-chief, he commanded not just the Army of the 
Potomac (of which Lincoln left him in literal command; ''I 
can do it all,'' McClellan told the president), but also 
every United States land force from Washington to 
California. In Prussia, staff officers from the Great 
General Staff, well versed in the policy and wishes of the 
national army headquarters, were attached to every Prussian 
army in the field. There they could help field commanders 
direct concerted operations and bring about unified 
results. When McClellan took over as general-in-chief, his 
headquarters, in effect, became national headquarters. It 
would have been obvious for a learned commander who had 
seen first-hand the organization of the Prussian General 
Staff, to verse his staff officers with his military 
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theories, expectations, and hopes and dispatch them to 
wide-ranging field commands where they could help 
orchestrate simultaneous campaigns. McClellan did not. 
The same dearth of information about his staff officers 
that appears in McClellan's correspondence for late summer 
1861 also characterizes his writings while general-in-
chief. At any rate, if he had been inclined to expan,d his 
staff's duties, McClellan actually had little time to do 
it. In March 1862 Lincoln took the general-in-chief's job 
away from McClellan so he could concentrate solely on his 
Peninsula Campaign, an attack on Richmond via a peninsula 
of land extending east from the Rebel capital to the 
Chesapeake Bay. 
The only thing certain about McClellan's staff during 
his tenure as general-in-chief was that it kept growing. 
Before he was through, McClellan had fashioned a personal 
staff that resembled a royal court more than an American 
army headquarters. On November 18, 1861, McClellan wrote 
his wife that, after visiting with a number of dignitaries, 
''I had to see Mr. Astor of New York.'' Then, almost as an 
aside McClellan added, ''and CI] appointed him a volunteer 
aide.'' Mr. Astor was John Jacob Astor, Jr., son of the 
late fur-trading millionaire. Astor's only apparent 
qualification to be a staff aide, other than money, was 
that he had chaired a committee to purchase arms and 
ammunition for the Union at the outbreak of the war. 
Later, after Lincoln had fired McClellan from command, 
Astor was one of a group of men who gave the McClellans a 
house in New York City. Accepting the house, McClellan 
called it an expression of ''personal regard.' 125 
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McClellan also added to this staff, as aides-de-camp, 
real members of French royalty. The Due de Chartres, known 
as Robert d'Orleans, and the Comte de Paris, Louis Philippe 
d'Orleans, both members of the exiled French House of 
Orleans, had attached themselves to the Army of the Potomac 
even before McClellan became general-in-chief. The men 
were pretenders to the French throne and had as constant 
escort their uncle, the Prince de Joinville. McClellan 
said he was tempted to add the prince as an aide, for he 
frequently accompanied the general. Robert D'Orleans saw 
action on February 7, 1862, when he rode with five 
squadrons of cavalry to clear a road of Rebel pickets. In 
a sharp firefight, one of D'Orleans' companions was shot in 
the head. Wh~l!_the fight was over, the cavalry commander 
thanked D'Orleans for his ''coolness, assistance, and 
advice.' 126 
By the time McClellan was ready to depart on the 
Peninsula Campaign in late March 1862, his personal staff 
had grown to a whopping twenty men. Fleshing out the staff 
were Colonel Edward H. Wright, aide de camp, a major in the 
Sixth Cavalry and former secretary to the American ministry 
in St. Petersburg, Russia; and Colonel Thomas T. Gantt, 
aide-de-camp and judge advocate general. McClellan also 
assigned as aides-de-camp Lieutenant Colonel Paul von 
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Radowitz, Major Herbert von Hammerstein, Major W. W. 
Russell, of the Marines, and Major F. Lecompte, of the 
Swiss Army. A host of captains also joined McClellan's 
headquarters as aides-de-camp. They included George A. 
Custer, Joseph Kirkland, Martin T. McMahon, William P. 
Mason, Jr., William F. Biddle, E. A. Raymond, and Arthur 
McClellan, the general's brother. Of this last group, only 
Custer, class of 1861, was a West Pointer. Before the 
campaign ended, McClellan had lost Lecompte and gained as 
aides Captains W. S. Abert and Charles R. Lowell. At the 
close of the campaign, Gantt, Astor, Russell, Robert and 
Louis Phillipe D'Orleans, and Raymond left the command. 27 
The Peninsula Campaign was McClellan's second attempt 
that spring at a large assault on Richmond. The first had 
ended in failure in February, even before it started, and 
prompted Lincoln to remove McClellan from the general-in-
chief's job. McClellan called it the ''Urbanna plan;'' he 
would land an army at Urbanna, Virginia, near the mouth of 
the Rappahannock River, then march overland and capture 
Richmond. To effect the plan, McClellan first had to clear 
the Shenandoah Valley of Confederates. Any Union army 
going into the valley, however, needed a supply line, and 
McClellan proposed a permanent bridge across the Potomac 
River, built on pontoon boats. Engineers floated the boats 
to the site on the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, intending to 
pass them to the Potomac through locks. Only when the 
boats arrived did engineers discover they were six inches 
too wide to pass through the locks. 
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McClellan cancelled the campaign. Calling it a 
''damned fizzle,'' Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton said 
it looked as if McClellan intended to do nothing. Lincoln 
had long been exasperated with McClellan's lack of 
aggression. Now McClellan's chief, Marcy, found himself 
back on Lincoln's carpet, not at McClellan's behest but at 
the president's. 
Lincoln did not let Marcy speak. ''Why in the Nation 
. couldn't the general have known whether a boat would 
go through that lock before spending a million dollars 
getting them there?'' thundered Lincoln, saying he thought 
McClellan would have the common sense to measure the boats 
first. ''I am almost despairing at these results,'' said 
Lincoln. He dismissed Marcy before the soldier could offer 
an explanation. 28 
Hesitation had marked McClellan's tenure as commander 
of the Army of the Potomac. It also marked his personal 
staff usage, for he had done little of import with his 
staff officers. That began to change when McClellan 
embarked on the Peninsula Campaign. The change was almost 
imperceptible, to be sure, but it was present nonetheless. 
The Peninsula Campaign was an agonizingly slow push to 
the gates of Richmond; in the end, it was a failure. In 
late March McClellan assembled his 70,000-man army on 
boats, floated them down the Potomac River from Washington 
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and into the Chesapeake Bay. In early April the army 
debarked at Fortress Monroe, on the tip of the Virginia 
peninsula. Southern General Joseph E. Johnston had overall 
command of Rebel troops protecting Richmond, but when 
McClellan's men arrived he had only 17,000 troops, under 
General John B. Magruder, on the Peninsula at Yorktown. 
McClellan's army drew up before Yorktown on April 5, but 
instead of attacking, the overcautious commander resorted 
to an unnecessary siege. Magruder stayed in his flimsy 
fortifications until McClellan had wasted a month digging 
siege lines and positioning heavy guns. By the time 
Magruder slipped out of the lines on May 3, Johnston had 
brought 40,000 more Confederate troops to the Peninsula. 
Claiming a brilliant, bloodless victory, McClellan occupied 
Yorktown, then pushed ahead to Williamsburg. There, 
Federals caught up with Johnston's rear guard, the main 
Confederate army retreating to Richmond, and a day-long 
fight erupted May 5. Federals occupied Williamsburg on May 
6, then pushed on toward Richmond. In the meantime, 
General Irvin McDowell's corps of 35,000, left behind to 
protect Washington, headed south to join McClellan's right 
flank so that, by the end of May when he reached Richmond, 
McClellan could count 100,000 troops at his command. 
The Army of the Potomac was but five miles outside 
Richmond, split north and south by the Chickahominy River, 
when Johnston finally launched a counteroffensive. The 
Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 and June 1, was a fierce but 
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confused fight on both sides. Men struggled through swamps 
and woods, and unit commanders lost control of the fight. 
When it was over, neither army had done much but lose men; 
Federals suffered 5,000 casualties, Rebels 6,000. 
McClellan, with overpowering strength, had been too timid 
to take Richmond. Johnston, on the other hand, had been 
unable to unseat McClellan. In the greatest consequence of 
the battle, Johnston suffered wounds that made him 
relinquish command. Within a day Confederate President 
Jefferson Davis gave command of the army to his top 
military advisor, General Robert E. Lee. 
The Army of the Potomac lingered near Richmond. Over 
the next several weeks, Lee took advantage of McClellan's 
idleness to refit the Southern army, which he dubbed the 
Army of Northern Virginia. On June 25 he was ready to 
initiate his own campaign to drive the Federals from 
Richmond. The counteroffensive became known as the Battle 
of the Seven Days, with fighting at Oak Grove, June 25, 
Mechanicsville, June 26; Gaines' Mill, June 27; Savage's 
Station, June 29; Frayser's Farm, June 30; and Malvern 
Hill, July 1. Casualties were staggering, with 
Confederates losing 3j286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 946 
missing. Federals lost 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 
6,053 missing. Lee did not destroy the Army of the 
Potomac, in fact he lost at Malvern Hill, but he forced 
McClellan to retreat to the James River, thus ending the 
Federal threat to Richmond for the present. McClellan 
called his retreat simply a ''change of base,'' but in 
truth the Peninsula Campaign was over. McClellan had 
started his retreat to Washington. 29 
43 
Although the Peninsula Campaign was another fizzle, to 
use Secretary of War Stanton's words, McClellan showed a 
glimmer of enlightened European staff usage on the 
Peninsula. Still, like the campaign itself, McClellan's 
staff assignments were tentative. At the outset, as 
McClellan was switching from the Urbanna to the Peninsula 
plan, he detailed John Jacob Astor, Jr., to keep records of 
all information regarding transports. That way McClellan 
would ''always know the exact conditions of the transports 
and their locality.' 130 
No matter how it ended, the Peninsula Campaign was a 
massive feat of organization and logistics. Naturally, the 
men of McClellan's special staff--the quartermaster 
general, commissary, and ordnance officers--coordinated 
transportation and supply. But the combat forces of the 
Army of the Potomac could never have marched without clear, 
concise orders from headquarters. McClellan's first 
assistant adjutant general, Seth Williams, handled that 
chore. 
Throughout the Army of the Potomac's time in Virginia, 
Williams wrote most of the general and special orders that 
kept the army running. Williams, of course, did not 
originate the orders; McClellan did. But Williams wrote 
understandable orders, made enough copies for the necessary 
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field commanders, and saw that they safely reached their 
destination. The orders Williams drafted were mundane but 
crucial to the performance of the army. For instance, 
before the army had debarked in Virginia, Williams issued 
orders outlining leave and furlough policy for enlisted 
men. Those same orders gave division commanders 
responsibility for policing and disciplining soldiers; 31 in 
Europe, such provost duties belD,nged to a member of the 
commanding general's personal.staff. 
As the campaign wore on, Williams issued new orders to 
division commanders to curtail rampant depredations against 
Southern civilians. Stealing had gotten out of hand after 
the army left Yorktown, Williams wrote. He added that 
anyone caught stealing would be ''placed in irons, tried by 
a military commission, and punished to the extent of the 
law.11:12 
In addition to issuing written orders, Williams also 
issued regular verbal orders as well, and he had a strict 
system for doing so. Williams required commanders of 
corps, unattached divisions, and detachments to have 
messengers present at his office at 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. 
daily to receive orders. Each day at noon, Williams wanted 
a staff officer from corps and detached headquarters to 
meet with him for orders. Williams also ordered that, 
after every march, corps and unattached unit commanders, or 
a representative staff officer, were to come to his 
headquarters and report the locations of their 
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headquarters. Finally, Williams wanted all the commanders 
of the various special staff departments to report to him 
after each march for orders. The system enabled the 
assistant adjutant general to stay in constant contact with 
field commanders. 33 Williams' system looked like a mixture 
of the duties which Berthier's ''general staff'' performed 
for Napoleon. Williams probably was not attempting to copy 
a Napoleonic system, however; his regulati.ons stemmed more 
from his own regimented mind and a need to bring 
administrative order to the large army. 
Williams, and his assistant, Albert V. Colburn, also 
issued immediate orders of march to field commanders, and 
they used a topographical bureau to help them. For 
example, as the army moved from Williamsburg on May 6 and 
7, Williams sent Fourth Corps commander Major General 
Erasmus D. Keys orders to send a brigade to a specified 
point. Williams did not write out the brigade's 
destination, but he enclosed a map with the destination 
marked ''A.'' Colburn sent similar orders to Colonel 
George A.H. Blake, commanding a brigade of cavalry. He 
enclosed a map with ''all the information in possession of 
the topographical bureau at these headquarters with regard 
to the region in question.'' 34 
The presence of a ''topographical bureau'' at 
McClellan's headquarters is interesting. None of 
McClellan's correspondence regarding staff composition, 
however, reveal who was in charge of the bureau or who 
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worked in it. Napoleon had made topographical mapping a 
function of his ''cabinet,'' and members of Berthier's 
special staff had distributed maps to field units, so the 
notion of having a topographical bureau at headquarters was 
not new. Whether McClellan considered it special or 
personal staff duty is unclear. 
Colburn proved as industrious as Williams. In a 
letter to his wife, McClellan said Colburn rarely left his 
side. ''He is one of the very best men I ever knew,'' 
wrote McClellan. He commented that Colburn was ''perfectly 
untiring. Day and night are about the same to him ... 
'' Hard work, nevertheless, took its toll. In another, 
almost whimsical, letter to Nell, McClellan described a 
night at headquarters, which the general called a deserted 
''secesh'' hut, before Yorktown. ''Colburn is copying a 
long letter--Seth, standing by the fire, looking very 
sleepy .... I am sorry to say that your Father is 
snoring loudly in a corner.•• 3 s 
Other members of McClellan's staff were also busy with 
varied duties. The French ''royals'' carried orders to 
different parts of the field, and Robert D'Orleans once 
directed two companies of infantry to their destination. 
Louis Philippe, Robert D'Orleans, and Prince de Joinville 
were with Fifth Corps commander Major General Fitz-John 
Porter throughout the Battle of Gaines' Mill during the 
Seven Days fighting. The Due delivered special 
instructions for troop placement from McClellan to the 
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Fourth New Jersey Infantry, and Joinville helped reorganize 
part of Brigadier General Dan Butterfield's brigade after 
Confederates attacked it. Later, Joinville directed the 
fire of Battery A, New Jersey Light Artillery. Lieutenant 
Colonel Paul von Radowitz and Major Herbert Hammerstein 
also helped Porter that day. Without citing their duties, 
Porter thanked McClellan's staffers for their ''courage and 
energy [which was] conspicuous among many brave men on 
[ the 1 field. ' ' 3 6 
Other McClellan staffers also did varied duty. 
Hammerstein and Nelson B. Sweitzer conducted reconnaissance 
for McClellan on May 6, the day following the Williamsburg 
fight, and Colonel E. H. Wright helped position regiments 
in intrenchments following the Fair Oaks battle. On June 
25, the first day of Lee's offensive, Hammerstein helped 
Brigadier General Daniel Sickles rally a portion of his 
Second Brigade, Second Division, who were fleeing their 
positions in panic. Colonel Edward McKee Hudson and 
Captain William P. Mason, Jr., assisted Army of the Potomac 
chief engineer Brigadier General John G. Barnard lay out 
Union lines at Malvern Hill on July 1 before the final 
battle of the Seven Days, and Captain Martin T. McMahon was 
with Sixth Corps commander Brigadier General William B. 
Franklin during at least part of the Seven Days. Franklin 
congratulated McMahon and others for ''bravely carrying 
orders under the most trying circumstances.'' 37 
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On the Peninsula McClellan was expanding staff duty by 
sending his aides into the field to help unit commanders. 
Their help was no doubt valuable and won the appreciation 
of combat commanders. But to say McClellan was seeking a 
European model of staff work would only be partly correct. 
McClellan gives no hint that he was following a cogent plan 
for his staffers. He did not brief the men with his views 
or give them authority to issue orders in his absence. 
Frequently the men became just an extra pair of hands or 
another courier, passing along orders from McClellan, or 
carrying orders for the commanders they were assisting. 
They never acted in an advisory capacity, which would have 
made them an extension of McClellan in the field. 
McClellan was only knocking at the door of expanded staff 
duty. 
At the siege of Yorktown, however, McClellan did show 
a hint of modern staff usage. On April 27, three weeks 
after the siege began, McClellan appointed General Fitz-
John Porter, then a division commander in the Third Corps, 
as ''director of the siege'' and gave Porter two of his own 
staff aides, Captains Joseph Kirkland and William P. Mason, 
as siege assistants. Porter said he received the 
appointment ''for reasons known only to the major general 
commanding.'' McClellan did have a reason. Siege work was 
not chief of staff Marcy's specialty, and ''he cannot 
assist me in siege operations,'' said McClellan. McClellan 
wanted all generals in the trenches to report directly to 
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Porter instead of Marcy, and Porter was to report in person 
to McClellan or Marcy at least twice daily to receive 
instructions. ''I (will] give all my orders relating to 
the siege through ... (PorterJ--making him at the same 
time commandant of the siege operations and a chief of 
staff for that portion of the work.'' McClellan added that 
the new arrangement ''will save me much trouble, relieve my 
mind greatly and save much time. 1138 
Why McClellan gave Porter the job so late into the 
siege only McClellan knew. And never mind that the siege 
was useless to begin with; McClellan's troops could have 
easily pushed Magruder from Yorktown. What is important is 
that McClellan was trying to use a modern staff 
organization to handle an extra burden, and free him to 
attend operational matters. McClellan was not so much 
detaching staffers Kirkland and Mason to work with Porter, 
he was temporarily adding Porter: to his own staff. 
McClellan said as much when he referred to Porter as ''a 
chief of staff'' for: the siege. 
As it worked out, though, Kirkland and Mason became 
permanent members of Porter's staff. Arriving in the 
Yorktown trenches, they toured the works with Porter, 
familiarizing themselves with the siege. In the last days 
of the siege Porter fell ill and had to stay in his tent. 
He relied on Kirkland, Mason, and his own staff officers 
for reports on Union progress and intelligence on enemy 
movements which, said Porter, the men ''obtained often by 
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great exposure to the fire of the enemy.'' When the siege 
ended, Kirkland and Mason did not return to McClellan's 
staff. Whether McClellan officially detached them is 
uncertain, but Porter was soon referring to them as members 
of ''my staff.'' They assisted Porter in a fight at 
Hanover Court House, May 27, and were with him throughout 
the Seven Days. 39 
McClellan used his father-in-law and chief of staff, 
Marcy, extensively as a link between headquarters and field 
commanders. Those men frequently received orders from 
Marcy, not McClellan, on everything from bivouac positions 
to artillery placements and reconnaissance missions. Marcy 
wanted to hear often from field commanders. ''Do not lose 
sight of the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly 
and fully informed of everything which occurs in your 
front,'' he told Fitz-John Port~r. 40 
While Mar£¥ occasionally made spot decisions, he never 
had full rein to issue orders without first checking with 
his son-in-law. Marcy could, without hesitation, direct a 
division of troops to help construct a bridge then cross it 
to support other troops in battle, as he did at Savage's 
station on June 28. But more often his comments left no 
doubt whom the orders were coming from. Marcy used phrases 
such as ''I am directed by the commanding general to say. 
'' or ''the general commanding directs that you ... 
'' Marcy frequently verified orders with McClellan, 41 but 
McClellan never authorized Marcy to speak with the full 
authority of the commanding general. 
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Throughout the Peninsula Campaign and the Seven Days, 
just as he had after the Battle of Rich Mountain, McClellan 
used Marcy to keep the president and secretary of war 
apprised of his situation. Marcy put the best face on all 
of his reports. On May 10, from Yorktown, Marcy wrote 
Stanton that McClellan was on the main road to Richmond--a 
heartening choice of words, considering the time McClellan 
had just wasted at Yorktown--and that gunboats were 
clearing the Pamunky River of sunken Rebel vessels. On May 
28, Marcy sent Stanton a brief report of the Battle of 
Hanover Court House. He called the Union victory 
''decisive,'' and commented that Confederate ••prisoners 
say Cit] will have a demoralizing effect upon their 
army.'' 42 
On June 27, during the Seven Days, McClellan used 
Marcy to break bad news to Washington. Saying Federal 
troops had been fighting all day against superior numbers, 
which they had not, Marcy told Stanton, ··we shall endeavor 
to hold our own, and if compelled to fall back, shall do it 
in good order, upon the James River.'' McClellan was 
planning just such a retreat, and Marcy softened the news 
of 1t by saying the James would be a better supply conduit 
for the army. 4 3 
When the Seven Days' battles ended at Malvern Hill, 
McClellan sent Marcy to Washington to personally request 
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Lincoln and Stanton send him 100,000 more troops so he 
could ··accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond.'' 
Marcy met with Lincoln and Stanton on July 4, and he scared 
Lincoln with the notion that McClellan might have to 
surrender if Lee attacked him again. After their meeting, 
Lincoln gave Marcy a letter to deliver to McClellan saying 
that the most troops,he could send would be about 25,000, 
and them not for a month or six weeks. Marcy sent 
essentially that news to McClellan on July 4, adding that 
Lincoln and Stanton ''speak very kindly of you and find no 
fault.''44 
McClellan would not try to capture Richmond again. 
Having lost faith in McClellan, President Lincoln split up 
the Army of the Potomac and gave most of it to Major 
General John Pope. Pope had won a minor victory in the 
West, and Lincoln had called him to the Virginia theater to 
fight Lee. McClellan remained in command of a skeleton 
force around Washington, but when Lee trounced Pope at the 
Second Battle of Bull Run and invaded the North, Lincoln 
again turned to McClellan. He told the general to 
reorganize the Army of the Potomac and stop Lee. 
In September 1862, Lee crossed his army into Maryland. 
He wanted to move into Pennsylvania but could not leave a 
large Federal garrison at Harper's Ferry in his rear. 
Boldly, Lee split his small force. Part of it, under 
Stonewall Jackson, moved to capture the garrison, and the 
rest continued northward. 
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Groping blindly for Lee in the Maryland countryside, 
McClellan halted the Army of the Potomac near Frederick, 
Maryland, on September 13. On a camp site Lee's army had 
just abandoned, some of McClellan's soldiers found a copy 
of Lee's battle plan, detailing the exact destinations of 
his units. An excited McClellan wired Lincoln that he 
would soon catch Lee; had he moved promptly he could have 
done so. Instead, McClellan moved as timidly as he had on 
the Peninsula, waiting sixteen hours before leaving 
Frederick. McClellan did bring one of the separated pieces 
of Lee's army to battle at South Mountain on September 14, 
and Union troops won the day. But, with a chance to 
destroy Lee's army in detail, McClellan again dawdled, 
wasting September 15 and 16 and allowing the pieces of the 
Army of Norther·n Virginia time to reunite in a defensive 
position at Sharpsburg, Maryland, behind Antietam Creek. 
At dawn on a foggy September 17, McClellan finally 
attacked. His plan, to hit three strategic points of Lee's 
line, was sound enough, but he executed it poorly. Instead 
of smashing the length of Lee's line simultaneously, 
McClellan committed the attacks piecemeal, never bringing 
the full weight of his superior numbers to bear on Lee's 
hard-pressed force. Instead Lee, with the advantage of 
interior lines, could move troops from sector to sector to 
counter McClellan's separate blows. The battlefields 
became legendary: the Cornfield, the East Woods, the 
Bloody Lane, Burnside's Bridge. By evening Lee's men had 
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held fast, but the cost was terrific. Of about 40,000 men 
engaged, estimated Confederate casualties were 2,700 
killed, 9,024 wounded, and 2,000 missing, totaling 13,724. 
Union casualties were estimated at 2,010 killed, 9,416 
wounded, and 1,043 missing, or 12,469 out of about 75,000 
men in battle. 4 ~ 
McClellan never increased staff duties to take 
advantage of the Confederate orders he had found, and, on 
the seventeenth, he did not use his staff officers to 
coordinate his triple attacks. In fact, when Second Corps 
commander Major General Edwin V. ''Bull'' Sumner arrived at 
McClellan's headquarters to complain that the attacks were 
proceeding ''in driblets'' and would do no good, 
McClellan's staffers refused to let him see McClellan. The 
commanding general had been up all night planning the 
battle and was asleep. 46 
McClellan's staff work throughout the campaign was 
unspectacular and varied little from what he had done on 
the Peninsula. Marcy, Colburn, and Seth Williams handled 
the bulk of headquarters correspondence. 47 On the day of 
battle, McClellan dispatched his staffers to accompany 
combat commanders. When Major General Joseph Hooker's 
First Corps opened the battle on Lee's left at dawn, Chief 
of Staff Marcy and Major Herbert Hammerstein joined him. 
When Hooker fell with a wounded foot, Hammerstein notified 
McClellan's headquarters; Marcy soon had orders to put 
Major General George G. Meade in command of Hooker's 
corps. 48 
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On other parts of the field, assistant adjutant 
general Albert Colburn helped direct an artillery battery 
into position, and Captain Martin T. McMahon was present 
with Major General William B. Franklin's Sixth Corps. 
Franklin commended McMahon for his work but did not explain 
what duties he performed. On the southern end of the 
field, McClellan had assigned Major General Ambrose 
Burnside and his Ninth Corps to cross Antietam Creek and 
assail Lee's right. The creek was only knee-deep and 
easily fordable, but Burnside insisted on shoving his men 
across a narrow bridge. They were easy targets for Rebel 
snipers on high ground across the creek, and Burnside 
wasted precious hours trying to cross. Finally, McClellan 
sent aide Thomas M. ''Judge'' Key to urge Burnside along. 
Key arrived about 1 p.m., just as Burnside's men got across 
the river. Riding back to headquarters, Key told McClellan 
that Burnside thought he could hold his position, but 
McClellan sent Key back with orders for Burnside to storm 
Sharpsburg itself. Key also carried orders removing 
Burnside from command if he did not obey. 49 
Antietam was McClellan's last battle. On September 
18, Lee, his army badly cut up but undefeated, waited for 
McClellan to make a move. McClellan had a fresh reserve 
corps with which he could have struck Lee, but he did not. 
Lincoln, exasperated, fired McClellan in November. Marcy 
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remained with the army as an inspector general, and Seth 
Williams remained at its headquarters throughout the war, 
serving as adjutant to McClellan's successors Ambrose 
Burnside, Joseph Hooker, and George Meade.~ 0 McClellan 
retired to New York City to await orders, and he asked the 
War Department to allow ten of his personal staff officers 
to accompany him and help draft reports.~ 1 
For a soldier who had had--such a good opportunity in 
Europe to observe modern military staffs in action, 
McClellan did remarkably little with his own staff. 
Perhaps he did not trust the men. After the Peninsula 
Campaign McClellan told his wife that he had little use for 
the civilians on his staff. ''The most useless thing 
imaginable is one of these 'highly educated' civilians,'' 
he complained, saying they were slow to learn, and he would 
never take on another one. But McClellan did remarkably 
little with the--trained men on his staff. Seth Williams 
ably ran the clerical end of McClellan's headquarters, and 
Randolph Marcy functioned efficiently, within the limits 
McClellan gave him, as a liaison with field officers and 
high command in Washington. The other staff officers, many 
of them West Point trained, were simply couriers in 
shoulder straps. McClellan never used them to coordinate 
battles, he did not give them authority to issue orders in 
his absence, and, as general-in-chief, he did not dispatch 
them to assist in the operation of the various Union armies 
in the field. At times, such as during the siege of 
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Yorktown, McClellan hinted at establishing a modern staff 
organization for his army. In the end, however, he 
hesitated to expand the role of his staff officers, just as 
he hesitated to deliver a crushing blow to the armies of 
the Confederacy. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEE: MATTERS OF ROUTINE 
Robert E. Lee, whom Southerners revered as perhaps 
their greatest general, did nothing during three years of 
fighting to advance personal staff work at his 
headquarters. Lee had a personal staff, and they performed 
well the duties he gave them. But Lee never allowed 
himself a large staff and, unlike European generals, he 
never involved them in operational matters. Until early 
1864, Colonel Robert H. Chilton was Lee's chief of staff. 
Chilton was a chief in name only, performing duties little 
different from that of an assistant adjutant general. When 
attrition took members from his staff, Lee refused to 
replace them, choosing instead to heap excess headquarters 
work on the remaining staff officers. The small character 
of Lee's staff prompted Lee biographer Douglas Southall 
Freeman to comment that no other general ''ever fought a 
campaign comparable to ... [Lee's of 18641 with only 
three men on his staff, and not one of them a professional 
soldier.' ' 1 
Lee was no stranger to staff work. An 1829 graduate 
of West Point, he served as an engineer on General Winfield 
Scott's special staff during the Mexican War. Lee became 
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Scott's right-hand-man, reconnoitering gun placements at 
Veracruz, picking a route over treacherous ground for 
artillery to approach Mexico City, and sighting guns on 
Chapultepec. Lee rose from captain to colonel during the 
war. 2 
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Fifteen years later, as a general himself, Lee was 
cautious about putting together his own staff. An act 
which the Confederate congress passed in the summer of 1861 
allowed generals to request civilians for staff positions 
with the equivalent rank and pay of regular army positions. 
Generals frequently abused the act, however, requesting as 
many volunteer aides-de-camp as they could get. Many of 
those aides were relatives or politicians; few of them had 
the experience required for the job. Lee was not opposed 
to having relatives on staff, as long as they were 
competent and· willing to work, but he decried large numbers 
of aides. While he was building one of his first 
headquarters staffs, Lee told his son, George Washington 
Custis Lee, that he had two experienced aides on his staff 
for the present, but he feared he would soon have to let 
them go. ''I suppose it is in vain for me to expect to 
keep an instructed officer, there is such demand for their 
services with troops,'' Lee said. Realizing that the 
Confederate Army had limited manpower, the fear that he 
might be keeping some officer from duty on the line 
prevented Lee from adequately staffing his headquarters 
throughout the war. 3 
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Lee resigned from the United States Army and offered 
his services to the Confederacy soon after Virginia seceded 
from the Union in May 1861. Lee served briefly as an 
advisor to President Davis in Richmond, and he had a small 
staff to assist him with matters of army mobilization. In 
August 1861, Davis sent Lee with the rank of full general 
to coordinate the efforts of three independent Southern 
forces in northwest Virginia. Political rivals and inept 
military men commanded the forces, however, and Lee's hopes 
for a combined offensive in western Virginia vanished. 4 
Lee took along a staff officer who would ultimately be 
with him until Appomattox--Captain Walter Herron Taylor. 
Taylor was born in 1838 in Norfolk, Virginia. As a boy he 
attended the Norfolk Military Academy, and he enrolled at 
age sixteen at the Virginia Military Academy. His military 
education ended abruptly in 1855, however, when his 
father's death forced him to withdraw.~ Taylor was a 
member of a Virginia militia company when the Civil War 
began, and influential friends landed him a job aiding Lee 
while the general was Davis' advisor. On the trip to 
western Virginia, Taylor and Lieutenant Colonel John A. 
Washington, who had also been on Lee's Richmond staff, were 
Lee's only staff officers. Lee came to know the men well 
as they shared a tent on the expedition. He commented in a 
letter to his wife, Mary, about how Washington knelt in 
prayer morning and night. Tragedy befell the little 
headquarters, when, on September 13, Federal soldiers 
killed Washington when he rode out with Lee's nephew, 
Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, to reconnoiter a position. 6 
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The western Virginia expedition over, Davis assigned 
Lee to command coastal defenses in South Carolina, Georgia, 
and east Florida in late 1861. Taylor went with Lee to 
Charleston where the general put together a headquarters 
staff -that reflected his attitudes about staff composition-
-small and efficient. Lee cast about for members of the 
Lee family who might join his staff, and he asked his son, 
Custis, to recommend someone. However, such a selection 
would have to be mutually acceptable, he told Custis, ''for 
I have so much to attend to, that I must have those with me 
who can be of service.'' 7 
Ultimately, Lee's small staff, seven men in all, 
contained none of his relatives. Captain Thornton A. 
Washington, adjutant general; Taylor, assistant adjutant 
general; and Captain Joseph Manigault, volunteer aide-de-
camp, made up Lee's personal staff. Captain Joseph c. 
Ives, chief engineer, Lieutenant Colonel William G. Gill, 
ordinance officer, a Captain Walker, chief of cavalry, and 
Major Armistead Lindsey Long, chief of artillery, composed 
the special staff.a Washington and Long were West Point 
graduates, Washington in 1849, Long in 1850. 9 
In Armistead Long, a friend of the extended Lee 
family, General Lee made another lasting association. Long 
would switch to Lee's personal staff and serve there until 
taking an artillery line command after the battle of 
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Gettysburg in 1863. Long was previously an officer in the 
United States Army, resigning his commission shortly before 
the first battle of Bull Run in July 1861 to join the 
Confederacy. Long first met Lee at an interview in 
Richmond when Lee was Davis' advisor. Lee's ''grace of 
. bearing and courteous but mild and decided manner'' 
impressed Long. So did Lee's unpretentious attitude. The 
general wore only a grey suit,·-Long noted, and had ''no 
handsomely dressed aides-de-camp or staff officers filling 
the anteroom.'' Only Taylor and some clerks attended 
Lee.io 
Lee was also suitably impressed with Long. He 
commissioned him a major and appointed him chief of 
artillery for General W. w. Loring's Army of Northwest 
Virginia.ii Loring, incidentally, would be one of the 
generals who would complicate Lee's mission to western 
Virginia that August. Long's assignment to Loring was 
short-lived, however; in late November 1861 Long received 
orders to report to General Lee's headquarters in 
Charleston.i 2 
For four months Lee and his staff strengthened the 
coastal defenses of their department, constructing 
batteries and earthworks and fortifying weak points. While 
they saw no battle, Lee and his staff were present for a 
fire that destroyed half of Charleston the night of 
December 11. The men noticed the fire as they crossed the 
Ashley River in a rowboat, but thought little of it. They 
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went to their hotel, the Mills House, and were beginning 
their dinner when they noticed more commotion outside. 
Going to the roof of the hotel, Lee and staff saw that the 
fire was completely out of control and threatening their 
building. Returning downstairs, they found the lower 
levels in chaos as guests tried to escape. Lee and Long 
each carried a baby from the building, while Taylor, Joseph 
Ives, and the wives of Long and Thornton Washington 
followed them outside. Lee and company spent the night at 
a private residence. The fire burned itself out, sparing 
the Mills House, but cutting a great swath between the 
Cooper and Ashley rivers. 13 
Such excitement cemented relationships on the staff, 
and Lee showed a fondness for Long when he took him to 
visit the grave of nis father, Henry ''Light Horse Harry'' 
Lee. The elder Lee was returning from the West Indies in 
1818 when he died near the estate of Revolutionary War 
general Nathanael Greene, on Cumberland Island, Georgia. 
Light Horse Harry was buried in a corner of the Greene 
family cemetery. On their visit, Lee quietly regarded the 
dilapidated condition of the estate, then he and Long 
returned to their boat. 14 
In March 1862, Jefferson Davis called Lee back to 
Richmond, ostensibly to give him command of all Confederate 
armies. Davis did not make Lee ''general-in-chief,'' 
however, because he considered himself a hands-on military 
leader and did not want to lessen his own control of 
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Southern forces. In reality, then, Lee returned to his old 
job as Davis' military advisor. Nevertheless, the 
Confederate Congress approved a staff for Lee, allowing him 
a military secretary, with the rank and pay of a cavalry 
colonel, and four aides-de-camp, with the rank and pay of 
cavalry majors. 15 
Walter Taylor followed his boss to Richmond. As all 
adjutants-general were officially part of the adjutant-
general's department in Richmond and only assigned to field 
commanders, Lee offered Taylor the chance to remain with 
the adjutant-general's office or become one of the new 
aides-de-camp on his staff. Taylor said he would serve 
wherever Lee assigned him, but the general pressed him. 
Taylor said he would rather be an aide, reasoning that the 
job would spare him ''much confinement about headquarters 
and the annoyance and troubl~ of attending to papers and 
routine work, and [I would] be more on the field. 1116 -
Armistead Long stayed in South Carolina for a time, 
but he received orders in May 1862 to join Lee in Richmond. 
He accepted Lee's offer of the military secretary's job and 
became a colonel on Lee's new staff. 17 Lee rounded out his 
staff with majors Thomas Mann Randolph Talcott, Charles 
Marshall, and Charles Scott Venable. In Taylor, Marshall, 
and Venable, Lee had the nucleus of the staff that would 
remain with him for the rest of the war. 
None of Lee's new staff officers were professional 
soldiers, but all were highly intelligent men of Virginia 
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birth. Their intellect and standing in the Commonwealth no 
doubt influenced Lee to place them on his staff. T. M. R. 
Talcott was a family friend of Lee's before the war. 
Talcott's father, Colonel Andrew Talcott, was an engineer 
and one of Lee's old friends. Lee fondly referred to 
Talcott's mother, Harriet Randolph Hackley Talcott, as 
''the Beautiful Talcott.'' The younger Talcott enjoyed 
working mathematical problems and eventually became a 
colonel of engineers in Confederate service. 18 
Venable was born in 1827 in Prince Edward County, 
Virginia, and attended Virginia's Hampden-Sidney College. 
He tutored mathematics there from 1843 to 1845, and in 1856 
he became a professor of natural philosophy at the 
University of Georgia. Venable moved on to South Carolina 
College in Columbia where he taught mathematics from 1857 
to 1860. After the Civil War, Venable would become a 
professor of mathematics at the University of Virginia. 
When the war began Venable volunteered his services to the 
Confederacy and saw action at Bull Run, acting as an aide 
to Captain W. H. Stevens of the engineers. Venable's 
comrades on Lee's staff frequently referred to him as 
''Professor,'' and Confederate artillerist Edward Porter 
Alexander called him a man of ''high type in intellect and 
character.' 119 
Charles Marshall was born in 1830 at Warrenton, 
Virginia, into a family rich in Virginia heritage. His 
great-grandfather, Thomas Marshall, had been commander of 
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the Third Virginia Regiment during the Revolution. Thomas' 
eldest son--Charles' great-uncle--was legendary United 
States Chief Justice John Marshall. Charles Marshall 
received a master's degree from the University of Virginia 
in 1849, taught for a while at the University of Indiana, 
and practiced law in Baltimore shortly before the Civil War 
began. 20 
The staffers labored with Lee in Richmond until a 
threat to the Confederate capital changed their jobs for 
the rest of the war. Throughout the spring, Union Major 
General George B. McClellan and his 100,000-man Army of the 
Potomac had been creeping up the peninsula east of 
Richmond. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston commanded 
the armies defending Richmond, falling back before 
McClellan's advance, almost without a plan. Indeed, 
neither Jefferson Davis nor anyone at Lee's headquarters 
knew Johnston's plans, for the general in the field 
preferred military secrecy to cooperation. Johnston 
finally struck back, in the Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 and 
June 1, the battle which incapacitated him for command. 21 
Near the end of the first day's fighting, a bullet 
struck Johnston in the right shoulder. An instant later a 
shell fragment hit him in the chest and knocked him from 
his horse and out of the battle. Command of the 
Confederate forces fell to General Gustavus w. Smith, but 
he barely knew how to proceed for Johnston had not informed 
Smith of this plans. Soon Davis and Lee, who had ridden 
from Richmond to check on the course of the battle, found 
Smith near nervous exhaustion under the strain of his 
unexpected command. Realizing Smith could not handle the 
defense of Richmond, Davis transferred command to Lee. 22 
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On June 1, at Lee's direction, Walter Taylor issued 
Special Orders Number 22, announcing Lee as general of the 
Confederate army before Richmond. Writing for Lee, Taylor 
said the new commander regretted the loss of Johnston and 
encouraged Rebel soldiers to continue the fight. Taylor 
said Lee was sure that every soldiers would ''maintain the 
ancient fame of the Army of Northern Virginia and . 
conquer or die in the approaching contest,'' Taylor wrote. 
With that, Lee christened the army, hitherto a collection 
of independent commands, with the name it would carry into 
legend. 23 
Suddenly Lee's staffers were catapulted from aiding a 
military advisor in a Richmond office to assisting a combat 
commander on the field of battle. Lee realized he would 
need additional help at headquarters, and he quickly added 
two new officers to his personal staff. By June 4 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Chilton was at headquarters as 
Lee's chief of staff and principal assistant adjutant 
general, and by June 6 Captain Arthur Pendleton ''Penny'' 
Mason was issuing orders as a second assistant adjutant 
general. 24 
Mason had served General Johnston as assistant 
adjutant general throughout the Peninsula Campaign. After 
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the first day of the Battle of Seven Pines, Mason remained 
at headquarters even after the wounded Johnston and his 
other staffers quit the field. Upon assuming command, Lee 
made Mason his own assistant adjutant. 25 
Chilton had been an assistant adjutant and inspector 
general in the regular Confederate service before Lee chose 
him as his chief. Born in Virginia in 1817, Chilton 
entered West Point in 1833. He--graduated in 1837 among 
future generals Braxton Bragg, John Sedgwick, and Joseph 
Hooker. Chilton served in the First United States Dragoons 
until the Mexican War began in 1846. Then he took a 
position on the staff of General Zachary Taylor. Chilton 
carried orders for Taylor in the Battle of Buena Vista, and 
when Colonel Jefferson Davis of the Mississippi Rifles was 
wounded, Chilton carried him off the field. Chilton's 
gallantry earned him a brevet to major. Chilton remained 
in the army af_t.er the war, and in 1854 Davis, by then 
United States Secretary of War, appointed him an army 
paymaster. Chilton followed southern states out of the 
Union, resigning from the United States Army on April 29, 
1861. Chilton served in the adjutant general's office in 
Richmond before joining Lee. 26 
Chilton was immediately involved in the flurry of 
activity at Lee's headquarters as the general prepared the 
Army of Northern Virginia to defend against the Federals, 
yet his position on the staff seemed confused from the 
start. On June 4, the day Lee announced him as chief of 
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staff, Chilton issued orders for Lee assigning generals to 
command. Throughout the next week Chilton drafted orders 
establishing provost guards in each division and 
corresponded with unit commanders. Chilton, however, did 
not sign his correspondence as ''chief of staff,'' using 
instead his other title, ''assistant adjutant general.'' 27 
But Chilton's job as principal adjutant was short-lived. 
Routine paperwork, which Lee hated, flooded his 
headquarters. The general spent much of each morning, a 
pile of such documents on his desk and his staff officers 
arrayed in a semi-circle before him, doling out papers to 
each staffer and instructing them on how to handle the 
work. The mundane work was soon too much for Lee, who 
needed to concentrate on operations instead, and he 
summoned Walter Taylor. ''[He] said that he would have to 
put me back in the office,'' said Taylor. ''I knew what he 
meant .... He had real work to do and wished to be rid 
of these matters of detail.'' By June 21 Taylor was 
signing himself ''acting assistant adjutant general,'' and 
he said from that time on he, not Chilton, directed the 
staff adjutant general's department. 28 
Taylor always resented Chilton's presence on the 
staff, however. Once when Chilton was away from camp, 
Taylor wrote his girlfriend, Bettie Saunders, that he did 
not care if Chilton returned. ''You see he has the rank 
and credit of A.A.G. and I have the unthankful and 
unremunerative part of the position, namely the labor and 
the responsibility.' 129 
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Chilton nevertheless remained busy, drafting general 
and special orders for Lee which largely affected army 
organization. Armistead Long communicated Lee's wishes to 
Rebel cavalry leader J. E. B. Stuart for the placement of 
cavalry pickets, and to Major W. H. Stevens, Lee's chief of 
engineers, about laying out defensive lines. Mason and 
Taylor handled routine matters. 30 
Lee's staff officers did not gather intelligence for 
him, something that Jomini had emphasized as a major staff 
job. That job fell to jeb Stuart and his cavalry. On June 
12 Stuart's command left on a three-day dash around 
McClellan's army. They returned with the exact positions 
of McClellan's forces. Stuart told Lee that McClellan's 
right flank was vulnerable to attack. 31 
With the information from Stuart, Lee prepared to push 
the stalled McClellan from the gates of Richmond. He 
outlined a plan to bring General Thomas Jonathan 
''Stonewall'' Jackson's army down from the Shenandoah 
Valley, where it had wreaked havoc on Federals during the 
spring, and have it fall on McClellan's exposed right 
flank, while Lee's main force struck McClellan from the 
front. While the beginning of the campaign on June 25 was 
disjointed, Lee's army battered McClellan for a week in the 
Battle of the Seven Days. 
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Little evidence of staff activity during the Seven 
Days exists, partly because Lee avoided detailed written 
orders, which staff officers would have drafted. The only 
elaborate order to come from Lee's headquarters was General 
Order Number 75, which Chilton drafted for Lee and issued 
on June 24. The orders included precise instructions to 
all commanders participating in the fight. Any other 
orders Lee issued were verbal, and his brief comment that 
his staff officers ··were continuously with me in the 
field'' indicates the staffers were probably relaying those 
orders to their recipients. Walter Taylor did just that on 
June 27 when he delivered orders directly to Major General 
Richard S. Ewell, and on June 30 Chilton rode out from 
headquarters to place General John B. Magruder's division 
where Lee wanted it. Talcott met Brigadier General Lewis 
Armistead on the field July 1 to inform him of enemy 
positions. 32 
That Lee shunned elaborate written orders during the 
fighting reveals something of his expectations of his 
staff. Taking a commander's operational ideas and crafting 
them into clearly understood orders, then getting them 
efficiently to line commanders, had always been a prime 
function of a personal staff officer. European staffers, 
especially chiefs of staff, had even become involved in 
planning operations. By opting for verbal orders during 
combat, something he would do throughout the war, Lee was 
cutting his staff officers out of all but the courier phase 
78 
of that process. In part, Lee chose verbal orders to 
insure the secrecy of his plans. The relatively small size 
of his army, which never approximated contemporary European 
armies or the Union forces he opposed, also enabled Lee to 
get away with using verbal orders. But in a larger sense, 
Lee considered himself his own chief of staff and what 
historian Clifford Dowdey calls an ''operations officer.'' 
Although Stonewall Jackson would later act as something of 
an operational advisor to Lee, the Seven Days campaign 
sprang fully from Lee's mind. He certainly never consulted 
Chilton, his titular chief of staff. Lee's attitude toward 
the chief's job may, in fact, be the reason Chilton never 
signed his correspondence as ''chief of staff.'' Lee might 
occasionally use his staffers as a sounding board (''Now, 
Colonel Long, how can we get at those people?'' Lee asked 
his military secretary when they reconnoitered Federal 
positions before the Seven Days) but he expected no 
informed military response. Walter Taylor said after the 
war that Lee typically asked such rhetorical questions of 
those around him, ''not that he attached any importance to 
or expected any aid from what might be said in reply,'' but 
the questioning allowed him to think out loud. No, Lee 
would handle the battles. What he wanted from his staff 
was someone to shield him from what Taylor called ''matters 
of routine. 1133 
After the Seven Days, Lee's personal staff officers 
settled in to their jobs, and their duties confirmed Lee's 
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expectations of them. He wanted his staffers to shield him 
from paperwork, headquarters housework, and griping 
soldiers. He also expected diligence and prompt service 
from his staff. When he had all that, things went well 
around headquarters. 
Lee inherited his first headquarters, the home of 
widow Mary Dabbs outside of Richmond, from Joe Johnston, 
and he used it before and after the Seven Days, but on the 
march the job of selecting a headquarters location fell to 
Colonel Armistead Long. Long was an experienced 
artillerist, and in future campaigns Lee would use his 
topographical skills to reconnoiter Federal positions and 
place Confederate artillery. But Lee could also use those 
skills for everyday work; ''he has a good eye for locality, 
let him find a place for camp,'' Lee reasoned. Long said 
Lee was easily satisfied with his selections, and only once 
did he refuse a site Long had picked. That was at 
Winchester, Virginia, when the whole of the Army of 
Northern Virginia made camp before Lee, taking the best 
spots. Long found some bare ground on a farm, and its 
owners assured him that Lee and his staff were welcome to 
stay in their yard. Long ordered up the staff's modest 
baggage wagons, but when Lee arrived he ordered everything 
moved to a stoney field nearby. ''This is better than the 
yard,'' he commented. .;' 'We will not now disturb those good 
people.' 134 
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The Dabbs house was probably the most comfortable 
place Lee's staff would ever occupy. Lee conducted his 
business, with Long usually in attendance, in a back room 
of the house, while Taylor, Chilton, and Mason handled the 
duties of the adjutant general's office from a front room. 
The house also provided a comfortable place for staff 
officers to dine together. 3 ~ 
In the field, though, headquarters accommodations were 
a good deal rougher. Lee's Mexican War experience taught 
him that private soldiers on the line could become jealous 
of a staff officer's lot, and he tried to see that life at 
headquarters was little different from life at the front. 
That helped endear Lee's army to him, but Walter Taylor and 
his comrades were just as likely to find themselves 
sleeping in a field of rocks when a combat division had a 
meadow for a bed. And Taylor once commented to his 
sweetheart in Richmond that Lee would ''suffer any amount 
of discomfort and inconvenience sooner than to change a 
camp once established. ' ' 35 
Lee's headquarters were sparse, typically consisting 
of from five to eight pole tents. Staff officers usually 
slept two or three to a tent, while Lee stayed in a wall 
tent, usually no bigger than the others in the assemblage. 
A few wagons hauled headquarters papers, equipment, and the 
staff officers' baggage, of which Lee allowed them only a 
small box each. Those wagons parked around camp in no 
particular order, and couriers and camp servants frequently 
slept beneath them at night. No banners or guards marked 
the headquarters as that of the army's commanding 
general. 37 
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Meals were as Spartan as the headquarters. ''While we 
never really wanted for food,'' said Taylor, ''we only 
enjoyed what was allotted to the army generally. Ours was 
the regular army ration.'' Mess furniture was of tin, and 
Taylor said Lee never used his ·-:r-,ank to obtain ''dainties 
for his table or any personal comfort for himself.'' Lee 
did not forbid liquor in camp, but none of the staff 
officers regularly imbibed. 38 
Of course, as military secretary, Armistead Long did 
more than just choose ground for headquarters camp. Long. 
helped Lee with his correspondence, writing letters and 
some orders to line commanders. In one instance, however, 
Long's correspondence went to a higher authority. On 
September 2 Long drafted, from Lee's dictation, a letter to 
President Jefferson Davis outlining Lee's reasons for 
taking the war into the North. The letter heralded Lee's 
first invasion of the Union. 39 
However, most of the paperwork, which fairly flooded 
headquarters, landed squarely on Walter Taylor. Every day 
each corps or independent command of the army received 
reports and papers from its regiments, brigades, and 
divisions, and each day it sent its package of 
correspondence to Lee's headquarters. Taylor said they 
included ''matters great and small, important and 
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unimportant,'' from furlough requests to ''some intricate 
question of the relative rights of the officers of the line 
and of the staff~'' Couriers arrived with such documents 
around the clock. Lee hated trivial matters. As Taylor 
said, ''matters of great import ... caused him to lie 
awake for hours,'' and Lee trusted his chief adjutant to 
handle anything not requiring the general's direct action. 
So Taylor had to examine all correspondence arriving at 
headquarters and dispense with it properly. He said he 
became so adept at his job that a courier could wake from 
sleep with a dispatch and he could ''tell at a glance'' 
whether the communication was important or just routine. 40 
Taylor once became so involved in protecting his boss 
from unnecessary paperwork that it caused his temper to 
flare. He had saved a stack of d0cuments so Lee could 
dispense with them all at once. Noticing that Lee was in 
an ''ill humor,'' Taylor said ''I hastily concluded that my 
efforts to save him annoyance were not appreciated.'' The 
young adjutant threw down the papers, venting his own 
anger. Lee calmly looked up and said, ''Colonel Taylor, 
when I lose my temper, don't let it make you angry.' 141 
Taylor, however, was frequently exasperated with his 
boss. In letters to his sweetheart, Bettie, Taylor 
complained about the small size of Lee's staff and how 
overworked he felt. ''[Other generals] have ten, twenty, & 
thirty Ajt Generals, this army has only one and I assure 
you at times I can hardly stand up under the pressure of 
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work,'' said Taylor. Despite his griping, Taylor was not 
disposed to seek relief from the work for he had an intense 
desire to please Lee. In that Taylor was also frustrated. 
''I am not satisfied to have others say ... my presence 
here is necessary. I want him to tell me, then I'll be 
satisfied,'' Taylor said. 42 
Robert Chilton, as titular chief of staff and 
assistant adjutant general, drafted most of Lee's general 
and special orders. Lee, of course, originated the orders, 
and Chilton penned them in order form, made the requisite 
copies, and distributed them to their recipients. 
Immediately after the Seven Days, general orders dealt with 
repositioning combat units in case of another Federal 
threat and with altering generals' assignments to better 
organize the Army of Northern Virginia. As summer wore on, 
orders regarded a variety of topics, such as urging unit 
commanders to see that troops had uniform weapons, either 
smooth-bore or rifled, so the ordnance department could 
distribute the right kind of ammunition. Another order 
directed units to locations that would be ''conducive to 
the health of ... [the) command . where good water, 
ground, &c, would afford pure air and convenient camps.'' 43 
Perhaps the most literary job of the headquarters fell 
to bespectacled Charles Marshall, whom Lee assigned to 
write the general's official campaign reports. Every unit, 
from a company to a corps, submitted reports of their 
engagements, skirmishes, and battles. Marshall first waded 
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through all of those accounts before he could write Lee's 
official reports. The task was not easy. ··one of the 
most difficult things I had to do was to reconcile the many 
conflicting accounts of the same affair,'' said Marshall. 
When Marshall could not justify an important but confused 
point, he would ride out to the army and interview the 
officers who submitted the reports. At other times he 
would summon the correspondents to headquarters to settle a 
detail. 44 
Marshall did not have the last word on the reports, 
however; General Lee did. After completing a report, 
Marshall would submit it to Lee, who became headquarters 
editor, making any corrections, insertions, or deletions he 
thought would make the report clearer. Marshall often 
cringed as Lee struck from a manuscript some bit of detail 
he had spent hours verifying. Lee specifically asked 
Marshall if reports contained any conflicting material, and 
frequently he poured over the same sources his aide used to 
make his official reports, as Marshall said, ••as truthful 
as possible.'' 45 
Marshall pulled no punches in his reports, and when he 
thought a commander had been lax or incompetent during a 
campaign, he said so. ··colonel, if you speak so strongly 
of this you will have nothing left to say of something 
better,'' Lee chided Marshall, and he usually deleted 
sentences condemning a subaltern's actions. Marshall 
countered that the reports should include such information, 
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if only to shift blame for a failure from Lee. ''The 
responsibility for this army is mine,'' Lee answered, 
preferring not to place blame in a public report. When 
Marshall penned Lee's official report of the July 1863 
battle of Gettysburg, he pointedly blamed the Confederate 
defeat in part on cavalry General Jeb Stuart who, trying to 
recreate his ride around the Union army on the Peninsula, 
led his troopers on a similar jaunt in Pennsylvania. 
Stuart, however, was gone on the first two days of the 
battle, and left Lee without the intelligence he needed to 
conduct the battle. Characteristically, Lee removed the 
damning phrases from his report. In his post-war memoirs, 
however, Marshall said, ''there are material facts ... 
which in my opinion are necessary to a correct 
understanding of the [Gettysburg) campaign,'' and he 
proceeded to heap blame where he thought it should be--on 
Stuart. 46 
While the staffers stayed busy writing orders and 
reports, the work was sometimes so voluminous that Lee had 
to write a great deal of correspondence himself. That Lee 
wrote frequent letters to President Davis, the secretaries 
of war, and Inspector General Samuel Cooper is not unusual. 
But Lee spent much time passing on simple intelligence to 
unit commanders, and he once wrote detailed instructions to 
a colonel at Fredericksburg, Virginia, explaining how to 
break up a railroad and dispose of the ties. 47 
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Besides handling paperwork, writing orders, and 
drafting official reports, Lee wanted his staffers to do 
one other thing--protect him from solicitous visitors at 
headquarters. Walter Taylor said that, between campaigns 
or in winter quarters, virtually every soldier in the Army 
of Northern Virginia went ··to work with pen and ink to 
state his grievance or make known his wants and· desires.'' 
That increased the paperwork. at headquarters immensely. 
The odd complaint that slipped past Taylor and reached Lee 
usually returned to an aide with, as Charles Venable called 
it, ''the old-fashioned phrase, ''Suage him, Colonel, 
'suage him.''' 48 • 
Once an aggrieved officer came to headquarters and 
would settle for nothing less than an interview with Lee. 
Staffers finally relented and allowed him into Lee's tent. 
After a time, the officer departed, and soon Lee, visibly 
angry, emerged from his tent. Entering his adjutants' tent 
he asked, ''Why did you permit that man to come to my tent 
and make me show my temper?' ' 49 
As Lee's staff settled into their office routines, 
they became the general's family in the field. They 
learned his likes and dislikes and were in a unique 
position to take the true measure of the man, not the 
legend that the war would produce. While they had every 
respect for their commander, Lee's staff officers did not 
hold him in awe. Behind his back they called him ''the 
Tycoon,'' a reference to Lee's family heritage, Virginia 
social class, and his estate at Arlington. 50 
Walter Taylor said that, while some people found Lee 
generally unapproachable, the opposite was in fact true. 
He said Lee was indeed dignified, but his manner with his 
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staff ''invited closer friendship.'' Taylor said, 
small circle of the personal staff ... there was 
··rn our 
[with Lee] a degree of camarade-rie that was perfectly 
delightful.'' Conversation at meals was relaxed, 
••unreserved as between equals,'' and Lee frequently jested 
with others at the table. Taylor said that, while staffers 
observed the protocols of rank and defeience, Lee's 
headquarters had none of the ··rigid formality and the 
irksome ceremonial regarded by some as essential . to 
the . commander-in-chief of an army.• 15 1 
Lee had a certain dry wit, and he liked to use it on 
his staffers. His mealtime jesting was often good-
naturedly at their expense. Once Charles Marshall caught 
the brunt of the general's humor. Marshall was in his tent 
one night in late September 1862 when fellow aide T. M. R. 
Talcott and artillerist Colonel E. Porter Alexander entered 
and started working out some complex mathematical problem. 
Marshall cared little for math and opted instead for 
whiskey. When the others declined to drink with him, he 
made as if to empty a bottle by himself. Just as he poured 
a drink, ••a pretty stiff one,'' Alexander recalled, Lee 
poked his head through the tent flaps. The general's look 
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petrified Marshall, and Talcott and Alexander teased him 
about what Lee would do to him the next day. At breakfast, 
when Marshall unwisely complained of a headache, Lee 
commented that, ''Too much application to mathematical 
problems at night, with the unknown quantities x and y 
represented by a demijohn and tumbler, was very apt to have 
for a result a headache in the morning.' 152 
Lee had an irascible, petulant side as well, and staff 
officer Venable had plenty of opportunities to see it. 
Other staff members reasoned that Venable's age, thirty-six 
when the war started, and his dignified former position as 
a college professor, made him the logical choice to 
approach The Tycoon when he was in a foul humor. That 
dubious job left Venable with a slightly different portrait 
of Lee than Taylor had. ''The views which prevail ... as 
to the gentle temper of the great soldier . are not 
altogether correct,'' said Venable. ''No man could see the 
flush come over that grand forehead and the temple veins 
swell on occasions of great trial of patience and doubt 
that Lee had the high, strong temper of a Washington, and 
habitually under the same strong control.'' Occasionally, 
though, Lee's control slipped and the mighty temper flared; 
Taylor had seen it, and Venable caught his share of it as 
well. In the fall of 1864, Lee told staffers and unit 
commanders to start a movement at 2:00 a.m. the next 
morning. Mistakenly thinking he had told them 1:00 a.m., 
Lee was in the saddle an hour early and hopping mad at 
89 
everyone's absence. Venable scrambled to get everyone in 
line, and when all was in order Lee asked Venable to ride 
forward and act as a guide. Venable, talking to someone 
else, did not hear Lee. The general's anger flashed and he 
grabbed a courier named Evans. ''Evans,'' he snapped, ''I 
will have to ask you to act upon my staff today, for my 
officers are all disappointing me.'' Lee was cool toward 
Venable for two weeks. That episode notwithstanding, Lee 
was usually quick to make amends. Another time after he 
had snapped at Venable, the staffer left Lee's tent and 
went to sleep on the ground. Feeling sorry, Lee took off 
his own poncho and placed it over Venable before he too 
went to sleep.s 3 
The routines and duties that Lee's staff established 
in the summer of 1862 varied little for the rest of the 
war. In the weeks before Lee's Second Bull Run campaign in 
August, Chilton was one of the busiest men in the 
headquarters, corresponding with line commanders and 
drafting orders. That work culminated with Special Orders 
Number 185, which launched the campaign. 54 
During the Second Bull Run campaign, Lee sent units 
under Stonewall Jackson north from Richmond to counter a 
threat from Federal Major General John Pope and his new 
Army of Virginia, created from independent commands and 
parts of McClellan's Army of the Potomac. When he became 
convinced that McClellan and his remaining army were going 
to stay idle on the Peninsula, Lee and the rest of the Army 
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of Northern Virginia under General James Longstreet turned 
north to help Jackson. On August 29, on the old Bull Run 
battlefield, Pope ordered a piecemeal attack, which Jackson 
halted. The next day Longstreet joined Jackson, and the 
force easily bent Pope's left flank back and sent his whole 
army in retreat. In his official report of the battle, 
Longstreet thanked Lee's staff officers for ''great 
courtesy and kindness in assisting me on the different 
battle-fields,'' but he did not elaborate on what duties 
they performed. 55 
Lee's next campaign, the invasion of Maryland, ushered 
in changes in his staff. Victorious in the Seven Days and 
at Second Bull Run, Lee wanted to continue his momentum, 
but also shift the theater of war from Virginia and allow 
his army to forage off Northern soil for a while. Also, 
many Confederates believed their military presence in 
Maryland would ignite an anti-Union uprising there. In a 
letter to Jefferson Davis on September 3, Lee said ''the 
present seems to be the most propitious time since the 
commencement of the war'' for such a campaign. He said 
Union forces were weak from their string of defeats and, 
while he could not successfully attack them in their 
Washington defenses, the campaign would serve to draw them 
out and ''harass'' them. A victory on northern soil might 
also win European diplomatic recognition for the South. 
Lee's 45,000-man army began a three-day crossing of the 
Potomac River into Maryland on September 4. By September 
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7, when his army converged on Frederick, Maryland, Lee had 
realized that no popular rising was coming; Confederate 
leaders had misjudged pro-Union sentiment in western 
Maryland.~ 6 
Lee hoped he could do some damage with his campaign, 
however, and he drafted orders to do just that; the plan 
was complex and risky. Lee hoped to push his invasion into 
Pennsylvania where he could cut the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
a major federal artery. He could not do that, however, 
unless he established secure supply lines in the Shenandoah 
Valley, and the Valley hosted a 10,000-man Union garrison 
at Harper's Ferry. That garrison had to fall before Lee 
could go much farther. In camp at Frederick, Lee and 
Stonewall Jackson mapped out the operation. They planned 
to split the army into four pieces: divisions under 
Jackson, General John Walker, and General Lafayette McLaws 
would split off and attack Harper's Ferry from three 
directions while Lee and Longstreet waited at Boonsboro for 
their return. Splitting the army was decidedly risky, 
especially since Jeb Stuart's outriders had already brought 
Lee word that George McClellan had refitted the Army of the 
Potomac and led it into Maryland. Trusting that McClellan 
would move as slowly in Maryland as he had on the 
Peninsula, Lee was certain Jackson's expedition would have 
time to seize Harper's Ferry and reunite with Lee and 
Longstreet before the Federals posed any threat. Besides, 
Lee would keep South Mountain, a finger of the Blue Ridge 
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Mountains, between his army and McClellan's, with Stuart's 
cavalry guarding the mountain passes. 57 
At Lee's headquarters, September 9, his chief of staff 
and adjutant Robert Chilton went about his primary task, 
drafting Lee's operational plans into orders for the army. 
The resulting Special Orders Number 191 became perhaps the 
most controversial orders of the war. The orders 
themselves were an example of fine military writing, 
clearly laying out Lee's instructions for Jackson, McLaws, 
Walker, Longstreet, Stuart, and Daniel Harvey Hill, who 
would form the rear guard of the army at Boonsboro. The 
orders even directed Lee's primary aide, Walter Taylor, to 
return to Winchester, Virginia, and gather up all the sick 
and wounded Confederates from recent battles. 58 
The controversy of Special Orders Number 191 was not 
in its writing, but in its delivery. After drafting the 
orders, Chilton made the requisite copies and dispatched 
them to the generals with commands in the operation. Upon 
receiving his copy, Jackson made a copy for D. H. Hill, who 
had been in Jackson's command but was detached for service 
with Longstreet in this instance to help guard South 
Mountain. Thus two copies of the orders were on their way 
to Hill, one without Chilton's knowledge. 59 
On September 10 Lee's army moved out of Frederick, 
putting the Harpers Ferry campaign in motion. Three days 
later, at Frederick, the Army of the Potomac happened to 
camp on the same site where Harvey Hill's division had 
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camped. Two soldiers found an unusual package in some tall 
grass--three fine cigars wrapped in paper. The cigars were 
a great find, but as the men unwrapped them, they realized 
they had something more. The paper was labeled 
''Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, Special Orders 
No. 191,'' and was signed by someone named Chilton. The 
men quickly turned the paper over to their superiors; who 
ran it to Twelfth Corps headquar-ters. There a colonel who 
had served with Chilton before the war verified the 
handwriting, and the orders went on to McClellan. At his 
headquarters, McClellan was entertaining a contingent of 
Frederick citizens when he received Lee's orders. He did 
not hide his elation, exclaiming ''Now I know what to 
do.' ,so 
When speculation arose that Harvey Hill was somehow to 
blame for losing Special Orders Number 191, he maintained 
that he had received only one copy of the orders, that from 
Jackson. He carefully saved the copy to prove his story. 
He had always received his orders from Jackson, and he 
apparently thought it appropriate that the practice 
continue in Maryland, even though he was temporarily split 
from Jackson's corps. For his part, Chilton maintained 
that Lee's headquarters must have received a receipt from 
Hill for the orders, otherwise the staff would have 
attempted to verify that Hill had received it. Lee blamed 
no one, and he mounted no investigation of the incident. 
Hill continued trying to clear himself of fault in the 
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matter, and after the war he wrote Chilton trying to learn 
facts that might absolve him. 61 
That the orders could fall into enemy hands represents 
a breakdown in staff work at Lee's headquarters. If 
Jackson was to have given orders to Hill, Chilton should 
have known that. If Chilton or other members of Lee's 
staff were to be the sole distributors of orders from 
headquarters, then line commanders should have known that 
as well. Given that the clear, precise, and prompt, not to 
mention secure, distribution of orders was a primary job 
for any headquarters staff the loss of Special Orders 
Number 191 was a critical error. The fault may well have 
rested with Lee himself, for not better defining to his 
line officers the duties of his personal staff. 
Any opportunity the lost orders gave McClellan, 
however, he frittered away by delaying his march from 
Frederick. Also, one of the Frederick citizens who had 
been visiting McClellan when the lost orders arrived turned 
out to be a Southern sympathizer, and he quickly sent word 
to Lee that McClellan had the orders. When the Army of the 
Potomac tried to push across South Mountain on September 
14, Harvey Hill's men met them with stiff resistance. 
McClellan won at South Mountain, but he did not destroy 
Lee's army, and the advance warning gave Lee time to 
prepare a retreat. He put Longstreet's units on the march 
to a town called Sharpsburg. From Lee's headquarters, 
Chilton and Armistead Long fired messages to McLaws to 
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abandon his operations at Harper's Ferry and rush back to 
the main army. Walter Taylor, back in Virginia, heard of 
the fight at South Mountain and raced back to be with his 
chief. On September 15, Lee received word that Harper's 
Ferry had fallen to Jackson, and Lee notified him to leave 
a contingent there to handle the surrender and hurry the 
rest of his force to Sharpsburg. There, near Antietam 
Creek, Lee and McClellan fought the bloody battle of 
Antietam on September 17. 62 
As he had during the Seven Days, Lee avoided elaborate 
written orders during the fight .. A message from Chilton to 
Brigadier General William N. Pendelton, Lee's chief of 
artillery, asking him to be sure all reserve artillery and 
stragglers were on the field was the only correspondence to 
come from Lee's headquarters during the battle. 63 
Nevertheless, Lee's staffers had plenty to do. In his 
official report of the Maryland campaign, Longstreet 
thanked Chilton, Long, Taylor, Marshall, Venable, Talcott, 
and Mason ''for great courtesy and kindness in assisting me 
on the different battle-fields.'' Longstreet's 
acknowledgement was virtually the same as the one he penned 
after Second Bull Run and offered no explanation of what 
Lee's staff officers did for him. Lee did not even mention 
their activities in his report of the campaign. Taylor, 
Long, and Chilton did ride orders out to brigade and 
division commanders during the campaign. Certainly, 
though, Lee expanded the role of his military secretary, 
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Armistead Long, at Antietam. Long rode about the 
battlefield, helping position artillery batteries for best 
effect. In so doing, Long was actually acting in the 
artillery department of Lee's special staff, but Lee was 
capitalizing on Long's pre-war experience in artillery. 64 
With the exception of Long positioning cannon during 
battle and Taylor falling back to gather wounded Rebels at 
Winchester, Virginia, Lee asked nothing extra of his staff 
during the Maryland campaign. No staff officer helped Lee 
with operations; Lee used corps commander Jackson instead 
to help him plan the Harper's Ferry expedition. While 
staffers no doubt performed efficiently in drafting orders 
to draw the parts of the Army of Northern Virginia back 
together after the Battle of South Mountain, they had also 
participated in the ''lost orders'' debacle that caused the 
emergency in the first place. Lee's staffers remained 
clerks at a battlefield headquarters, handling matters of 
routine on a campaign that was anything but routine. 
Lee soon faced a new opponent. When Lincoln fired 
McClellan, he replaced him with Major General Ambrose 
Burnside. Burnside did not want the job, but he devised a 
plan that had merit. He would feint toward the vital rebel 
supply line of the orange and Alexandria Railroad, drawing 
Lee in that direction, then turn and mass at Falmouth, 
Virginia, across the Rappahannock River from 
Fredericksburg. From there Burnside could cross the river 
and use it as a supply line while he drove for the 
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undefended Richmond. Burnside moved with speed, but when 
he arrived at Falmouth on November 19 the pontoon boats he 
needed to cross the river were not there. The boats did 
not arrive for two weeks. The delay allowed Lee, who had 
in fact lost Burnside, to assess his enemy's intentions and 
consolidate the Army of Northern Virginia at Fredericksburg 
to oppose Burnside's river crossing. 65 
Written staff work emanating from Lee's headquarters 
while he moved his army to Fredericksburg was sparse. 
Chilton, Taylor, and Penny Mason drafted general and 
special orders to facilitate the movement. 66 The lack of 
written orders, however, only shows again Lee's fondness 
for verbal instruction. 
Even though he had been watching Confederates take up 
defensive positions on hills behind Fredericksburg for 
weeks, Burnside decided he would cross there anyway. On 
December 11, under heavy sniper fire from the town, 
engineers placed the belated pontoon boats. The next day 
Burnside massed his troops on the Rebel side of the river, 
and on December 13 he commenced one of the most ill-advised 
battles of the war. Federals had some success at Stonewall 
Jackson's position south of Fredericksburg, but they had to 
relent for lack of support. Immediately west of 
Fredericksburg, at a place called Marye's Heights, the 
Federals ran into a buzzsaw. Secure in a sunken road 
behind a rock wall atop the Heights, James Longstreet's men 
had only to choose their targets as Burnside launched seven 
waves against them. The Union men never had a chance at 
Fredericksburg, and by nightfall their losses in killed, 
wounded, and missing were more than 12,600. Confederates 
casualties were about 5,300. 67 
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Lee's headquarters issued no orders during the fight, 
but his staffers were busy anyway. Lee commented that, 
''my personal staff were unremittingly engaged in conveying 
and bringing information from all parts of the field.'' In 
his official report of the battle, Lee commended his 
military secretary, Armistead Long, who again helped place 
artillery. Long, with the help of Charles Venable and T. 
M. R. Talcott, trained 200 guns on the hapless Federals. 
Talcott alone placed a four-gun battery four miles south of 
Fredericksburg, ''in an excellent position,'' Lee said, to 
destroy Union gunboats trying to navigate the river. 
Taylor and Marshall were busy ''communicating orders and 
intelligence,'' said Lee, and Venable and Talcott 
''examine[ed] the ground and the approaches of the 
enemy.' 168 
The Army of Northern Virginia wintered behind--and 
improved--its old defenses at Fredericksburg. In April 
1863, the Union Army of the Potomac, now under Major 
General Joe Hooker, drew up across the Rappahannock from 
Fredericksburg. But Hooker did not intend to batter his 
army against Marye's Heights. He would leave about 40,000 
men at Fredericksburg as if they were going to attempt such 
an assault, but he quickly marched the bulk of his army 
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west about ten miles to a crossroads tavern in Virginia's 
Wilderness known as Chancellorsville. Lee faced an enemy 
on both flanks but boldly attacked the situation. On May 1 
he left 10,000 men under General Jubal Early to protect 
Fredericksburg. Then, again splitting his army in the face 
of the Federals, he wheeled his remaining 46,000 men 
(Longstreet's were on detached duty south of Richmond) 
toward Chancellorsville. Suddenly Hooker relinquished the 
initiative, withdrawing to a five-mile perimeter around 
Chancellorsville, and Stuart's cavalry brought Lee word 
that Hooker's right flank was vulnerable. In a meeting in 
the woods of the Wilderness the night of May 1, Lee and 
Stonewall Jackson developed a bold plan. Lee would divide 
his force again. He would send Jackson and 28,000 men on a 
circuitous route that would land them on Hooker's right. 
Lee would keep a scant 18,000 men in front of Hooker and 
hope the Union commander did not realize he could easily 
swamp Lee and get between Jackson and Early. 69 
On May 2 Jackson moved out. Federal scouts detected 
the movement and reported it to Hooker, but as Lee had 
hoped, he thought the Confederates were retreating. That 
evening Lee began firing on Hooker's left as a distraction 
and, about 6:00 p.m., Jackson's men screamed out of the 
tangle of the Wilderness upon the unsuspecting Federals, 
knocking them back about two miles. Jackson was riding 
back to his lines that night when his own men, skittish 
after a day of hard campaigning, mistakenly shot him. The 
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wound first cost Jackson his left arm, then his life. 
Command of Jackson's troops fell to Jeb Stuart, who on May 
3 joined with Lee to drive Hooker from Chancellorsville. 
At Fredericksburg, however, Union General John Sedgwick 
began assaults that pushed Early's depleted numbers from 
Marye's Heights. Lee turned part of his force at 
Chancellorsville to help Early, and in fighting on May 3 
and 4 the Rebels forced Sedgwick back across the 
Rappahannock. 7 o 
Lee's staff performed at Chancellorsville as they had 
throughout the war. Armistead Long again posted troops and 
artillery, while the other aides carried orders about the 
field. In the process of delivering an order, however, 
Chilton proved how risky verbal instructions could be. On 
May 1 Chilton arrived at Fredericksburg with orders for 
General Jubal Early to march from that place to 
Chancellorsville, leaving only a few troops and some of 
William Pendelton's artillery to counter the Federals 
across the Rappahannock. Early and Pendelton questioned 
the orders. Could Chilton have been mistaken? Why would 
Lee want to further deplete his right while planning an 
attack on his left? Chilton explained that Lee did not 
consider the threat at Fredericksburg great, and convinced 
the men that the orders were correct. Chilton returned to 
headquarters and Early moved out, leaving Pendelton at 
Fredericksburg. Soon, however, came written word from Lee. 
Chilton had misunderstood Lee's wishes; Early was to leave 
Fredericksburg only if he considered the situation there 
safe. Chilton had failed to communicate the latitude Lee 
had given Early. 71 
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Just as he received Lee's corrected orders, Early got 
word that Federals were advancing behind him, about to take 
Fredericksburg. If that was true, Lee's right was in 
danger of collapse, and so was his attack at 
Chancellorsville. Early had to decide whether to return to 
Fredericksburg and refortify defenses or march on to Lee, 
knowing that Federals might catch him from the rear. Eager 
subalterns convinced him to return to Fredericksburg, which 
he did, finding, happily, that reports of a Federal assault 
were incorrect. Lee's right remained intact. 72 
To be sure, Chilton had been mistaken in the orders he 
gave Early, and the calm manner in which he delivered and 
defended them before Early's questioning suggests he had no 
reason to believe he was in error. The insistence upon 
verbal orders, however, was Lee's. Having to remember 
several important details, execute a ride of several miles, 
and then repeat them was difficult enough. To do it in a 
tense battlefield situation was even worse. Certainly some 
of Lee's written orders had already fallen into enemy 
hands, in Maryland, but at Chancellorsville he risked 
having his right immediately rolled up because of a 
forgotten phrase. 
Two months later, at the Battle of Gettysburg, 
Pennsylvania, July 1-3, Lee relied again on limited staff 
102 
work. Lee used the momentum he gained at Chancellorsville 
to again invade the North. Hooker's Army of the Potomac 
shadowed the invaders, but in late June Abraham Lincoln 
replaced the timid Hooker with Pennsylvanian George G. 
Meade. On July 1 outriders of both armies collided at the 
crossroads town of Gettysburg, and, as reinforcements 
rushed up, the battle developed seemingly out of the hands 
of Lee and Meade. Dismounted Union cavalry and Confederate 
infantry fought through the morning west of Gettysburg 
while two divisions of Federals rushed through Gettysburg 
to seize ground north of the town. Confederate pressure 
mounted, however, and units of Baldy Ewell's Rebel corps 
pushed the Federals back through town. Union troops west 
of Gettysburg also retreated, and all the Federals made for 
a series of hills south of town known as Cemetery Hill and 
Cemetery Ridge. Lee arrived on the field late in the day 
and suggested that Ewell attack through Gettysburg and 
drive the Federals from the hills before the bulk of the 
Union army got up to reenforce them. Ewell did not strike, 
however, and through the night Union generals solidified 
their defenses south of Gettysburg. Lee massed his men 
about a mile west of Cemetery Ridge on a lower elevation 
known as Seminary Ridge. 73 
July 2 saw a series of disjointed Confederate attacks 
to knock the Army of the Potomac from its desirable high 
ground. Men of James Longstreet's corps, after marching 
and countermarching, attempted to flank and mount a rocky 
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and supposedly undefended hill, known as Little Round Top 
to the folks of Gettysburg, on the far left of the Union 
line. Once there the Rebels could fire down into the Army 
of the Potomac, but Federals rushed to the hill and 
stubbornly repulsed assault after assault. Longstreet's 
men also attacked an exposed salient that Union General Dan 
Sickles had created when he ill-advisedly moved forward 
from the Union lines, hoping to protect his own flank. In 
battles at the Peach Orchard, Wheatfield, and Devil's Den, 
Longstreet drove Sickles back into the Union line, but 
accomplished nothing else. At the north end of the Federal 
defenses, Jubal Early's men of Ewell's corps gained some 
ground at a place called Culp's Hill but failed to make an 
appreciable dent in Meade's line. At midday July 3, 
Confederates opened an artillery barrage on the length of 
Cemetery Ridge, hoping to soften Union positions. Lee 
planned to send 15,000 men under General George Pickett 
across the mile gap between the armies and have them 
assault the Union lines, much as Ambrose Burnside had done 
at Fredericksburg. Longstreet opposed the plan, but after 
two hours of bombardment, which hardly damaged the 
Federals, he ordered Pickett on his way. ''Pickett's 
Charge'' was a futile disaster; Union soldiers turned it 
back in vicious hand-to-hand fighting on Cemetery Ridge. 74 
The Battle of Gettysburg marked the only time Lee used 
a staff officer in something resembling an operations role; 
his help was mediocre at best. Armistead Long, the 
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military secretary, had won Lee's confidence by posting 
artillery in all the army's major battles since Antietam. 
Before marching into Pennsylvania in June 1863, Lee called 
Long into his tent and traced his invasion plans on a map, 
asking the colonel his opinion. That was probably one of 
Lee's rhetorical questions, of the type that Walter Taylor 
said helped him think out loud, for when Long suggested 
engaging Hooker near Manassas Lee disagreed, saying that 
would just let the Army of the Potomac fall back to 
Washington and regroup. Once at Gettysburg, however, Lee 
pressed Long into service posting and rechecking 
Confederate artillery and, with artillery chief William 
Pendleton, surveying the Union lines at Cemetery Ridge. 
Long brought Lee the news on July 2 that Federals were 
behind a stone wall and on a reverse slope, and he said an 
attack on that position would probably not succeed. 
Nevertheless, sitting in an apple orchard with Lee while 
the general planned Pickett's assault, Long assented that 
Confederate guns could silence the Union artillery. When 
Lee queried Long about making the attack without Stuart's 
cavalry, Long said the attack should go in unsupported. 75 
Gettysburg was the nadir of the always unspectacular 
staff work that came out of Lee's headquarters. Years 
later Walter Taylor unwittingly criticized Lee's use of his 
staff when h.e remarked that operations at Gettysburg were 
disjointed. ''There was an utter absence of accord in the 
movements of the several commands and no decisive results 
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attended the operations of the second day,'' he said. 
Lee's staff work also drew fire in the memoirs of another 
former member of his army. Artillerist E. Porter 
Alexander, commenting on the countermarching that preceded 
Longstreet's attack on the second day of Gettysburg, said 
it showed just ''how time may be lost in handling troops, 
and ... the need of an abundance of competent staff 
officers by the generals in command.'' Alexander said that 
no Rebel general had the staff he needed to ensure proper 
execution of orders. ''CA commander] should have a staff 
ample to supervise the execution of each step, and to 
promptly report any difficulty or misunderstanding,'' he 
said. 76 
At least one prominent Civil War historian has also 
criticized Lee's staff work at Gettysburg. Lee typically 
gave his lieutenants great leeway in the execution of their 
orders, often including the phrase ''if practicable'' in 
his instructions. He had done just that when he urged 
Baldy Ewell to attack through Gettysburg and throw Federals 
off Cemetery Hill. He also had maintained his practice of 
issuing few orders during battle; on the second day at 
Gettysburg he sent only one message and received only one 
report. Kenneth Williams, in his classic series Lincoln 
Finds a General, commented that, while the vague and poor 
orders Lee often gave may have come from his ''amiability 
and courtesy,'' they dictated that ''an adequate staff 
constantly [be] at hand, with sufficient rank and 
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experience to raise searching questions about what was 
done'' and challenge vague instructions. The possibility 
that Lee was sick at Gettysburg made the presence of an 
efficient staff doubly important. ''There was no one who 
could do responsible planning other than himself,'' 
commented Williams. ''Although he probably was compelled 
to depend upon Providence to 'raise up' another Jackson, he 
might have done something for himself in the matter of 
staff officers. 117 7 
The deficiencies in Lee's staff were of his own 
making. Lee chose to be his own chief of staff, 
essentially disenfranchising his titular chief, Chilton, 
who had shown no propensity for anything other than writing 
orders, from an integral part of staff work. When he did 
pose operational questions of his-staff, as he did with 
Armistead Long, he only heeded suggestions that affirmed 
his own plans. And, by relying on verbal instructions, he 
denied himself the chance to use in battle the writing 
skills that his staff developed handling the mountains of 
paperwork in camp. Regardless of how well a courier 
rehearsed his dispatches before leaving headquarters, by 
the time he rode through difficult battlefield situations 
they could never have been as clear at the recipient's end 
as if someone had concisely written them. 
Lee always had a small staff, and after Gettysburg it 
got smaller. In September 1863, Armistead Long received a 
brigadier general's commission and Lee gave him command of 
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the Second Corps' artillery. Lee aide T. M. R. Talcott 
became a lieutenant colonel and took command of an engineer 
regiment. Penny Mason, whom Lee inherited from General Joe 
Johnston after the Battle of Seven Pines, returned to 
Johnston's staff when that general recovered from his 
wounds enough to resume a command. 78 
Lee also lost his sometime chief of staff, Robert 
Chilton. Since the Battle of Antietam, Chilton's staff 
career had been a curious one. While Lee never blamed 
Chilton for the lost orders during the Maryland campaign, 
just a few weeks after Antietam Chilton, on paper at least, 
was off Lee's personal staff. Walter Taylor had bumped 
Chilton as primary adjutant soon after Chilton arrived at 
headquarters in June 1862. On October 28, 1862, Lee 
officially moved Chilton, who by then was a brigadier 
general, to his special staff as inspector-general. Lee 
announced that all communications previously addressed to 
Chilton should be directed instead to assistant adjutant 
Penny Mason. On November 24, 1862, in orders which Chilton 
drafted, Lee officially moved Taylor from aide-de-camp to 
acting assistant adjutant general, and quickly Taylor took 
over Chilton's duties of w~iting general and special 
orders. Although Chilton had never truly acted as a chief 
of staff, Lee continued to address Chilton as both chief of 
staff and adjutant in future correspondence. Also, Chilton 
continued to sign himself as assistant adjutant-general in 
correspondence. Chilton's status on the staff may indicate 
that Lee wanted some type of liaison between his personal 
and special staffs, or that Chilton was unsuited to staff 
work and Lee did not quite know what to do with him. 79 
108 
A letter which Lee wrote to Chilton in April 1863 
indicates that Chilton was uncomfortable with staff work, 
or that someone else was questioning his fitness for a 
headquarters position. Indeed, when Jefferson Davis made 
Chilton a brigadier general, the Confederate senate refused 
to confirm him. In response to a query from Chilton, Lee 
assured Chilton that his staff duty had been ''zealous and 
active ... and I have never known you to be actuated by 
any other motive in the performance of them than the 
interests of the service.'' Lee said that he had always 
known Chilton to be ''open and straightforward,'' and that 
he was entirely satisfied with Chilton's performance as 
chief of staff. 80 
Chilton remained at Lee's headquarters for eleven 
months following that letter, acting as inspector-general,· 
titular chief of staff, and sometime adjutant. His 
inspector-general's duties took him away from headquarters 
frequently, and he was thorough and conscientious in seeing 
that units he inspected were ready for service. He once 
irritated Jeb Stuart by pointing out that the guns and 
equipment of some cavalry artillery batteries needed 
routine care and cleaning. When Stuart complained to Lee, 
the general said Chilton's report was ••a simple statement 
of facts,'' and that he trusted Stuart and his officers 
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would ''correct these evils.'' Chilton remained busy at 
headquarters, too. By early 1863 he was once again helping 
Taylor draft special and general orders, and he frequently 
corresponded with unit commanders. Although he used him 
very little as a chief of staff, Lee apparently trusted 
Chilton. In February 1864, when Lee travelled to Richmond 
to see Davis, he left Lieutenant General Richards. 
''Baldy'' Ewell in command of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. Ewell, who had been ill, worried about taking 
the responsibility, but Lee assured him Chilton would be at 
headquarters and that he should consult with Chilton ''on 
all matters of importance connected with the army.'' 81 
Walter Taylor, who did not like Chilton, said the 
command arrangement between Chilton and Ewell was 
unsatisfactory. On February 23 Taylor complained to Bettie 
Saunders that, ''Gen'l Ewell who is supposed to be in 
command doesn't relieve me at all, nor does my friend 
Chilton who terms himself 'Chief of Staff.' Neither has 
volunteered one single suggestion or in any way divided the 
responsibility.'' A week later, Taylor reported to Bettie 
that Union movements had alarmed him. Taylor thought the 
Confederate army should be rearranged to avoid danger, but 
Ewell was away at his own camp and unable to give advice. 
Taylor then consulted Chilton, but, said Taylor, ''his 
reply to the first question I put to him was so very muddy 
and exhibited such ignorance of the situation that I was 
convinced I was to receive no help from this quarter.'' 
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Taylor finally made the changes himself, and, no doubt much 
to his own delight, earned Lee's praise when the general 
returned. 82 
Chilton departed from Lee's staff within two months, 
accepting a position in General Samuel Cooper's adjutant-
general's department in Richmond. In a letter to Chilton 
on March 24, Lee said, ''I shall miss your ever ready aid 
and regret your departure.'' He thanked Chilton for his 
service and wished him well, adding, ''CI) trust that in 
your future sphere of action, your zeal, energy, and 
intelligence will be as conspicuous as in your former.'' 
Lee noted that he would try to find someone to fill 
Chilton's place, but he never did. 83 After all, Walter 
Taylor could write orders as well as Chilton, and indeed 
had been doing so since the start of the war. 
With Chilton, Long, Talcott, and Mason gone, Lee's 
personal staff numbered three--Taylor, Marshall, and 
Venable--when he first engaged the Union's new general-in-
chief, Lieutenant General Ulysses s. Grant, in early May 
1864. The fighting that began in the Wilderness of 
Virginia was almost constant for eleven months, but Lee 
made no changes at headquarters except to heap extra work 
on the remaining three men. During the Wilderness fight, 
Lee's staffers did keep in better contact with field 
commanders than they had in previous battles, corresponding 
with the likes of Jeb Stuart and Baldy Ewell almost hourly 
between May 5 and 7. Before the fight Lee also began 
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riding out each morning with Marshall and Venable to 
examine Confederate lines. Taylor almost solely handled 
the writing of general and special orders. 84 Work at Lee's 
headquarters remained substantially unchanged for the rest 
of the war. 
Charles Venable appointed himself something of Lee's 
protector. During the Wilderness fight, when Lee 
threatened to personally lead·-a·column of Texans into 
battle, Venable and General James Longstreet reigned the 
Tycoon in from such rash behavior. When Lee was trying to 
conduct operations from a sickbed on May 23, Venable 
suggested calling in P. G. T. Beauregard to take temporary 
command of the army. _Lee would have none of it. 85 
In April 1865, as Lee's army prepared to evacuate its 
lines at Petersburg, Virginia, which Grant had invested for 
nine months, Walter Taylor approached his boss with an 
unusual request--he wanted to go to Richmond to get 
married. Lee was surprised, but Taylor explained that his 
sweetheart, Elizabeth Selden Saunders, worked in a 
government bureau, her home was behind Union lines, and she 
wanted to ''follow the fortunes of the Confederacy,'' if 
Lee established lines farther south. Lee agreed, and 
Taylor galloped off to a hurried wedding. 86 
When Taylor returned to Lee on April 3, but a week of 
war remained for the Army of Northern.Virginia. When Lee 
slipped west from Petersburg, Grant did likewise and caught 
the fleeing Confederates in a pincer's grasp. On April 7, 
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Grant opened correspondence with Lee with a view to the 
latter's surrender. On April 9, Lee relented, and Charles 
Marshall, who had for three years recorded the history of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, recorded, at Lee's 
dictation, its final act, requesting a meeting with Grant 
to discuss the surrender of Lee's army. Marshall was the 
only member of Lee's staff to accompany him to the 
surrender at Appomattox Court House.a? 
Lee remained close to his staff after the war. He 
frequently corresponded with Chilton, who became president 
of the Columbus Manufacturing Company near Columbus, 
Georgia. In July 1865, Lee decided to write an account of 
the campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia, and he 
requested that Walter Taylor send him accurate informatio~ 
about troop strengths as Taylor had compiled such numbers 
to send to Richmond throughout the war. Lee's duties as 
president of Washington College in Virginia, however, kept 
him from writing the book, and Taylor used the figures in 
his own memoirs. Taylor led an impromptu reception for the 
old general in April 1870 when, after a lengthy tour of 
Florida and the southeastern seaboard which doctors had 
prescribed for his health, Lee and his daughter Agnes 
returned to Portsmouth, Virginia. Taylor and former Lee 
staff officer Charles Venable sat with the general's family 
at Lee's funeral in October 1870. In later years, not only 
Taylor but Venable, Charles Marshall, and Armistead Long 
would write memoirs of their experiences with Lee's army.•• 
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Lee did little to expand the duties of his staff 
during the war. Even though Armistead Long made himself a 
minor reputation posting artillery and Walter Taylor might 
dash out to join a charge now and then, Lee's staffers were 
primarily clerks. Certainly they prepared marching orders 
that set the Army of Northern Virginia in motion and which 
established communication lines, which Jomini had suggested 
were staff duties, and they made complex orders, such as 
Special Orders 191, easily understood. Still, staffers 
failed to always insure proper delivery of orders and, 
again with Special Orders 191, were involved in a breakdown 
of communications that threatened the security of the whole 
army. 
Lee's staff actually perfo,:med well within the limits 
he gave them, but the Tycoon hobbled his headquarters. 
Fearing he might be keeping a qualified man from the line, 
he kept his staff small. When a staffer showed line 
qualifications, such as Armistead Long or T. M. R. Talcott, 
Lee sent them there, opting to deprive his headquarters of 
talent rather than the army in the field. Lee further 
hindered his headquarters, and subsequently the army, by 
relying on verbal orders. While Lee thought he was 
securing his directives, he was keeping his staff from 
doing what they had trained themselves to do best--write 
orders. Chilton's errant instructions to Early at 
Chancellorsville proved how dangerous the practice was. 
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Worst of all, Lee refused to adequately use his chief 
of staff. Chilton may have indeed been ill-suited for the 
job; such may never be known as the memoir writers of the 
staff rarely mention Chilton, and Lee seems never to have 
regarded Chilton as anything but a friend. However, Lee 
never replaced Chilton with an active chief of staff, 
either. He chose to remain his own chief, making all 
operational decisions and originating all the plans that 
his staffers subsequently drafted into orders. The 
embodiment of general and chief in one man was especially 
dangerous when Lee fell ill, and Charles Venable had 
recognized that fact when he suggested Beauregard 
temp6rarily replace Lee during the Wilderness fight. 
Lee's personal staff bore the general's mark. Like 
Lee, his staffers did their best with what they had to use. 
If Lee wanted to use them primarily as clerks and couriers, 
so be it. They could do no more. And as the Army of 
Northern Virginia dwindled, so did their number at 
headquarters. Of course Lee was not trying to emulate 
European staff systems during the Civil War, he was 
scrambling to keep his army alive. Nevertheless, the 
audacity he showed in some of his campaigns never spilled 
over into his conception of staff work. 
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CHAPTER IV 
GRANT: A CIVILIAN STAFF 
1861--1862 
Ulysses s. Grant was the most victorious general of 
the Civil War, winning signal campaigns in each major 
theater and ultimately forcing Robert E. Lee to surrender 
his Army of Northern Virginia. Grant also made more use of 
his personal staff than any other general of this study. 
Grant's ideas of staff usage were not full-blown when he 
became a brigadier general in 1861, however; they matured 
during the war until his headquarters was a professional 
unit functioning much like a small model of a Prussian 
staff. In 1861, though, Grant's staffers were civilians 
just learning about war. They were, however, men Grant 
felt comfortable with. While some of the men ultimately 
proved useless as staff officers, in 1861 they were Grant's 
family away from home. 
Two factors--an intense need for familial comradeship 
and a disastrous personal time between the Mexican and 
Civil Wars--directly influenced the way Ulysses Grant built 
his staff. Unlike Robert Lee, who picked men for his staff 
merely whom he believed could adequately fulfill their 
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duties, Grant gave staff jobs to men who had befriended him 
during a difficult time of his life. He created a staff 
that could support his emotional--as well as military--
needs. 
stresses that influenced Grant's staff began in his 
childhood. Grant had little closeness with his parents. 
Born April 27, 1822, in Point Pleasant, Ohio, Hiram Ulysses 
Grant (he did not become Ulysses Simpson Grant until a 
clerical mistake at West Point made him so) was the first 
of six children of driven businessman Jesse Root Grant and 
his taciturn wife Hannah Simpson Grant. Hannah spoke 
little about anything, even her first born, and townsfolk 
in Point Pleasant and Georgetown, Ohio, where the family 
moved when Ulysses was eighteen mpnths old, thought the 
woman had an unusual disinterest in the child. Grant 
biographer William McFeely has suggested that the woman was 
''simple-minded'' or had a ''psychosomatic disorder.'' 
Ulysses became as detached from his mother as she was from 
him; in later life, after he gained fame, he wrote little 
about her. 1 
Ulysses fared little better with his father. Jesse, 
who did not marry until he had established a successful 
leather tanning business, seemed proud of his children--
Samuel Simpson, Clara Rachel, Virginia Paine, Orvil Lynch, 
and Mary Frances were Ulysses' siblings--and he attended 
their needs. He never neglected or abused them, but he was 
more interested in business, financial security, and social 
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position than fatherly affections. Jesse was also a 
braggart who made as many enemies as friends. As the first 
child, Ulysses bore the brunt of Jesse's entrepreneurial 
hopes. Ulysses did not shine at athletics or academics, 
and he appeared to be a slow learner. Grant authority Gene 
Smith suggests Georgetownians twisted the boy's name to 
''Useless'' to get back at the irritating Jesse. 
Nevertheless, Jesse sought to counter his son's 
deficiencies by giving him work at the tannery, but the boy 
considered the place odious. He hated the sights, smells, 
and sounds of it, especially when animals were being 
butchered for their hides. Jesse soon realized, to his 
chagrin, that Ulysses was no businessman of any kind. When 
an adult bested Ulysses, then but eight years old, in a 
horse deal, the incident embarrassed both son and father. 
The deal, and .his father's reaction, hurt the boy so much 
that fifty years later the victorious general and former 
president recalled it in his memoirs with a hint of regret. 
Finally Jesse recognized that Ulysses was good with horses-
-the boy was a remarkable horse handler, as good with the 
animals as he was mediocre at school--and let him handle 
all the chores that required a horse or team. Still, even 
until Ulysses was a major general, Jesse, in veiled actions 
and phrases in letters, never let his son forget that he 
was not a businessman. 2 
Jesse knew that Ulysses, with no clever business 
sense, needed another livelihood. When his son was 
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seventeen Jesse secured him an appointment to West Point. 
The education was free and guaranteed graduates careers as 
soldiers or engineers. Grant did sufficiently mediocre 
work at West Point to finish twenty-first of thirty-nine 
cadets in his class, but some of his classmates realized 
what the folks back in Georgetown--the ones who thought him 
slow--did not. Ulysses Grant had a keen, active mind, but 
without proper mental stimulation he could quickly become 
uninterested. Grant's roommate, Rufus B. Ingalls, also 
destined to be a Civil War general, recalled, ''In his 
studies he was lazy and careless.'' Grant would not study 
a lesson thoroughly but simply read it over once or twice. 
Still, Ingalls said, ''he was so quick in his perceptions 
that he usually made fair recitations even with so little 
preparation.'' Grant could blame his inattention on at 
least one distraction--homesickness. In 1871, as 
president, Grant revealed to a friend how he really felt 
about West Point. He said he looked forward to the day he 
would retire from public life. ''That day is at hand . 
and I hail it as the happiest day of my life, except 
possibly the day I left West Point, a place I felt I had 
been at always and that my stay at had no end. 113 
After his graduation in 1843, the army assigned Grant 
to the Fourth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks in st. Louis. 
st. Louis was the home of another of Grant's West Point 
friends, Frederick Tracy Dent, and he visited the Dent home 
often. There he met Fred's oldest sister, Julia, and found 
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in her the companionship his family in Ohio never offered. 
They became engaged before the Fourth Infantry got orders 
to join General Zachary Taylor's army in Texas, where war 
between the United States and Mexico loomed. 4 
Going to war in 1846, Lieutenant Grant was a staff 
officer himself, serving as quartermaster on the Fourth's 
special staff. The Fourth fought with Taylor in northern 
Mexico and General Winfield Scott in his campaign against 
Mexico City. Grant's duties kept him at the rear tending 
supplies, and, while he occasionally stole to the front to 
be part of the action, he found his job as unrewarding as 
West Point had been. 
After the war, in 1848, Grant and Julia were married. 
They traveled to Grant's assignments at Detroit, then 
Sackets Harbor, New York. Their first son, Frederick Dent 
Grant, was born in 1850, and, as the only child at the 
Sackets Harbor garrison, he became the darling of the post. 
Ulysses enjoyed his role as husband and father, taking to 
it as his own father never had. His little family replaced 
the loneliness he had felt with his parents and at West 
Point. But the companionship Grant needed was short-lived, 
for in 1852 the army transferred the Fourth to the Pacific 
coast. 5 
The assignment devastated Grant. He did not let 
Julia, pregnant with their second child, accompany him to 
the West, a fortunate decision for Grant's group crossed 
the isthmus of Panama in July 1852 during a cholera 
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epidemic that killed thirty-seven of them. Grant's 
decision perhaps saved his growing family's lives, but it 
indirectly cost him his career. First assigned to Columbia 
Barracks, Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory, Grant found 
peacetime quartermaster duties even more mundane than in 
wartime. Looking for diversion and a way to augment his 
army pay, and, perhaps, still trying to earn his father's 
favor, Grant tried several money-making schemes. None of 
them succeeded. 6 
Grant's business failures troubled him, and he missed 
his family, which now included infant son Ulysses, Jr., but 
he had something of a surrogate family to support him. At 
Sackets Harbor, a career army couple, the Getzes, whom 
everyone knew simply as Maggy and Getz, were the Grants' 
servants. The couples were quite fond of each other, and 
Maggy and Getz went with Grant to Vancouver. Biographer 
McFeely says the Getzes ''provided the domestic center 
without which Grant's world would not hold.'' Maggy 
cooked, and Getz tended household chores, and they shared 
Grant's worry about his family. But in mid 1853 Maggy and 
Getz left the army to open a business, leaving Grant's home 
barren. 7 
The Fourth was soon reassigned to Fort Humboldt in 
northern California, and by the time he reached that place 
in February 1854, Grant was a man on the edge. Lonely, 
bored, and stewing over his business failures, Grant became 
depressed. He took to his room and began drinking. The 
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commanding officer at Fort Humboldt, Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert Buchanan despised Grant and had no sympathy with his 
problem. The two had clashed back at Jefferson Barracks in 
St. Louis when Buchanan fined Grant some bottles of wine 
for being late to mess. (The lieutenant had been at the 
Dent home seeing Julia). Their relations were no better in 
California, and, catching Grant drunk on duty, Buchanan 
gave him an ultimatum--resign or face public charges. 
Grant would not do the latter. Hoping to save himself and 
his family from humiliation, he resigned in April 1854. 8 
Grant's life became a financial hell. Jesse Grant, 
fearful his son had squandered the only job he could ever 
hold, petitioned Secretary of War Jefferson Davis to 
rescind the resignation. Davis declined, and Captain 
Grant's resignation stood. Jesse then offered Ulysses a 
job at his Galena, Illinois, tannery. Ulysses refused, 
having the same feeling toward the leather business as he 
did when he was eight. Between 1854 and 1858, Grant tried 
to sustain his family, which would also include Nellie, 
born in 1855, and Jesse, in 1858, by farming. He worked 
farmland belonging to Julia's brother, Lewis Dent, near St. 
Louis, and erected a rough-hewn log farmhouse he called 
''Hardscrabble.'' His farming effort failed, however, and 
Julia secured Ulysses a job with one of her cousins, Harry 
Boggs, who ran a rent collection business in St. Louis. 
But Grant hated bill collecting as much as he hated 
tanning, and he quickly wanted out of the firm of Boggs and 
132 
Grant. Some of his friends tried to get Ulysses the job of 
county engineer, for which his West Point schooling well 
qualified him, but the position went to another man. In 
1860 Grant relented and accepted his father's offer of a 
job at the Galena leather goods store. 9 
When the Civil War started in April 1861, Grant helped 
muster and drill Galena men for armed service. With the 
help of political sponsor Republican Congressman Elihu B. 
Washburne, himself a Galena man, Grant attained a colonelcy 
and command of the Twenty-first Illinois Infantry Regiment. 
Sent to secure the Federal presence in northeastern 
Missouri, which wavered between loyalty and rebellion, 
Grant learned in August 1861 that President Abraham Lincoln 
had submitted his name for promotion to brigadier 
genera1.~0 
With his general's commission, Grant had survived the 
bleakest time of his life; those years, however, influenced 
the personal staff Grant put together to help him run his 
first general command. Grant selected Galena men and men 
who had been kind to him during his trials. The many 
people who had been cruel to Grant in his younger years--
bullies in Georgetown, Robert Buchanan, Jesse Root Grant, 
and even his mother in her silence--and the loneliness in 
which he had spent much of his life, from Ohio to West 
Point to Fort Humboldt, instilled in Grant certain needs. 
He knew he needed people around him whom he considered 
worthy of his trust. Grant needed Julia and his children 
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most of all. But now, going to war, Grant knew that would 
not be possible, and as the Getzes had been his surrogate 
family at Columbia Barracks, he had to have a surrogate 
family with him on the battlefield. The men of his staff 
would, by their propinquity, be that surrogate family. 
They would eat with him, bunk with him, and come to know 
his inner-most thoughts in a world that Julia could never 
be part of--the entirely male v/oild of nineteenth-century 
warfare. Unfortunately, some of the men Grant selected to 
form his inner circle would later prove unworthy of his 
trust, but their appointments helped Grant make the 
transition from devoted husband and father to fighting 
general. 
Grant's commission as general sent men scrambling to 
get on his staff. Philip Drum, a Galena man whose cabinet 
shop was near Jesse Grant's leather goods shop, requested 
Grant appoint his son, First Lieutenant Thaddeus G. Drum, 
of the Nineteenth Illinois Regiment, to his staff, and E. 
A. Collins, who had been a partner of Jesse Grant's more 
than ten years earlier, tried to get a staff job for a 
friend. A Josh Sharp, probably a relative because Julia 
Grant's sister, Ellen, had married a Dr. Alexander Sharp 
(who did, in fact, become brigade surgeon on Grant's 
special staff), offered to work for free on Grant's staff, 
and even Jesse Grant recommended a Mr. Foley for the staff. 
No less than Abraham Lincoln also endorsed an applicant, 
John Belser, a clerk at the Illinois adjutant-general's 
office, for a spot on Grant's staff. Grant, knowing whom 
he wanted and needed, resisted all those petitions. 11 
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One of the first men Grant selected for his staff was 
a man who had supported him during his trying experience as 
a bill collector in St. Louis. Grant and his brother-in-
law, Boggs, had rented office space from the law firm of 
Josiah G. McClellan, William S. Hillyer, and James C. 
Moody. The lawyers became friends of Grant's. On March 
29, 1859, McClellan and Hillyer had witnessed Grant's 
manumission of a slave, William Jones, whom he had 
purchased from his father-in-law, Frederick Dent, during 
his farming days. All three men had also endorsed Grant in 
his bid for the st. Louis county engineer's job. Hillyer 
became closest to Grant, who later described Hillyer as 
''quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very 
brilliant.'' Grant chose Hillyer to join his staff, with 
the rank of captain, as an aide-de-camp. 12 
Grant also felt obliged that one of his aides come 
from the regiment he had commanded at the start of the war, 
the Twenty-first Illinois; such a selection would honor the 
men who had given Grant his first successful job in seven 
years. He chose First Lieutenant Clark B. Lagow, who had 
joined the Twenty-first on May 7, 1861. Lagow was perhaps 
''settling'' for Grant, for he had unsuccessfully 
petitioned Illinois Governor Richard Yates for a position 
on the staff of either general John Charles Fremont or John 
Pope. Nevertheless, on August 11, 1861, Grant appointed 
Lagow to his staff as an aide-de-camp with the rank of 
captain. 13 
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Perhaps the best appointment Grant ever made to his 
staff was that of assistant adjutant general John Aaron 
Rawlins, a Galena attorney. Rawlins would become Grant's 
chief of staff and serve Grant into his presidency, 
ultimately becoming secretary of war. Born February 13, 
1831, Rawlins was the son of a charcoal burner who supplied 
charcoal to Galena's lead mines. Rawlins' father, James, 
was also an alcoholic. In him John saw early the effects 
of drink, and he pledged himself to a life of abstinence. 
When James followed the Gold Rush to California in 1849, 
John handled the charcoal burning, but he augmented his 
rudimentary education by reading and studying on his own, 
and he developed a keen interest in politics and debating. 
In 1853 he began to study law with Galena attorney Isaac P. 
Stevens. He became Stevens' partner in 1854 and the next 
year took over the practice. Rawlins shone at jury trials 
and public debates where he could use his oratorical 
skills. In public speaking, Rawlins was dramatic. Once 
possessed of an opinion, Rawlins would vehemently defend it 
with a booming voice and strident tones. 14 
While Rawlins was attorney for Jesse Grant's Galena 
leather shop, Ulysses did not take the measure of the man 
until he attended a patriotic meeting on April 16, 1861, 
held in response to the Confederacy's bombardment of Fort 
Sumter. Republican Congressman Washburne spoke first, 
delivering a popular militant address. Then Rawlins, a 
Democrat, took the floor and proclaimed that the war cut 
through party lines. ''It is simply Union or disunion, 
country, or no country,'' he declared. ''Only one course 
is left for us. We will stand by the flag of our country 
and appeal to the God of Battles!'' The address stirred 
Grant's military blood and he returned to the army. Two 
days later he was raising volunteers in Galena. 1 ~ 
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On August 7, 1861, soon after receiving his brigadier 
general's commission, Grant offered Rawlins a staff job. 
''I ... wanted to take one mah from my new home, 
Galena,'' Grant explained, ''and there was no man more 
ready to serve his country than he.'' Grant wanted Rawlins 
for assistant adjutant general, but a Montague s. Hasie 
held the job and Grant offered Rawlins a position as aide-
de-camp. Hasie was soon gone from the staff, however, and 
Grant amended his offer to Rawlins. On August 10 Grant 
wrote Julia, ''I have invited Mr. Rollins [he evidently did 
not know Rawlins well enough to spell his name correctly] . 
a place on my staff.'' He encouraged Julia to have his 
brother, Orvil, in Galena, hurry Rawlins to Grant's camp. 
In the meantime, Rawlins penned a flowery acceptance to 
Grant, saying the job was a ''compliment unexpected.'' 
Nevertheless, he believed Grant would not have offered the 
job if he thought Rawlins unfit for it. Rawlins accepted, 
saying ''whatever the duties and responsibilities devolved 
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upon me ... , I will with the help of God discharge them 
to the best of my ability.'' 16 
still, a personal crisis kept Rawlins from hurrying to 
Grant's side. His wife died of tuberculosis August 30 at 
her father's home in Goshen, New York, leaving Rawlins with 
three children under five years old. While Rawlins 
returned to New York to settle affairs, his supporters in 
Galena feared Grant would withdraw the staff offer, and 
several of them wrote the general asking him not to change 
his mind. On August 31 Grant asked Julia to reassure 
Rawlins' fri~nds that he had no intention of giving the job 
to anyone else. Three days later he told Washburne the 
same thing, noting, ''I never had an idea of withdrawing . 
. . [the offer] so long as he felt disposed to accept no 
matter how long his absence.'' Grant showed his loyalty to 
Rawlins, and his own decision, saying, ''Mr. Rawlins was 
the first one I decided upon for a place with me and I very 
much regret that family affliction has kept him away so 
long. ' ':i.7 
Rawlins was with Grant at Cairo, Illinois, by 
September 8, for that day he filed with the adjutant 
general's office in Washington General Orders Number Four 
listing Grant's staff composition. Grant was thirty-nine 
years old, Lagow thirty-two, and Rawlins and Hillyer both 
thirty. While none of the staffers had any real military 
experience, Grant called them ''three of the cleverest men 
that can be found anywhere.'' 18 
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Given command of the District of Southeast Missouri, 
Grant first went to Ironton, Missouri, in August, then Cape 
Girardeau, and finally across the Mississippi River to the 
southern tip of Illinois at Cairo in early September. 
There he guarded the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi 
rivers. At Cairo Grant finished building his staff. He 
brought aboard Major John Riggin, Jr., as a volunteer aide-
de-camp, and Major Joseph Dana Webster as his chief of 
engineers. Although Webster was on Grant's special staff, 
he quickly bridged the gap between divisions of Grant's 
headquarters to become a trusted advisor of the general. 
By the end of December he was Grant's first chief of 
staff.i 9 
Webster, whom Grant termed an ''old soldier ... of 
decided merit,'' brought the most military experience to 
Grant's staff. Gray-haired and steely-eyed with a bushy 
moustache and goatee, Webster was fifty years old when he 
joined Grant's staff. Born in Hampton, New Hampshire, he 
graduated from Dartmouth College in 1832. He ,studied law 
for a time, then engineering, and in 1835 he became a 
government civil engineer. In 1838 he joined the United 
States Army topographical engineers. He was in the Mexican 
War and left the army in 1854 as a captain. Moving to 
Chicago, the home of his wife, Webster helped lay out the 
city's early sewer system and elevate downtown Chicago 
above the level of Lake Michigan. When the Civil War 
started, he rejoined the army, going to Cairo as a 
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paymaster with Illinois volunteers occupying that place in 
late April. On May 1 he was commissioned inspector of the 
First Brigade of Illinois Volunteers, but he continued to 
act as an engineer. On June 18 Illinois Governor Yates 
named Webster ··engineer in chief'' with the rank of 
colonel. Three days later he also took an appointment as 
an additional paymaster. On August 27 General Fremont, 
commanding the Department of the West, ordered Webster to 
erect defensive works around Cairo. When Grant arrived a 
few days later he brought Webster onto his staff. 20 
With Webster working on defenses and Rawlins drafting 
the orders that organized the command, Hillyer became 
something of an all-purpose man for Grant. While the 
general was first setting up camp in Cairo, Hillyer brought 
him his general's uniform and horse from st. Louis. 
Hillyer also sent word to Captain Reuben B. Hatch, 
assistant quartermaster at Cairo, that Grant needed office 
space and quarters for himself and the staff. Hillyer soon 
had to take emergency leave to be with his wife, whose 
father and brother had died suddenly, but when he returned 
Grant had additional duties for him. Grant had written 
Captain Chauncey McKeever, Fremont's assistant adjutant 
general in St. Louis, that many troops who had never been 
sworn in were serving around Cairo. Grant requested 
Fremont's headquarters send someone or authorize someone in 
Grant's command to do the job. It fell to Hillyer, and on 
October 4 Rawlins issued orders making his fellow staffer 
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mustering officer for the district. Finally, on October 
30, Grant sent Hillyer, under flag of truce, to deliver a 
Southern prisoner into Rebel lines. The mission turned out 
to be a prisoner exchange of sorts, for Confederates told 
Hillyer they had a man who wanted to go North. Hillyer 
took him aboard his steamer, but on the trip home the man 
jumped overboard and drowned. 21 
Grant enjoyed others' children as much as his own, and 
Hillyer's son, Williams., Jr., was in Grant's camp in the 
fall of 1861, probably due to the family's losses in early 
September. Grant had quite a joke with the boy on November 
1 when he issued a ''general order'' to ''all whom it may 
concern.'' He appointed ''Master Willie S. Hillyer Pony 
Aide de Camp with the rank of major .... All stable 
boys will take due notice and obej him accordingly.' 122 
Grant could learn only so much about his staff 
officers and his army, and they about him, while sitting in 
camp. On November 7, 1861, at Belmont, Missouri, they all 
got their first taste of Civil War battle. Shortly before 
Major General Henry W. Halleck replaced him as chief of the 
Department of the West, General Fremont had ordered Grant 
to demonstrate against Kentucky Confederates south of 
Cairo. Fremont feared that Rebels under General Leonidas 
Polk might sweep out of their base at Columbus, Kentucky, 
on the Mississippi River, and into southern Missouri and 
join Confederates under General Sterling Price. Fremont 
planned to bag Price himself--although Washington bagged 
Fremont for inactivity before he got the chance--and he 
wanted Grant to keep Rebel reinforcements from arriving. 
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He cautioned Grant, however, not to bring on a fight. But 
Grant was a fighter. When he received intelligence 
(faulty, it turned out) that some of Price's men were 
massing at Belmont, immediately across the river from 
Columbus, to cut off a contingent Grant had sent into 
Missouri to capture a Rebel raiding party, he disregarded 
Fremont's order about fighting. On November 6 Grant put 
3,000 troops on navy gunboats at Cairo and headed down the 
Mississippi. At dawn the next day the troops unloaded 
three miles above Belmont, formed into line of battle, and 
quickly routed four regiments under Brigadier General 
Gideon Pillow that Polk had sent across the river to 
counter Grant. Elated at their quick victory, Grant's men 
began looting the tiny Confederate camp they found at 
Belmont; the place had never been a staging area for a 
larger operation. While the Federals were taking spoils, 
though, reinforcements from Polk came ashore at Belmont and 
surrounded them. Grant was unperturbed when he had a horse 
shot from under him, and he remained cool in the face of 
the new development, dryly noting, ''Well, we must cut our 
way out as we cut our way in.'' That they did, and during 
the sharp fight Grant stayed at the rear of his men, 
shepherding them back to their boats. He was the last one 
to board. 23 
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As Civil War battles go, Belmont was merely a raid. 
The place had no strategic value, Confederates were not 
using it to base larger operations, and it was untenable, 
as Rebel guns at Columbus could rake it at will. But it 
was a classroom for Grant and his men. While Grant had 
seen action in Mexico, he had never commanded men in 
battle. Likewise, Belmont was first blood for Grant's 
volunteers. All performed well and developed a measure of 
confidence in each other. 24 
All of Grant's staff officers were with him at 
Belmont, but Grant gives little idea of their duties. In 
his report of the engagement Grant expressed his gratitude 
to Rawlins, Lagow, and Hillyer, saying, ''I am much 
indebted for the promptitude with which they discharged 
their several duties.'' Grant continued, ''Major J. D. 
Webster . also accompanied me on the field and 
displayed soldierly qualities of a high order.' 12 ~ 
Rawlins described the fight at Belmont in detail in a 
letter to his mother November 15. While he revealed 
nothing about the duties he performed for Grant on the 
field, he did stick close to his chief. ''I was by the 
side of General Grant when his horse was shot under him,'' 
he said, explaining that Grant's horse had balked for a 
moment, and Rawlins took the lead as the men rode up to the 
ranks. When Rawlins turned back to Grant, ''the General 
said his horse was shot so severely that it was necessary 
to leave him on the field.'' In a letter that surely would 
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have been more unnerving than reassuring to a mother, 
Rawlins wrote, ''I was in the midst of danger and within 
the reach of the rebel fire more than once during the 
day.'' Rawlins biographer James Harrison Wilson, who would 
serve as an engineer on Grant's special staff, said Belmont 
taught Rawlins the advantage of taking the initiative in 
battle, and made him an ''earnest advocate of striking the 
first blow.' 126 
Belmont had proved that Rawlins was certainly willing 
to stick close to Grant; before the end of the year he was 
sticking with Grant on an issue that would haunt the 
general throughout the war. After Grant's raid on Belmont, 
the public began to see him as a fighting general, but 
detractors surfaced as well. Some questioned Grant's 
competence, claiming the fight was unnecessary; after all, 
Grant had gained nothing strategic, and casualties were 
about 600 men on each side. Others opened an old wound, 
namely Grant's drinking in California and his resignation 
from the army. On December 17 a Benjamin Campbell of 
Galena wrote Grant's political sponsor, Elihu Washburne, 
saying a ''good authority'' had told him Grant was 
''drinking very hard.'' Campbell suggested Washburne write 
Rawlins and get the real facts. 
Washburne did indeed write Rawlins, who responded with 
fervor in defense of his commander. In a lengthy letter 
(Rawlins the wordsmith seldom wrote any other kind) dated 
December 30, Rawlins emphatically allayed Washburne's 
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worries. He said Grant was not ''drinking very hard'' and 
such a statement ''could have originated only in malice.'' 
Rawlins described Grant when he arrived at Cairo as a 
··strictly total abstinence man,'' and said friends had 
told him that had been Grant's habit for five or six years, 
or since he left California. Rawlins said Grant took a few 
social drinks after the fight at Belmont, unusual to those 
around him because of his abstinence, and never enough to 
''unfit him for business.'' Rawlins said that in September 
Grant's doctor had prescribed two glasses of beer a day to 
cure dyspepsia; Grant follo~ed the prescription for two 
weeks but gave it up when it did no good. 27 
With his letter to Washburne, Rawlins assumed the job 
of Grant's protector, both from the bottle and from the 
public. Julia had done it at home, now Rawlins would do it 
in camp. Grant had not been on a bender since becoming a 
general, but he still had his problem with drink, and the 
astute Rawlins recognized it by late 1861. Over the next 
few years he would willingly ride herd over Grant's 
drinking, and early on, in this letter to Washburne, he 
revealed the source of his loyalty to Grant. ''I regard 
his interest as my interest ... ; I love him as a father; 
I respect him because I have studied him well, and the more 
I know him the more I respect and love him.'' Rawlins 
assured Washburne that Grant would never disgrace himself 
or his uniform with drink, and he pledged himself to that 
assurance. 2 • 
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From the outset, Grant asked more of his personal 
staff than the terms adjutant general or aide-de-camp might 
imply. Grant had already shown that when he made Hillyer a 
mustering officer. He used Hillyer again in December 1861 
to investigate lumber contractors who were defrauding his 
army's quartermaster department. Hillyer cracked the case 
in St. Louis and recovered a great deal of money for the 
army. Grant also dispatched Riggin that same month to 
investigate a river steamer reportedly running contraband 
goods into the Confederacy. 29 
Joseph D. Webster also did more than just supervise 
engineering for Grant. On November 8, the day after the 
fight at Belmont, Grant sent Webster to confer with 
Leonidas Polk about tending the dead and wounded left on 
the field. Webster also returned sixty-four Confederate 
prisoners whom Grant had unconditionally released. In 
December Webster returned another seventeen prisoners to 
Polk, and in January he made another such trip, delivering 
a sick prisoner whom Polk had specially requested be 
released. But Wesbster had joined Grant's inner circle as 
well. Rawlins described Webster as ''a counsellor of the 
General ... who was with him at and all through the 
Battle of Belmont, who has seen him daily and has every 
opportunity to know his habits.'' One can only surmise 
Rawlins' meaning of the word ''counsellor;'' Grant shed no 
light on his relationship with Webster in his Memoirs, and 
Webster left no collection of papers that might provide 
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illumination. Throughout the war, however, Grant 
habitually listened to the opinions of his staffers and 
generals he trusted, and he considered those opinions in 
making decisions. Webster was probably one of the earliest 
of those advisors. Regardless, Webster had gained Grant's 
trust enough that, by December 23, he was Grant's first 
chief of staff. 30 
To be sure, Grant's staff had its share of mundane 
duties to perform, just as did Lee's. Hillyer, whom Grant 
knew best of the men, and Rawlins wrote most of the letters 
and orders at headquarters. James Harrison Wilson summed 
up Rawlins' clerical duties in late 1861 and early 1862 
when he wrote, ''Rawlins' duties ... were confined to 
issuing orders, sending out instructions and making 
returns. These orders ahnounced ~he staff, the creation of 
brigades and divisions, and the assignment of regiments 
thereto, but the greater number of them were dictated 
verbally by General Grant from his own personal experience 
and related to the discipline of the troops in camp and on 
the march, prohibiting them from leaving camp or going 
outside of the line of sentinels except upon duty, 
forbidding them to straggle, maraud, or fire away 
ammunition upon any pretext except in battle.' ' 31 
During and after the war Grant detractors claimed that 
Rawlins was, in fact, Grant's brain; that he masterminded 
Grant's plans and that Grant would have had no operational 
success without Rawlins telling him what to do. But 
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Wilson's comment about Rawlins writing orders which Grant 
had verbally dictated puts the lie to that story. Grant 
did indeed seek advice, but his decisions, and subsequently 
his orders, were his own. Rawlins simply wrote them for 
distribution to the army, a prime function of any staff 
officer. Wilson discusses the issue more directly, saying, 
''It cannot be contended that Rawlins was greater or wiser 
than Grant ... nor can it be properly claimed that he .. 
. 'supplied Grant with brains,' as some have declared.'' 
Wilson concludes that, while he did not think for Grant, 
Rawlins gave the general ''qualities and characteristics 
which ... [he] did not possess.'' That is exactly the 
relationship John Vermillion says is essential between a 
good chief of staff, which Rawlins became, and his 
commander. 32 
In late 1861 and into the new year, Grant petitioned 
Halleck to let him take his army, grown now to near 20,000 
men at Cairo, on an invasion of Tennessee. Confederate 
General Albert Sidney Johnston had stretched a poorly 
manned defensive line through northern Tennessee, and he 
knew it would fail if Federal troops pushed hard enough. 
He knew just where it would likely fail, too--sister posts 
twelve miles apart called Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. 
Henry guarded the Tennessee River, Donelson the Cumberland. 
Those rivers bisected Johnston's line, and, even though 
they flowed north, the Confederate commander knew Federal 
gunboats could buck the current, get in his rear, and 
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threaten the Confederacy's hold on Tennessee. Grant saw 
the weakness, too, and he tried to sell Halleck on a 
waterborne expedition into Tennessee. Halleck remembered 
Grant best for stories of his drunkenness, though, and 
besides, if any victories were to be won in the West, 
Halleck wanted to win them. So, when Grant traveled to St. 
Louis to persuade Halleck about an invasion, Halleck 
dismissed him. But when Grant returned to Cairo he 
received intelligence from General C. F. Smith, an old 
regular and one of Grant's West Point instructors and 
military idols, that troops could easily take Fort Henry. 
Grant wanted to work in conjunction with United States Navy 
Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote. They planned to use 
gunboats on the Tennessee to soften up Fort Henry, and 
float 17,000 of Grant's men up the river to capture the 
fort. Only when Foote lent his name to the plan did 
Halleck relent, for he trusted Foote and not Grant. 
Grant's expedition to the sister forts was a bona fide 
campaign, the first he and his staff had embarked upon, and 
during the next two weeks Grant's chief, Webster, would 
prove himself worthy of the title. On February 2 the 
expedition left Cairo, and the next day the transports 
stopped just below Fort Henry to disembark troops on either 
side of the river. Grant planned to have a column under C. 
F. Smith capture the heights across from the fort while 
Brigadier General John A. McClernand's First Division moved 
behind the fort to cut off escape. In a move that 
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foreshadows Grant's staff usage in 1864, he placed Webster 
with McClernand the day before the assault began. 
McClernand was a political rather than a professional 
general, and by the end of the year Grant had fully 
recognized the man's incompetence as a field commander. 
Before Fort Henry, however, Grant did not yet have cause to 
suspect McClernand's abilities, so Webster was not along to 
hold McClernand's hand. More likely, Webster's job was to 
lend an old engineer's eye to the situation before them, 
for he participated in two scouting parties. On April 5, 
Webster rode out with Colonel P. J. Oglesby and a 
detachment of the First Brigade, First Division, to 
reconnoiter the country near Fort Henry. Also that day 
Webster accompanied McClernand, and engineers James B. 
McPherson and a Lieutenant Freeman on another 
reconnaissance; which confirmed to McClernand the strength 
of Fort Henry's guns. 33 
On February 6 Grant launched the assault, the ground 
columns moving on Fort Henry and a third sailing upriver 
with the navy. Foote's gunboats, however, started and 
finished the fight before Grant's infantrymen, bogged down 
in winter mud, could get into the fight. Fort Henry's 
commander, Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman, realized his 
garrison could not withstand Grant's assault, and he sent 
2,500 of his men to safety at Fort Donelson. He stayed 
behind with a contingent to put up a token fight, then 
surrender, which he did to naval officers. Grant did not 
care who took the surrender; Fort Henry and, effectively, 
the Tennessee River had fallen. Fort Donelson and the 
Cumberland were next. 
While he first hoped to attack Fort Donelson on 
February 8, Grant had to delay his attack a few days. 
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Foote needed time to get his gunboats back downriver to 
Cairo, pick up 10,000 reenforcements that Halleck had 
decided to send the expedition, and move up the Cumberland 
to Fort Donelson. The navy remained busy, however, and so 
did Joseph Dana Webster. On the seventh three gunboats 
dashed up the Tennessee River, demonstrating their new 
control of the waterway. Webster, some other officers, 
perhaps including John Riggin of Grant's staff, and two 
companies of sharpshooters went with Commander Henry Walke 
on the expedition, which destroyed the bridges of the 
Memphis and Bowling Green Railroad. On February 9, Webster 
accompanied Grant on a cross-country reconnaissance to 
within four miles of Fort Donelson. Another of Grant's 
staffers, Hillyer, also stayed busy. He escorted prisoners 
captured at Fort Henry to Paducah, Kentucky, where Union 
officials would send them north. 34 
On February 12, leaving 2,500 men at Fort Henry, Grant 
started his men on their twelve-mile march to the rear of 
Fort Donelson. While they started in beautiful, spring-
like weather, by nightfall winter had returned, bringing 
sleet and snow and plunging temperatures below zero. Grant 
took his men to within gunshot of Fort Donelson's defenses 
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and, headquartering his staff in a farmhouse kitchen, 
deployed his army on the land side of Donelson. Grant 
posted Smith's division on the left, and McClernand's on 
the right, although the line was not long enough to close 
an escape route along the Cumberland on Grant's far right. 
The gunboats bringing·Halleck's replacements were late, so 
Grant ordered Brigadier General Lew Wallace to bring 2,000 
of the reserves from Fort Henry to help close the gap. As 
it was, none of the reinforcements arrived until the 
fourteenth, and all went into line under Wallace's command. 
When Foote did arrive, Grant urged him to immediately 
attack the fort. He did and met with signal failure. 
Confederate gunners in Fort Donelson got their range and 
slammed solid shot into the iron-cased boats, sending them 
spinning out of control downriver and out of the fight. 
Foote himself suffered a wound in the battle. Before he 
went north with his battered armada, Grant conferred with 
him on the fifteenth. 
While Grant was away, Confederates inside the fort, 
under the joint command of generals Gideon Pillow, John B. 
Floyd, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, staged a counterattack 
designed to open an escape route through Grant's line. The 
attack smashed into McClernand's line, on Grant's right, 
sending it reeling. McClernand put up a desperate fight, 
but could not hold on and soon sent a desperate plea for 
help to Wallace, whose Third Division was in line between 
McClernand and Smith. Before he left, Grant had ordered 
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his men emphatically to hold their positions (McClernand 
had initiated a needless skirmish on the thirteenth and 
Grant wanted no more of that), and Wallace refused to lend 
McClernand a hand without orders. He sent a messenger to 
Grant's headquarters asking for permission to move, but 
then, at that critical hour of battle, Grant's staff 
officers failed him. None of the men, green in battle to 
be sure, would take the initiative and change the orders. 
Even though he could not get permission, Wallace finally 
sent two brigades to McClernand. Wallace's messenger to 
the farmhouse had bestirred Grant's staff, however, and 
John Rawlins was quickly riding to Wallace's position. 
While the two men talked, a flood of retreating Federals 
overran them, one frantic man crying out ''We're cut to 
pieces!'' Rawlins, the vehement patriot, unholstered his 
revolver and made as if to shoot the man; Wallace stopped 
him. :n, 
Despite Wallace's assistance, the Confederates pried 
open their escape route. They hesitated, however, and 
Grant returned to find McClernand and Wallace dithering 
while the army disintegrated. Grant, angered, ordered the 
men to counterattack. Then, with Chief of Staff Webster 
riding by his side, Grant galloped up and down the line 
rallying the retreating men. Grant recalled that he told 
Webster to ''call out to the men . 'Fill your cartridge 
boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to 
escape and he must not be permitted to do so.''' Grant 
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said that ''acted like a charm. The men only wanted 
someone to give them a command.' 136 Webster was by Grant's 
side much of the day, and a painting of the fight on the 
fifteenth depicts the chief of staff sitting his horse amid 
snow and barren trees not fifteen feet from Grant, looking, 
with his grey beard and blue cloak blowing in the wind, 
like Father Winter himself. 37 
Finding Smith, Grant told the old general that he must 
attack the works guarding Fort Donelson. Smith did, 
gaining a secure hold in the entrenchments. Now the 
Confederates were reeling, and Chief of Staff Webster raced 
back to the right, telling McClernand and Wallace that 
Smith had a foothold in the Rebel works and that they 
should press their attack. 38 They soon retook the ground 
on the right. 
During the night, the Confederate generals decided 
they must surrender Fort Donelson. Two of them, Pillow and 
Floyd, ingloriously escaped, leaving Buckner to surrender. 
on February 16, Grant sent Buckner his famous message 
calling for ''unconditional and immediate surrender.'' 
Buckner had no choice but to accept Grant's demand. 
Donelson and the Cumberland were at last Grant's. 39 
In the days following the surrender Webster continued 
to act in an enlarged capacity. On February 19 he 
accompanied Flag Officer Foote on an ''armed 
reconnaissance'' up the Cumberland River some thirty miles 
to Clarksville, Tennessee. With the steamer Conestoga and 
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the gunboat Cairo they neared Fort Defiance at Clarksville, 
where a white flag fluttered in the breeze. Foote said 
expedition troops landed and found the place deserted. 
Webster and a Lieutenant Commander Phelps, commander of the 
Conestoga, took possession of the fort and ran up the 
United states flag. Webster gathered intelligence on the 
mission indicating that Grant's push in the northwest part 
of Tennessee had driven Sidney Johnston and his 
Confederates from Nashville, farther up the Cumberland, and 
the Tennessee capital was apparently open for Federal 
occupation. 40 
In his official report of the surrender of Fort 
Donelson, Grant commended each member of his staff, saying 
''all are deserving of personal mention for their gallantry 
and service.''" 1 He mentioned no particulars. To be sure, 
the Fort Donelson campaign was a classroom for 
inexperienced staff officers. The men had experienced an 
easy win at Fort Henry, perhaps so easy it imbued them with 
false confidence. Fort Donelson, with its winter weather, 
delays, spontaneous and dumbheaded behavior by McClernand, 
and a tenacious Rebel counterattack, was the opposite of 
Fort Henry. Grant no doubt felt obliged to commend all of 
his staff officers for their work, with which he may well 
have been satisfied. In fact, though, the staffers, and 
Grant, had much to learn about headquarters work. Grant 
failed to leave anyone on the field in charge when he left 
to talk to Foote on the fifteenth, and he did not give any 
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of his aides authority to act in his stead in an emergency. 
While Webster performed yeoman service for Grant on the 
fifteenth, riding from field to field, often at Grant's 
side, Grant might have better used him at headquarters to 
direct operations and handle crises. Rawlins, too, had 
much to learn, for as adjutant his job was to coordinate 
troop movements and monitor the fluid situation, not 
threaten a frightened soldier with death. 
Rawlins apparently realized he had much to learn. His 
friend, James Harrison Wilson, said the Donelson campaign 
gave Rawlins ''a clear insight into the difficulties and 
dangers of military life.'' He said the campaign taught 
Rawlins that he had to know accurately what was going on 
throughout Grant's command and at headquarters, and that he 
needed complete records of orders and communications. 
Wilson, always a Rawlins supporter, said the adjutant was 
equal to the task. Grasping the problem, Wilson said, 
Rawlins became ''an acknowledged factor of great power and 
influence in the daily administration of the army, as well 
as in the personal and official fortunes of its chief.' 142 
Rawlins did indeed quickly grasp the need for order 
around Grant's headquarters. On March 15, just a month 
after Fort Donelson, he issued General Orders Number 
Twenty-one, in which he perfectly stipulated the duties of 
each staff officer. That was something no one, not Robert 
Chilton nor Walter Taylor, had done for Robert E. Lee's 
headquarters; the organized Seth Williams had not even 
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done it for McClellan. Rawlins gave himself ··special 
charge of the books of records, consolidating returns, and 
forwarding all documents to their proper destination.'' 
The job was not small, and Rawlins got someone to help him. 
The man was Captain William R. Rowley, a former lieutenant 
in the Forty-fifth Illinois Regiment. Rowley, a native of 
Gouveneur, New York, had been in Galena when the war 
started. He was a prominent Republican, clerk of the Jo 
Daviess County circuit court, and a man with Congressman 
Elihu Washburne's ear. In January Grant had agreed to try 
to get Rowley a spot on his staff, if the War Department 
would authorize him another man, and Rowley had petitioned 
Washburne for assignment to Grant. He had also supported 
Grant amid another spate of rumors about the general's 
drunkenness in late January. (''Any one who asserts that 
.. [Grant] is becoming dissipated is either misinformed or 
else he lies,'' Rowley told Washburne.) Grant appointed 
Rowley to his staff on February 26, and Rawlins quickly 
made him his assistant. The two men hit it off. By late 
March Rowley was urging Washburne to secure a major's 
commission for Rawlins. His commendation shows how 
immersed Rawlins had become in headquarters duty: ''He 
works night and day and probably performs as much or more 
hard labor than any other staff officer in the service of 
the United States.'' 43 
Also in General Orders Twenty-on~, Rawlins assigned 
Hillyer to see that commanders of division level and below 
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furnish returns to headquarters, and he put Lagow and 
Riggin in charge of applications for passes. He also 
directed Lagow and Riggin to ''have a care to the amount of 
supplies on hand,'' both in commissary and quartermaster 
stores; apparently Rawlins did not trust the chief 
commissary or chief quartermaster of Grant's special staff 
to supply them with accurate information. Rawlins' 
delineation of Webster's dutie~-ieflected the trust Grant 
had in his chief of staff. Rawlins wrote that Webster 
''will be the advisor of the general commanding, and will 
give his attention to any portion of duties that may not 
receive proper attention.'' With General Orders Number 
Twenty-one, Rawlins was exercising what James Harrison 
Wilson called the ''authority and responsibility'' Grant's 
headquarters needed. 44 
While Rawlins was lining out headquarters, Grant, now 
a major general by virtue of the Forts Henry and Donelson 
campaign, was seeking a promotion for his chief of staff. 
On March 14 Grant submitted Webster's name to Secretary of 
War Edwin M. Stanton for a brigadier generalship. For 
promotion Webster needed a field command, and Grant secured 
for him, nominally, command of the First Illinois 
Artillery. Aide-de-camp Hillyer also recommended Webster's 
promotion to Congressman William McKey Dunn of Indiana. 
Webster's promotion to general eventually came through, but 
not until November 29, 1862. 45 
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The next test of Grant's staff would come at the 
Battle of Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862, in southwest Tennessee. 
Confederate General Sidney Johnston and his army had 
retreated from Nashville across Tennessee to Corinth, 
Mississippi, a vital Rebel rail junction just across the 
state line. Grant intended to move his Army of the 
Tennessee up the Tennessee River to a place called 
Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the river and twenty 
miles northeast of Corinth. There Grant would await Major 
General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio to join him 
from northeast Tennessee. Then the combined armies would 
go after Johnston's men at Corinth. Major General Henry 
Halleck almost derailed Grant's plans, however. Halleck, 
angry that Grant, not himself, had returned much of 
Tennessee to Union control, trie~ to discredit Grant. 
Halleck suggested Grant was insubordinate when he left most 
of his army at Fort Donelson and went to check other areas 
in his field of command. Halleck also charged that Grant 
refused to answer telegrams; Grant received them late, for 
a Rebel posing as a Union telegrapher impeded their 
delivery. Halleck ordered Grant back to Fort Henry and 
said the expedition up the Tennessee must proceed under 
command of General Smith. Grant obeyed and sent Smith on 
his way. Abraham Lincoln, pleased with Grant's victories, 
forced Halleck's hand, however, and told him to press 
charges against Grant or to drop the matter. Halleck 
relented and Grant hurried forward to join his army. 46 
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By late March Grant had established his headquarters 
at Savannah, Tennessee, nine miles downstream from the bulk 
of his army at Pittsburg Landing. Grant and his staffers 
were all recuperating from illness (Grant had had diarrhea, 
chills, and fever for three weeks, he wrote Julia}, and 
Hillyer had gone to Washington, D. c., to have his position 
on Grant's staff formally recognized. Rawlins, who had 
also been sick, continued to help Grant organize the army. 
Grant typically spent the night at Savannah and went 
upriver to Pittsburg Landing during the day. On March 26 
Rawlins issued orders placing Major General Smith in 
command at Pittsburg Landing during the times Grant was at 
Savannah, and giving Brigadier General Benjamin M. Prentiss 
command of unattached troops at Pittsburg, thereafter 
called the Sixth Division. On April 2 Rawlins issued 
orders for Grant that further organized the command. 
General Orders Number Thirty-three gave Major General John 
McClernand command of the First Division; Smith command of 
the Second Division (Brigadier General W. H. L. Wallace 
would take command of the division when Smith contracted a 
fatal disease}; Major General Lew Wallace the Third 
Division; Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut the Fourth 
Division; Brigadier General William T. Sherman the Fifth 
Division; and Prentiss the Sixth. 47 
Meanwhile, Colonel Webster continued to conduct 
reconnaissance missions for Grant. On April 3, aboard the 
gunboat Tyler, he ran upriver from Pittsburg Landing to 
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scout debarkation points for a cross-country march to 
Corinth. He suggested that such a march, through ravines 
and over broken country, might be slow and d~ngerous, but 
once at Corinth Federals should have no trouble overcoming 
Rebel defenses. 48 
Grant soon had more immediate worries than the march 
to Corinth, for on the morning of April 6, 40,000 
Confederates under Johnston and General P. G. T. Beauregard 
slammed into his divisions on the plateau of land that 
extended west from Pittsburg Landing. Despite the claims 
of some Grant detractors, his men were not surprised; 
pickets had clashed in the days before the sixth, and the 
Rebels had approached during the pre-dawn hours with no 
degree of silence or secrecy. Nevertheless, Grant had 
expected no such attack, and neither he nor Sherman, who 
had assumed command at Pittsburg Landing from the ill 
Smith, had seen the need to entrench. The attack was 
fierce, especially on the Federal right, which Sherman's 
Fifth Division held, near a small chapel named Shiloh 
church which gave the battle its name. Sidney Johnston 
suffered a mortal wound in the fighting that bent both the 
left and right ends of Grant's line back; Benjamin 
Prentiss' Sixth Division became exposed in the center, and 
there his men fought savagely in what became known as the 
''Hornet's Nest.'' Even though Prentiss had to eventually 
surrender 2,200 men, the action gave Sherman and the other 
division commanders time to fall back about two miles to a 
161 
ridge near the Landing and regroup. Grant was at Savannah 
when the battle erupted. Hearing the firing, he hastened 
the first elements of Buell's army toward the Landing, and 
he ordered Lew Wallace and his division, which had been 
with Grant at Savannah, to hurry into the fight. Wallace, 
in an amazing display of incompetence, marched away from 
the battle and never got into the first day's fight. Grant 
and Buell soon arrived at the Landing, and, with Buell's 
25,000 fresh troops and Wallace's division finally at the 
battlefield, Grant prepared a counterattack for the 
seventh. The Federal push retook the ground they had lost 
the day before and drove Beauregard's army from the 
field. 49 
Grant's staff officers performed far better at Shiloh 
than they had at Fort Donelson. They acted with an 
independence of thought and action that enabled them to 
make spot decisions without specific orders from Grant. 
The general commended them all, saying they had been 
''engaged during the entire two days in conveying orders to 
every part of the field.'' In a flurry of dispatches early 
in the battle, Lagow, Hillyer, and Rawlins hurried off 
orders to lead elements of Buell's army, urging them to 
hurry to Pittsburg Landing.ea Several of the staffers, 
however, did considerably more than send dispatches. 
Grant and his staff were at the general's Savannah 
headquarters having breakfast when the battle started. 
Hillyer had returned about 3:00 a.m. from a trip to Cairo; 
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his arrival had awakened Rawlins, who had been up since. 
While they were eating, about 7:00 a.m., a private soldier 
entered and reported heavy firing from Pittsburg Landing. 
Breakfast went unfinished. Grant's headquarters steamer, 
the Tigress, awaited him on the Tennessee River, and Grant 
ordered his horses and those of his staff taken aboard. 
Then general and staff boarded; Grant's horse had fallen on 
him several days earlier and injured his leg, and he leaned 
on chief of staff J. D. Webster's shoulder as they went up 
the gangplank. Sailors on the Tigress kept steam up in the 
boilers in case of emergency, and the general was quickly 
on his way to the battle. Midway between Savannah and 
Pittsburg Landing was Crump's Landing, where Lew Wallace 
had his division. Wallace was standing on his headquarters 
boat, and Grant ordered the Tigress close alongside 
Wallace's ship. Grant shouted for Wallace to get his 
division ready to march at a moment's notice; Wallace 
replied he had already done so. Grant and his staff sailed 
At Pittsburg Landing the men went to work. Hillyer 
said they met ''hundreds of cowardly renegades'' fleeing 
toward the rear. He said Grant and the staffers rode to 
the center of the line, trying to rally the men. ··soon I 
found myself in the midst of a shower of cannon and musket 
balls, ff he said, noting that Grant remained cool, issuing 
orders and sending ''his aides flying over the field.'' 
Hillyer said while he was issuing an order a cannon ball 
passed within two feet of his horse's head. 52 
163 
Once again, Grant expanded the duties of his chief of 
staff. Recognizing Webster's artillerist's eye and 
engineer's background, he placed the old soldier in charge 
of all the artillery on the field. Webster went to work. 
Down at the landing, amid stacks of supplies that Grant's 
quartermasters and commissar ies'"were gathering for the 
Corinth campaign, was a five-gun battery, officially 
designated Battery B, Second Illinois Light Artillery. But 
the term ''Light Artillery'' was a misnomer; each of the 
guns were twenty-four-pounder siege guns. Henry Halleck 
had said teams of oxen would have to haul the guns to 
Corinth, but Webster reckoned they could be of service at 
Shiloh and he didn't have any oxen handy. Rounding up some 
soldiers, Webster had them manhandle the monsters onto the 
battleground, where he positioned them a quarter-mile from 
the river facing south. There they covered the landing 
and, as the battered Federal divisions fell back, the guns 
became the left end of Grant's last defensive line of the 
day. As units fell back, Webster commandeered much of 
their artillery, some of them no less than twenty-pounder 
Parrott guns, and added them to his end of the line. 
Before he was done Webster had fifty-two guns in place, and 
just in time. 
By 5:30 p.m. Rebels had mounted an offensive against 
Grant's left, but their job was tough. To get to the 
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Federals they first had to cross a watery, brush-choked 
ravine extending from the Tennessee known as the Dill 
Branch. The Union gunboats Tyler and Lexington, floating 
in the river, had their eight-inch and thirty-two-pounder 
guns aimed up the ravine to make the crossing hot, and any 
Confederate who forded the ravine found himself looking 
down the throats of Webster's killers. In his Memoirs, in 
a typical understatement, Grant credited Webster's guns 
with ''effectually check[ing ... the} further progress'' 
of the Rebels. Men in front of the guns, both Union and 
Confederate, had stronger emotions. When the guns opened 
up, some claimed the noise knocked their hats off, other 
said the concussion nearly broke their necks. Still others 
complained of bloody noses, bleeding ears, and deafness. 
Webster's overwhelming force did indeed check the Rebels' 
further progress and allowed the lead element of Buell's 
army to slip into line relatively unassaulted.!53 
No less important, if perhaps less dramatic, were 
aide-de-camp Williams. Hillyer's efforts to get troops on 
the battlefield. When General Buell arrived at Pittsburg 
Landing about 2:00 p.m., he told Grant that Brigadier 
General William Nelson's Fourth Division was soon to 
arrive, and that Colonel Thomas L. Crittenden's division 
was halted back at Savannah awaiting orders. Grant ordered 
Hillyer to escort enough boats back to Savannah to bring 
Crittenden on the field. Hillyer found Crittenden easily 
about 3:30 p.m. and put him on his way. He also discovered 
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that divisions under Brigadier General Alexander McCook and 
Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood were also at Savannah, 
awaiting orders. Hillyer wondered what to do. ''I had no 
orders expect for Crittenden, but we needed all the 
reinforcements we could get,'' he said. Grabbing pen and 
paper he wrote orders, under Grant's name, putting the 
divisions on the march. Then, remembering three idle 
regiments at Savannah, he ordered them, also, to march to 
the fight. Hillyer arranged for the troops' transportation 
then made his way back to Grant. He arrived at the 
battlefield after dark, in a pouring rain, and found Grant, 
Rawlins, and some other staffers lying on the ground, with 
no shelter, trying to sleep. Hillyer told Grant what he 
had done; ''he said I had done exactly right,'' said 
Hillyer. Hillyer's assumption of authority had brought 
badly needed troops onto the field for the second day's 
fight. ''We needed them all! ' ' Hillyer added. 154 
More frustrating duty fell to staff officers Rawlins 
and William R. Rowley. As he and the staffers had steamed 
up the Tennessee that morning, Grant had told Lew Wallace 
to prepare to march. After judging the situation on the 
field, Grant determined to get Wallace on the field right 
away. He sent Rawlins back to the Landing with orders to 
send assistant quartermaster Captain A. S. Baxter 
downstream to put Wallace on the march, via the River Road 
that paralleled the Tennessee and would bring him 
immediately into Grant's rear. Baxter took the steamer 
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Tigress to Crump's Landing, delivered the orders to 
Wallace, and reported back to Grant before noon. In the 
meantime, Grant sent a cavalry captain to make doubly sure 
Wallace got the message. According to Rawlins, the rider 
returned and said Wallace would not move without written 
orders. Rawlins' temper began to boil. ''He should have 
been by this time on the field. His presence then would 
have turned the tide of battle . [and] saved the lives 
of many brave men,'' he said. 
Grant turned to Rowley and asked him if he had writing 
materials in his pouch. Rowley did, and Grant ordered him, 
the cavalry captain, and two orderlies to ride back to 
Wallace. ''If he should require a written order of you, 
you will give him one,'' said Grant. As the men were 
leaving Grant called out ··see that you do not spare horse 
flesh.'' Rowley and company spurred off to Crump's 
Landing. He found Wa.llace had broken camp, but when he 
followed the column he discovered Wallace was on the wrong 
road. If left on his own course, Wallace would have ended 
up behind Confederate lines! Within sound of the firing at 
the Shiloh church, Rowley was astounded to find many of 
Wallace's men resting and the general and his staff idling 
at the head of the column. When Rowley told Wallace about 
the report of his unwillingness to move without written 
orders, Wallace snapped that it was a ''damned lie,'' and 
Rowley wouldn't have found him on the road if such was his 
intention. When Rowley questioned him .about his choice of 
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roads, Wallace replied he was on the only road he knew of. 
(Rawlins later commented that Wallace had been in camp at 
crump's Landing since mid-March and should have 
familiarized himself with the immediate area.) ·Rowley 
turned Wallace's column around and pointed them toward the 
River Road, but Wallace insisted he remain as a guide. 
Meanwhile, Grant, having not heard from Rowley, sent 
Rawlins and Lieutenant Colonel James B. McPherson to find 
him and Wallace's division. They found the division moving 
at a snail's pace, despite Rowley's urging. When it 
appeared that Confederates might be holding a bridge on 
their route of march, Wallace balked, asking the staff 
officers what he should do if the enemy was in the way. 
''Fight our way through until communication can be had with 
General Grant,'' was McPherson's reply. The men discovered 
the bridge was safe, but Wallace did not send forward a 
brigade to secure it until Rawlins suggested he do so. The 
staff officers kept Wallace headed toward the battle, but 
''he did not make a mile and a half an hour, although urged 
and appealed to push forward,'' said Rawlins. He got on 
the battlefield only after the day's fight was over. 55 
Grant did not publicly censure Wallace for his 
behavior at Shiloh, but Grant's staffers never forgave the 
errant general. In his Memoirs, Grant's comments about 
Wallace were mild. He said he could not understand why 
Wallace, with firing to his south, needed any other order 
than to come immediately to Pittsburg Landing without 
specifying a route of march. ''His was one of three 
veteran divisions ... ,'' said Grant, ''and his absence 
was severely felt.'' But Grant's aides freguently--and 
vehemently--rehashed the affair in camp. Newspaperman 
Sylvanus Cadwallader, who became close friends with Grant 
and the staffers and camped with them for much of the war, 
said the staff officers often spoke ill of Wallace, often 
in Grant's presence. ''[Grant] always assented to their 
criticisms of Wallace's behavior,'' said Cadwallader, 
noting that Grant never again trusted Wallace with an 
important command.& 6 
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Grant's personal staff ~t Shiloh was, in effect, a 
different staff than the one that had served him at Fort 
Donelson. Back at Donelson, with Grant momentarily gone 
from the field, the men had dithered when the Confederates 
staged their counterattack. No one had attempted to rally 
the shocked and retreating Federals, and no one, even when 
a courier presented them with the opportunity, had taken 
the responsibility to put McClernand, Smith, or Wallace in 
charge of a renewed Federal offensive. At Shiloh, however, 
the men acted with speed, authority, and efficiency, from 
Webster's enthusiastic positioning of guns and Hillyer's 
troop roundup, to Rawlins' and Rowley's hounding of Lew 
Wallace. Their work helped secure Grant's last position on 
April 6 and prepare the army for its counter strike on the 
seventh. Had Grant grasped the situation at Fort Donelson 
and told his staff officers what he expected of them at the 
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next battle? Probably, for the men had become quite close 
in their few months together, but none of them ever said; 
staff work was not the foremost topic in the personal 
histories that appeared after the war. Certainly, though, 
Grant knew that he could only be one place at a time on a 
battlefield. His two campaigns so far had been complex, 
involving close cooperation between navy and army units 
outside of Grant's command. Grant needed the flexibility 
to freely converse with cooperating commanders and the 
assurance that, if he was temporarily off the field, things 
would go along without him. Grant's use of his staff at 
Shiloh was not necessarily by the book, but then he didn't 
fight by the book either, as Henry Halleck so fearfully 
acknowledged. The actions of Grant's staff, rather, 
reflected the personality of their commander; they were a 
necessity of war as Ulysses S. Grant chose to fight it. 
13. 
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CHAPTER V 
GRANT: AN ACCIDENTAL STAFF 
1862-63 
Between the Battle of Shiloh, in April 1862, and the 
siege of Vicksburg, May-July 1863, Grant began to realize 
that the collection of friends he had placed around him in 
1861 were not all efficient staff officers. While John 
Rawlins and other of Grant's top aides groused about the 
ineptitude of their colleagues, Grant himself said little 
about it, choosing instead to cast about for effective uses 
for his staff. Indeed, Grant's command situation dictated 
he experiment with broader staff usage. As Grant's star 
rose and he took command of larger military departments, 
his staff needs became more complex. No longer would he 
direct battles first-hand from the battlefield, as he had 
at Fort Donelson or Shiloh; he was certainly present on 
many battlefields, but largely left the fighting to others, 
such as William Sherman or James B. McPherson. Instead, he 
crafted campaigns at headquarters and expected subalterns 
to carry them out. He no longer needed his staff officers 
solely to deliver messages or look for errant division 
commanders; rather, he needed men to help him with overall 
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campaigns, manage affairs in his vast Department of the 
Tennessee, and direct the operations of his increasingly 
larger armies. Grant realized this need gradually; indeed, 
over the next fifteen months his staff usage often appears 
disjointed. But slowly, as his command grew, Grant began 
expanding the role of his staff. 
In the weeks following the Battle of Shiloh, Grant 
beefed up his staff and recommended promotions for the 
staff officers who had served him well. On April 16 Grant 
requested the War Department make Lagow and Hillyer 
colonels for their ''courage and good conduct'' at Belmont, 
Fort Donelson, and Shiloh. Only major generals of the 
regular army could forward the requests to the War 
Department, and, as Grant was a volunteer, he hoped Henry 
Halleck would make the recommendations. Their promotions 
came through on July 17, dating back to May 3. John 
Riggin, Jr., who had served Grant as a volunteer aide with 
the honorary rank of captain, also received the official 
rank of colonel on May 3. Grant also hoped to see Rawlins 
promoted. He wrote Julia that ''Hillyer and Lagow will be 
Colonels. Rawlins is a Major and ought to be a Brigadier 
General.' ' 1 
In an expansion of his staff, Grant brought aboard 
Theodore s. Bowers as an aide-de-camp. Bowers was born in 
1832 in Pennsylvania and was a newspaperman who edited and 
published the Mount Carmel, Illinois, Register from 1852 to 
1861. At the start of the war, Bowers joined the Forty-
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eighth Illinois Infantry as a private. He became a first 
lieutenant on March 24, 1862. The Forty-eighth saw action 
at Shiloh as part of MCClernand's division. On April 26, 
1862, Rawlins issued General Orders Number Forty-five 
announcing Bowers as Grant's aide-de-camp. 2 
The months after Shiloh were one of the lowest points 
of Grant's military career, during which he suffered both 
public and military criticism. Grant had won at Shiloh and 
sent Beauregard's troops fleeing back to Corinth. But the 
victory was only marginal, and it ushered in another period 
of emotional trial for Grant. Rebels had surprised him, 
critics claimed. He had been drunk at Savannah when the 
attack came, others added. Staff officer William Hillyer 
tried to counter some of those criticisms in letters he 
sent Grant's father, Jesse Root Grant. 
Bowers, the newcomer, once did more than just write 
letters in defense of his boss' action at Shiloh. In 
October Sylvanus Cadwallader, the reporter, was aboard a 
train full of soldiers headed for Cairo, Illinois. Talk, 
of course, revolved around the war, and soon two men were 
heatedly discussing the merits of generals Grant and 
Rosecrans. One of them, a captain, began slandering Grant, 
saying he had been in battle at Shiloh and knew all the 
rumors about Grant were true. Cadwallader noticed a 
''small, dark complexioned, quiet, unobtrusive'' and 
''bilious'' man take an interest in the argument and edge 
near it. Soon the man, with a ''stony and cadaverous'' 
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expression and his eyes emitting ''scorn, wrath and hate,'' 
confront~d the belligerent captain. He said he could 
.l'' 
' forgive misstatements, but he could not forgive someone 
slandering a friend.by stating events which never occurred. 
'' You are a liar: I know, ' ' said the 1 i ttle man. '' You are 
a coward, I believe. I'll bet ten to one you were not in 
the battle of Shiloh.'' The crowd of soldiers, joining the 
side of the presumed underdog,/ cheered for the 1 i ttle man. 
Seeing that he cribld not win a fistfight if he started one, 
the captain backed down. At Cairo the men disappeared, but 
Cadwallader said two days later someone introduced him.to 
the little man who had defended Grant--Theodore Bowers. 3 
Grant could handle public criticism, but rebuke from 
within his own army was another matter. General Ha1leck, 
in St. Louis, said nothing to support Grant. The book-
learned Halleck had never had much confidence in the 
unscholarly Grant. Perhaps he had been drunk; perhaps he 
had been surprised. At any rate, he had let his victory go 
for nought by not pursuing Beauregard. The only thing for 
Halleck to do, he thought, was go to Pittsburg Landing and 
take command himself. 
Halleck arrived at the Landing on April 11 and took 
field command of all the armies in his vast Department of 
the Mississippi--Buell's Army of the Ohio, General John 
Pope's Army of the Mississippi, and Grant's Army of the 
Tennessee. But Halleck gave the Army of .the Tennessee to 
General George Henry Thomas and made Grant second in 
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command of the department. Grant's new job was supposedly 
a promotion, but in reality it wrested from him all 
authority and put him right where Halleck could keep an eye 
on him. As Halleck prepared to move his combined army of 
more than 100,000 men to attack Corinth, he ignored Grant. 
He did not consult him on plans, and he kept Grant in the 
dark about preparations. Halleck began his campaign on 
April 30; it was a farce. Corinth was but twenty miles 
from Pittsburg Landing, but it took Halleck a month to 
reach it. Averaging less than a mile a day, Halleck 
stopped each night to build elaborate fortifications to 
avoid the same type of surprise he supposed had befallen 
Grant at Shiloh. By the time Halleck reached Corinth on 
May 30, the Rebels had slipped away. Even though Halleck 
claimed a great victory, his crawl toward Corinth disgusted 
Grant. In his Memoirs Grant called Halleck's victory 
''barren,'' allowing, as it did, an entire Rebel army to 
escape unmolested. He added that, ''I am satisfied that 
Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign 
commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after 
the battle of Shiloh.'' 4 
Grant endured his inactivity throughout the Corinth 
movement and the subsequent fortification of the town, but 
that was enough. Halleck had virtually suspended him after 
winning his last two battles; if that was how this army 
treated winning generals, he didn't know if he wanted to 
stay in it. As biographer McFeely suspects, images of the 
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critical Halleck must have mixed with memories of the 
berating Jesse Root Grant and the harsh Colonel Buchanan at 
Fort Humboldt to bring the old Ulysses Grant--the failure--
back to the surface. Hearing that his friend was thinking 
about resigning, William Sherman rode to Grant's 
headquarters tent. He found Rawlins, Lagow, and Hillyer 
outside, and they directed him into the tent where Grant 
sat sorting papers. After a few minutes Sherman convinced 
Grant that matters might improve if Grant would just give 
them a chance. Grant listened to his friend and soon 
discovered that he was right; things began to improve. In 
late June he got permission to move his headquarters and 
staff to Memphis, Tennessee, which Federals had recently 
liberated from Rebel control. He would still be in an 
ineffective job, but at least he would be away from 
Halleck. Then, on July 11, Abraham Lincoln called Halleck 
to Washington to take command of all Union armies; Grant 
was rid of Halleck completely. Grant returned to make his 
headquarters at Corinth on July 15. In effect he became 
commander of all of Halleck's Department of the 
Mississippi, but orders making that official did not come 
until October 25.~ 
Although the summer of 1862 was an inactive period for 
Grant, his adjutant general, John Rawlins, started to 
become preeminent at headquarters. While Grant moved his 
headquarters from Corinth to Memphis and back again, 
Rawlins went along, setting up headquarters and tending to 
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official correspondence. With occasional assistance from 
Bowers, who became Rawlins' right-hand-man just as the 
former became Grant's, he drafted a spate of general and 
special orders which assigned commanders to units, banished 
from Memphis citizens who made unfounded accusations 
against occupying Federal troops, seized property in 
retaliation for guerrilla depredations, punished Federal 
troops who destroyed or stole.southern property, and 
outlawed Northern speculation in Rebel grain and cotton 
within Grant's district.• At the same time, Rawlins 
oversaw the activities of other staffers in the office. As 
his friend James Harrison Wilson later commented, ''He made 
it his practice to see that every one else performed the 
services assigned him.'' 7 
By relieving Grant of mundane, clerical worries, 
Rawlins, who had become a major in mid-April, was doing the 
job of a goo~ adjutant, and Grant appreciated it. In May, 
while Halleck was keeping him on ice, Grant wrote Julia 
that Rawlins was making a good hand. ''Rawlins has become 
thoroughly acquainted with the routine of the office and 
takes off my hands the examination of most all papers,'' 
Grant said. The general revealed his growing fondness for 
Rawlins when he said, ''I think he is one of the best men I 
ever knew.'' Rawlins had shown no penchant for operational 
planning, so Grant was laying it on thick when he commented 
''if another war should break out, or this one be 
protracted, [Rawlins] ... would make one of the best 
General officers ... in the country. 118 
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Grant had discovered in Rawlins a man who mirrored 
some of his own best qualities; ''He unites talent with 
energy, and great honesty,'' Grant told Julia. But in 
other ways, Rawlins was a foil for Grant. Both men were 
industrious, but where Grant was often shy, reticent, and 
uncomfortable with public speaking, Rawlins, the lawyer, 
was fond of oratory and frequently expounded on a variety 
of topics. The unflappable Grant never cursed, but Rawlins 
could burn the air with profane outbursts, something 
incongruous with his straight-laced, Puritanical morality. 
Rawlins was not shy about voicing opinions on any topic to 
Grant, and Grant appreciated and respected Rawlins' candor. 
In his Memoirs Grant wrote that Rawlins ''could say 'no' so 
emphatically to a request which he thought should not be 
granted that the person he was addressing would understand 
at once that there was no use pressing the matter.'' Grant 
concluded, ''Rawlins was a very useful officer .... I 
became very much attached to him. 119 
Rawlins, dark and brooding, was not known around 
headquarters for jocosity, yet one day in late Hay 1862 he 
fell victim to Grant's well cultivated sense of humor. 
Before leaving Galena, friends there presented Rawlins with 
a fine bay horse, and Rawlins became fond of showing off 
the animal's long tail. One morning, to his dismay and 
disgust, Rawlins found the horse's tail was suddenly no 
more than two inches long. The adjutant fumed and sought 
his pistol to shoot whoever had committed the prank. 
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Grant, standing nearby smoking a cigar, instantly realized 
what had happened--a wandering mule, not a delinquent 
soldier, had chomped off the horse's tail. Seeing Rawlins' 
rage and the absurdity of the situation, Grant burst into 
laughter. swearing, Rawlins wished the same fate would 
befall Grant's own horse. Nevertheless, Grant repeatedly 
had the last laugh; whenever the men rode anywhere 
together Grant needed only to glance at the horse's cropped 
tail to again lapse into laughter.io 
While Rawlins was establishing himself around 
headquarters, other positions on Grant's staff were in 
flux. During Grant's brief stay in Memphis he discovered 
he needed administrative help. Of the places he had 
occupied so far, none had had a large Rebel population. 
Memphis did, and the townsfolk soon deluged Grant with 
complaints. ''It took hours of my time every day to listen 
to complaints and requests,'' said Grant. To secure the 
help he needed, on June 24 he made his chief of staff, J. 
D. Webster, commander of the post of Memphis. The old 
soldier became ill, however, and Grant soon made Colonel T. 
Lyle Dickey commander of the post. He later assigned 
Webster to supervise construction of fortifications on the 
south end of Memphis.ii 
Meanwhile, Grant's ablest aide at Shiloh, Williams. 
Hillyer, had grown tired of war. ''I have seen enough of 
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war,'' he wrote his wife after Shiloh. ''God grant that it 
may be speedily terminated.'' He told her that he could 
not leave Grant until after ''we have driven the enemy from 
Corinth. When that is done I think I will leave it to 
others to finish up this rebellion. 1112 
Grant and Hillyer were close, and the general saw that 
his friend from st. Louis was used up. He recalled in his 
Memoirs that Hillyer had no ''personal taste or special 
qualifications for the duties of the soldier,'' and he may 
have realized that as early as June 1862. Nevertheless he 
bore with the staffer who had served him so well at Shiloh 
and had treated him so kindly before the war. That month 
he gave Hillyer a job away from the battle front, making 
him provost marshal in Memphis where he wanted him to 
''devise ways of correcting some ... abuses. 1113 
Grant may also have realized that Clark B. Lagow was 
unsuited to duty at a combat headquarters; he made the same 
comment about Lagow that he made about Hillyer, and by July 
1862 Grant was giving him assignments that took him away 
from headquarters. Grant's wife, Julia, and their 
children, were frequently in camp during slack times, and 
in early July Grant had Lagow escort them from camp back to 
Memphis. On July 10 Grant named Lagow acting inspector 
general for the army, a duty which shuttled him from camp 
to camp checking on the operational status of units. Five 
days later, however, Grant ordered Lagow to escort 
Confederate prisoners from Mississippi to a Federal prison 
in Alton, Illinois. No sooner had Lagow returned than 
Grant sent him to Hamburg, Tennessee, and Eastport, 
Mississippi, to investigate alleged trade abuses between 
the army and private citizens. 14 
More changes at headquarters came in August 1862. 
With Lagow, Hillyer, and John Riggin all away from 
headquarters, Grant sent William R. Rowley to deliver 
another group of prisoners to the prison at Alton. Then 
sickness dropped Rawlins. Grant commented in a letter to 
Julia August 18 that his military family was ''small . 
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Rawlins was obliged to have a serious surgical operation 
... to prevent his biles, or carbuncle, from turning into 
Fistula,'' he reported. He suspected Rawlins would be 
incapacitated for about ten days, but on August 22, 
Rawlins' condition no better, Grant sent him home to Galena 
to recover. Theodore Bowers, who would soon be acting 
assistant adjutant, took over at headquarters for Rawlins. 
Rawlins fared better in Galena, where, on August 30, he 
delivered an hour-long speech in defense of Grant, who was 
still under public criticism for his conduct of the Battle 
of Shiloh and his recent inactivity. 1 ~ 
Grant's headquarters family was indeed ''small'' just 
as he faced a dangerous military situation. After resuming 
command in mid-July, Grant found that Halleck had begun 
distributing units of the once-massive army to other 
commands. In August and early September, Grant received 
three orders to send troops to reinforce Don Carlos Buell 
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for operations in eastern Tennessee. That despite the fact 
that Grant was essentially on the defensive at an exposed 
forward point in Mississippi and facing the desultory raids 
of Rebel guerrillas and a more serious threat from 
Confederate generals Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn. 
Union general Samuel Curtis had driven those men from 
Arkansas at the Battle of Pea Ridge in March, but now they 
were south of Grant, in independent commands, and could 
combine to bring 40,000 troops to bear on any spot they 
chose. Van Dorn, senior in rank to Price, wanted to drive 
Grant north, negating the Federal gains of the previous 
spring. 16 
Grant had other ideas, though, and in the resulting 
campaign he attempted to use his staff in a new way, one 
that foreshadows his later staff usage. By mid-September 
Grant had a plan to prevent Price and Van Dorn from 
consolidating their troops. Van Dorn was at Holly Springs, 
Mississippi, sixty miles west of Grant at Corinth; Price 
was much closer, about twenty-two miles away at Iuka on the 
Memphis and Charleston rail line. Grant selected Price to 
fall first, and he moved his headquarters to Burnsville, 
Mississippi, also on the Memphis and Charleston and within 
twelve miles of Iuka. Grant's plan was complex. He would 
have General Stephen A. Hurlbut move south out of Memphis 
on a demonstration designed to hold Van Dorn at Holly 
Springs, and, just in case Van Dorn did venture eastward to 
help Price, he would leave a garrison at Corinth to handle 
him. Then he would send Major General E. o. C. Ord with 
two divisions north of Iuka and Major General Williams. 
Rosecrans, also with two divisions, south of Iuka. 
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Combined they had 17,000 men (Price had 15,000), and Grant 
wanted them to catch Price in a pincers movement and 
destroy his force. Grant instructed Ord and Rosecrans to 
move from their staging areas--Ord at Burnsville, Rosecrans 
eight miles south at Jacinto--ori September 18 and be in 
position to attack Price at Iuka at dawn September 19. 
Rosecrans was to move at least part of his troops by way of 
the Fulton road frqm Iuka to block any escape Price might 
try that way. 
Planning to have two seoarated armies converge 
simultaneously on a target was always complicated and 
risky, and the broken ground, poor roads, and swamps around 
Iuka made Grant's plan doubly so. Ord left on time, but 
Grant soon got word from Rosecrans that he was delayed and 
would not be in position to attack Price until noon on the 
nineteenth. Also, Rosecrans, for reasons of his own, 
decided to ignore the Fulton road and travel solely by 
another route. Grant told Ord to go ahead and establish 
contact with Price north of Iuka but warned him not to 
start a general fight until he heard Rosecrans' guns to the 
south. 
Grant directed the overall Iuka campaign, but for the 
first time he let subalterns do the fighting, and he must 
have felt at a loss. While he had telegraph and courier 
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contact with his field commanders, he could not be 
physically present with both. Grant spent some time with 
Ord's command, his own headquarters being only up the 
railroad track. But he could not do likewise with 
Rosecrans. Telegrams and couriers were no replacement for 
the strength of Grant's personality, and he needed some way 
to transmit his presence and authority to the tardy 
Rosecrans. Grant knew that speed was essential here, and 
he wanted Old Rosey to know it too, for in truth Grant did 
not believe Rosecrans could be in place when he said he 
could. Grant needed personal representatives with 
Rosecrans, and he turned to two staff officers to fill the 
job. Early on the nineteenth he sent Clark Lagow and 
Colonel T. Lyle Dickey, chief of cavalry on Grant's special 
staff, to find Rosecrans, ''explain to him the plan of 
operations,'' as Dickey later said, and prod the general 
into action. The staffers found Rosecrans shortly after 
noon at Barnett's, a farmhouse seven miles south of Iuka, 
and they paused to have lunch with him. Then they rode 
with the general to the head of his column, which was 
strung out over five miles. Presently Rosecrans' lead 
troops encountered Price's skirmishers, and the fight 
quickly became general. ''The shells burst around us--the 
bullets whistled through the air and it began to sound like 
some of the sharp passages at the battle of Shiloh,'' wrote 
Dickey. He and Lagow tarried about thirty minutes, then 
struck out to inform Grant that Rosecrans was engaged and 
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Ord should begin his attack. Broken terrain and Rebel 
soldiers prevented Lagow and Dickey from going directly to 
Grant and soon, with night falling and amid forests and 
grapevines, the men became lost. They attempted to travel 
by the North Star, but at one point Lagow's horse plunged 
into a ravine, landing on top of its rider. Neither man 
nor animal were seriously hurt, and they trudged on. By 
the time they reach Grant, however, dawn was breaking; they 
had been out all night. In fairness, a courier whom 
Rosecrans had sent to Grant independently of Lagow and 
Dickey arrived only shortly before they did. 
In the meantime, Ord, who had been ready for a fight 
north of Iuka for more than a day, never got one. He had 
been waiting to hear Rosecrans' guns south of town, but a 
strong northerly wind had blown the sound away from him. 
By the time word arrived early September 20 that Rosecrans 
was engaged, Price had slipped the noose and escaped to the 
southwest. 17 Grant would liked to have destroyed Price's 
army; nevertheless, his own troops had secured Iuka and 
prevented Price from entering Tennessee. 
Price headed west and joined Van Dorn, who, in early 
October launched an assault on Corinth. Grant had gone to 
st. Louis to discuss troop dispositions with Major General 
Curtis, then to Jackson, Tennessee, so Rosecrans handled 
Van Dorn. On October 3, Van Dorn drove Rosecrans' men back 
into excellent fortifications around Corinth, which Grant 
had built after resuming command. From there, on the 
fourth, Rosecrans defeated Van Dorn in a savage fight. 18 
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During the fight on October 4, Grant, at Jackson, took 
steps that showed he was settling into his role as an 
overall department commander instead of a battlefield 
commander. He hurried four regiments under General James 
B. McPherson to Corinth to help Rosecrans, and, wanting to 
insure Van Dorn's destruction, he ordered Hurlbut's 
division to get astride the Rebel line of retreat to Holly 
Springs, then he sent Ord to take command of that force. 
Once again he had Ord and Rosecrans on either prong of a 
pincers, but, while Ord had a sharp fight with Van Dorn's 
lead elements, and got wounded in the melee, Rosecrans 
again moved slowly. The pincers didn't close and Van Dorn 
got away. Rosecrans' repeated tardiness dampened Grant's 
confidence in the man. 19 
Military historian J. F. C. Fuller commended Grant for 
his strategy during the Iuka-Corinth campaign. ''He showed 
a strategic grasp that is quite amazing, seeing that 
hitherto he had no experience of a war of movement.'' 
Grant's weeks of inactivity under Halleck had given him 
time to study his maps and think, and, says Fuller, the 
resulting campaign ''marks him down as one of the most 
noteworthy generals of his age. 1120 
Likewise, the campaign indicates Grant's first step, 
albeit small, toward an enlightened usage of his staff. 
Cavalry chief Dickey's comment that Grant wanted him and 
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Lagow to ''explain [to Rosecrans] ... the plan of 
operations,'' shows Grant wanted the staffers to do more 
than just hurry up the slow general. He wanted Rosecrans 
to know just when and how events were to take place and the 
consequences riding on them. Grant had a chance to defeat 
two armies in detail and see that they never took the field 
again. Grant's concept of war centered on destruction of 
enemy armies, not merely putting them to flight, and he 
wanted that to be his field commanders' concept of war 
also. By sending staff officers to Rosecrans, Grant was 
trying to be in two places at once and see that his 
strategy went forward from both sides of Iuka. The 
complexity of his plan necessitated he do no less. But 
Grant's dispatch of Dickey and Lagow has a spur-of-the-
moment quality to it; he was thinking about getting 
Rosecrans into the fight, not forwarding nineteeth-century 
staff development. To have been truly effective, the staff 
officers perhaps should have been with Rosecrans from the 
start of the campaign, ensured that he travel along Grant's 
prescribed route, and, one of them at least, stayed behind 
with Rosecrans to see that the general prevent Price's 
escape until Ord could join the fray. Also, Lagow was 
probably not the staff officer to handle such assignments. 
Nevertheless, Grant had ventured forward, by necessity and 
somewhat unwittingly, into a new realm of staff usage. 
Rosecrans left Grant's command October 24 to take over 
Don Carlos Buell's army in east Tennessee, but before he 
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left he had some harsh words about Grant's staff. Old 
Rosey's departure was fine with both men, for the Iuka-
Corinth campaign had soured them on each other. Grant 
could not abide Rosecrans' double failure to pounce on a 
defeated foe, and Rosecrans could not understand why Grant 
pulled him off the pursuit of Van Dorn he belatedly began 
after the fight at Corinth. Grant believed that a chase 
deeper into Mississippi would necessitate the Union force 
living off the land, and to him that spelled disaster. 
Back in Washington, Halleck and Lincoln also wondered at 
Grant's seeming ambivalence; indeed, the month following 
the Battle of Corinth was another period of inactivity for 
Grant, of the type that had befallen him after Fort 
Donelson and Shiloh. A note from Rosecrans before he left 
for his own command could not have reassured the president 
and the general-in-chief, for he called Grant ''sour and 
reticent.'' He also griped about ''the spirit of mischief 
among the mousing politicians on Grant's staff.'' In 
short, he wanted to be away from Grant and his staff. 21 
Rosecrans did not elaborate about the ''mousing 
politicians'' comment. Certainly, Rawlins and Rowley were 
friends of Elihu B. Washburne, and the latter had used his 
influence with the congressman to get on Grant's staff. 
But in late October came a controversy which Rosecrans' 
remark may have foretold. In October the United States 
government arrested David Sheehan, a Galena attorney and 
former law partner of John Rawlins, and imprisoned him at 
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Fort Lafayette in New York. Sheehan, like Rawlins, was a 
Democrat, and the Federal government had charged him with 
treason. Rawlins took a brief leave from staff duties to 
investigate the charges and discovered they were erroneous. 
Back at headquarters, Rawlins wrote to Secretary of War 
Stanton to ask for Sheehan's release. Getting no response, 
Rawlins got Grant, Rowley, and generals Hurlbut and John 
Logan to also write Stanton. Grant's letter praised 
Rawlins and assured Stanton he would ask no favors for 
Sheehan if he was guilty. Sheehan was released in 
December. 22 In the meantime, on October 25, Grant was 
given command of the entire Department of the Tennessee, 
and two days later he recommended Rawlins for promotion 
from major to lieutenant colonel, Rowley to major, and 
Bowers to captain. 23 
November 1862 was a watershed month at Grant's 
headquarters. It saw Grant stir from his month-long 
military lethargy and embark on the campaign that would 
virtually win the Civil War in the west. It also saw 
subtle changes within the staff, changes that set the staff 
on a road to professionalization. 
Even when not campaigning, Ulysses s. Grant was not 
entirely idle; such was not his nature. He had been 
studying his maps and had concluded, quite correctly, that 
the Mississippi River town of Vicksburg, Mississippi, was 
the key to victory in the west. Strongly fortified, 
Vicksburg not only guarded the river below its heights from 
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Union boats, it also controlled rail lines that connected 
the western Confederacy to the east. A railroad ran east 
from Vicksburg to Jackson, Mississippi's capital, where it 
connected with other lines that ran into the heart of the 
Confederacy. Another line started on the Louisiana shore 
opposite Vicksburg and ran west. Capture of Vicksburg 
would cripple the rebellion, if not mortally then 
critically. Grant initially proposed to move south from 
his headquarters at Jackson, Tennessee, to Grand Junction, 
Tennessee, just short of the Mississippi line, and from 
there base an overland expedition to Vicksburg, more than 
150 air-miles away. 24 
But Grant was hearing rumors around his camp, and he 
did not like them. In Washington, Abraham Lincoln had been 
studying his maps, too, and had also decided Vicksburg 
should be the Union's target in the west. Lincoln had 
supported Grant though rumors of the general's drunkenness, 
but Grant had been moving slowly the past month and Lincoln 
wanted to make sure Vicksburg fell. He dispatched 
Massachusetts politician-turned-general Nathanial P. Banks 
to take command at New Orleans and mount an expedition up 
the Mississippi to grab Vicksburg. And, just to be sure, 
Lincoln would throw another column at the river town. In 
September, Major General John McClernand, the man who had 
caused Grant so much grief at Fort Donelson, had gone north 
on leave to visit an old Illinois friend--Abe Lincoln. The 
two had been lawyers together before the war, and Lincoln 
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had supported McClernand's promotion to major general. Now 
McClernand figured Lincoln would support him in a scheme 
that would make him the hero of the war. McClernand wanted 
nothing less than permission to recruit troops from the 
West, largely Indiana, Iowa, and Illinois, and form an 
independent army with the sole purpose of floating down the 
Mississippi from Memphis and taking Vicksburg. Lincoln and 
Secretary of War Stanton believed the idea was sound, and 
they approved McClernand's plan. They did not consult 
general-in-chief Henry Halleck, though, and he and the rest 
of the army were in the dark about this plan to open the 
Mississippi. 2 ~ 
such an expedition could not remain a secret for long, 
and Grant began to hear ''newspaper rumors'' about it. ''I 
was very much disturbed by [theml,'' he said. Grant could 
not abide McClernand. He had proved himself incompetent on 
the battlefield and now he showed himself as an intriguer. 
Grant would not allow the politician to run an independent 
command within his department. Grant set out for Grand 
Junction, but just to be safe he wired Halleck. He wanted 
to know if he was to sit still in Memphis while another 
force fitted out in that city and left on an expedition, 
and if Sherman, commanding the Memphis garrison, was 
subject to orders from the new command or Grant. Halleck 
wired back that Grant had control of all troops in his 
department and could ''fight the enemy where you 
please. ' ' 26 
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Grant was on the move overland, but he wanted Sherman 
involved too. Grant knew that, while both Sherman and 
McClernand were major generals, the latter had seniority. 
Even though Grant ranked McClernand, if McClernand arrived 
in Memphis, he could give orders to Sherman. Grant wanted 
Sherman with him on the push south, but first they had to 
make provisions for the safety of Memphis. They also had 
to do it quietly, lest McClernand hear that something was 
up and hurry to Memphis. So, Grant got his staffers in on 
the deception. William S. Hillyer had already been serving 
as something of a liaison between Sherman and Grant. On 
November 3 Sherman noted that Hillyer had been at his 
Memphis headquarters. ''[He) can explain fully how 
satisfactory everything is here,'' Sherman wired Grant. He 
would say little more, other than that he had no 
trepidation about leaving a garrison force to guard 
Memphis. ''The enemy would have to sacrifice more men than 
they can afford [to capture it),'' he said. Within a week 
both Hillyer and Lagow were back at Sherman's camp. Again, 
Sherman declined to tell Grant in a letter what they talked 
about. ''[They) will tell you fully of all figures, 
numbers, and facts that I deem imprudent to trust by this 
route,'' Sherman told Grant. On November 15 the two 
generals finalized plans in a meeting at Columbus, 
Kentucky, where Grant ordered Sherman to bring two 
divisions to Grant's forward position and march them down 
the Mississippi Central railroad. Sherman did as Grant 
asked, and by late November was ten miles north of Oxford, 
Mississippi. 27 
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Meanwhile, Grant moved from Grand Junction to La 
Grange, Tennessee. John Rawlins, traveling with him, began 
setting up headquarters there. ''Move everything belonging 
to Hd Qrs including Printing . press to this place 
where Hd Qrs of the Dept. will for the present be 
established,'' Rawlins wired Bowers in Jackson. Rawlins 
told Bowers to hurry down on the first train, adding, ''the 
Genl says for Mrs Grant to come with you. 112 • 
Rawlins might have been establishing headquarters at 
La Grange, but Grant was not sitting still. With McPherson 
on the left of his command, General C. S. Hamilton in the 
center, and Sherman coming down with the right, Grant 
entered Mississippi, pushing an estimated 30,000 
Confederates under Major General John c. Pemberton before 
him. By November 13 Grant had frightened Pemberton across 
the Tallahatchie River and occupied Holly Springs, where he 
set up a forward supply depot for the expedition. By 
December 1 Grant was also across the Tallahatchie and by 
the eighth he had occupied Oxford, Mississippi, where he 
stopped briefly to repair his supply line, the Mississippi 
Central extending to his rear. 29 
Meanwhile, Grant was making changes in his personal 
staff back at La Grange. Grant's command encompassed three 
major railroads--the Mississippi Central, the Mobile and 
Ohio, and the Memphis and Charleston--and he recognized 
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their importance in keeping his troops supplied. On 
November 1 he formally removed his old chief of staff, 
Joseph Dana Webster, by then a brigadier general, from his 
staff and made him superintendent of all the military 
railroads in Grant's department. He also made Colonel 
George G. Pride, who had been a volunteer aide with Grant 
since Shiloh, chief engineer of military railroads, 
responsible for keeping all the lines in the department in 
good repair. Grant had suggested the job for Pride to 
Halleck in early October. 30 
Grant made other changes in his staff, most notably 
making John Rawlins chief of staff as well as assistant 
adjutant general. In fact, most of the men on Grant's 
staff found themselves doing double duty as the general 
sought to get the most out of them. Hillyer remained as 
aide-de-camp and provost marshall, while Lagow was still an 
aide and acting inspector general. A Colonel George P. 
Ihrie also served Grant as an aide and acting inspector 
general. William R. Rowley, for whom Grant had just 
requested promotion to major, was aide-de-camp and 
mustering officer, and John Riggin was aide and 
superintendent of Grant's military telegraph. Only 
Theodore Bowers, Rawlins' helper, appeared on the staff 
roll with only one job, that of aide-de-camp. 31 
Grant's appointment of Riggin as telegraph 
superintendent quickly caused a controversy. On November 
14 Assistant Secretary of War P. H. Watson wired Grant's 
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headquarters at La Grange that ''some one signing himself 
John Riggin, superintendent of military telegraphs'' was 
interfering with telegraphs in Grant's department. Watson 
said the man did not have authority from Colonel Anson 
Stager, general superintendent of military telegraphs, to 
use the wires. ''[He] is an imposter,'' Watson said of 
Riggin. ''Arrest him and send him north ... before he 
does mischief by his interference.'' 
Grant wired Watson, commenting dryly that ''John 
Riggin .•. is my aide.'' Grant explained that he had 
authorized Riggin to send private dispatches over the wire 
before 10:00 a.m. so they would not interfere with military 
dispatches. Grant informed Watson that Riggin was 
departmental telegraph superintendent, ''a position which 
interferes with no present arrangement, but is intended 
solely for my relief.'' Watson countered that Stager had 
deputies to help him with the operation of the telegraph, 
and that Riggin ''must not interfere.'' 
One of Stager's ''deputies,'' J. c. Van Duzer, 
official telegraph superintendent in Grant's department, 
had in fact started the whole squabble. Van Duzer was 
absent in Cairo, Illinois, when Grant moved to La Grange, 
forcing the general to oversee construction of his own 
telegraph stations. When Van Duzer finally came on duty, 
he kept the wires so busy with commercial dispatches that 
Grant could not send military messages for a whole day. He 
suspended all private dispatches for a day, then had Riggin 
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issue the order about sending private messages only before 
10:00 a.m. In late November Grant again encountered 
difficulty finding space for his dispatches on the wire, 
and his telegraph operator told him Van Duzer was sending 
cotton dispatches. Van Duzer removed the tattling operator 
from Grant's headquarters, infuriating Grant. When Grant 
learned that Van Duzer had been promoted to oversee all the 
telegraphs in the department, Grant considered it a slap 
against himself and Riggin. He finally ordered Van Duzer 
arrested to prevent his further interference. Secretary of 
War Stanton eventually directed Grant to release Van Duzer, 
but the general had diffused the telegraph situation. 32 
Grant had made some changes in the structure and 
duties of his staff, but Rawlins, with full authority as 
chief of staff, wanted deeper changes. First Lieutenant 
James Harrison Wilson, a young engineer who had just served 
on George B. McClellan's special staff in the East, was 
assigned to duty in Grant's department, and arrived at his 
headquarters at La Grange on November 8. There he met John 
Rawlins, who was alone in the building. Rawlins, with a 
''dark and serious face,'' explained that Grant was away at 
Memphis but would probably assign Wilson to McPherson's 
special staff. Rawlins had done his homework on Wilson, 
learning about his family and background--Wilson was an 
Illinois man, as were many of Grant's staffers. Rawlins 
had apparently decided he could trust Wilson, for he 
launched into a lengthy discourse on conditions around 
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Grant's headquarters. Wilson said he spoke with 
''startling frankness, disguising nothing and extenuating 
nothing.'' Rawlins suspected that Wilson had heard rumors 
about Grant's drinking, and the chief quickly cut to the 
chase. He showed Wilson an abstinence pledge which Rawlins 
had made Grant sign. Rawlins perhaps intended to show 
Wilson that Grant recognized his problem, but, 
transparently, also let Wilson know that Rawlins had 
appointed himself Grant's conscience. Then, trying to play 
down the blemish of drink, Rawlins described the general as 
a ''courageous officer . [who would] lead us to 
victory,'' cryptically adding, ''if his friends could 'stay 
him from falling.''' 
Preliminaries aside, Rawlins explained that Grant had 
some good officers on his staff, but some bad ones as well. 
He asked Wilson to ''help clean them out.'' Wilson said 
Rawlins ''wanted to form an alliance ... with me for the 
purpose of weeding out worthless officers, guarding the 
general against temptation and sustaining him in the 
performance of the great duties which he would be called on 
to perform.' 133 
Wilson did not say whom Rawlins wanted rid of, but 
William R. Rowley made it fairly clear. On November 20, 
Rowley wrote to Elihu B. Washburne condemning some of his 
fellow staff officers. He said that Colonel John Riggin 
was an accidental staff officer. Someone higher up had 
mistaken a written compliment Grant gave Riggin as a 
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request for the man's permanent service. Worse yet, Riggin 
was drinking buddies with colonels Hillyer and Lagow. ''I 
doubt whether either of them have gone to bed sober for a 
week,'' Rowley said. 34 
Rowley's letter inspired a response from washburne to 
Grant. That letter has been lost to history, but on 
December 16 Rowley wrote to Washburne again, saying he 
hoped the congressman's letter would bring from Grant ''an 
answer .•• of the right kind.'' He said, however, that 
he feared Grant would ''hardly have the heart to cut loose 
from the •.• colonels.'' Rowley was away from 
headquarters when he wrote this second letter, and he 
commented that when he returned he hoped to find ''fewer 
loafers about headquarters.•• 3 & 
Alcohol, then, had caused a rift at headquarters. 
Rawlins had seen drink destroy his own father, and he would 
not stand by and watch it destroy Grant. If men so close 
to Grant were drinking, they were a threat, and Rawlins 
wanted them gone. But the problem included idleness as 
well. None of the staffers had professional military 
training when the war started; Rawlins, Hillyer, and Lagow 
were even in that regard. But Rawlins had made it his 
purpose to study the duties of a staff officer and carry 
them out. For the others to do any less was an affront to 
Rawlins' Puritanical bent. Certainly Hillyer had already 
expressed his war weariness, and Lagow had given a less 
than stellar performance at Iuka. But Grant was bearing 
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with them, as Rowley had feared he would, finding odd jobs 
for them, like escorting his family and transporting 
' 
prisoners. As chief, Rawlins had neither the power to hire 
nor fire; nevertheless, he would be glad if the slackers 
departed from headquarters. 
Grant soon revealed that he, too, was dissatisfied 
with his staff, but he also had the tender-hearted loyalty 
that Rowley feared would saddle him with incompetent men. 
When Washburne wrote to Grant in response to Rowley's 
letter, he also talked to Henry Halleck in Washington. 
Halleck told the congressman that he would help with any 
staff recommendations Grant might make. Grant wrote 
Halleck on December 16 that his ''labors'' with his army 
had been exceedingly hard, and he blamed that on ''having 
an entire Staff of inexperienced men in Military matters.'' 
He said that, of both his personal and special staffs, he 
regarded only two men as indispensable--Rawlins and Bowers, 
the latter of whom he had just recommended for promotion to 
major and the extra job of judge advocate. Grant's comment 
implied that everyone else on the staff was dispensable, 
but he talked ill about none of them. Hillyer was ''very 
efficient'' as provost marshal, relieving Grant of ''much 
duty that I have heretofore had to attend to in person.'' 
Grant said he was ''very much attached to [Lagowl 
personally'' and described him a as a ''true honest man, 
willing to do all in his power for the service. 1136 Grant 
recommended no one for dismissal, nor did he make any 
recommendations to better his staff. 
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Later, during the early stages of the Vicksburg 
campaign, Grant further revealed his dissatisfaction with 
his staff. Writing to Julia, Grant said, ''Since I came 
down here I have felt the necessity of staff officers.'' 
Some had been away from camp, ''and still others have been 
required,'' he said, adding cryptically, ''that is of a 
class that can do something.'' 37 Grant's comment was 
loaded, implying that he had plenty of staffers who did 
nothing, and that he could use no more of them. The 
context of his comment, the Vicksburg campaign, reveals 
again that, the more complex his campaigns became, the more 
Grant realized he needed competent staff officers. 
Grant's detractors, those who saw him as Rawlins' 
puppet, may suggest that Grant was following Rawlins' lead 
in trying to improve the staff. Such is doubtful. Grant 
respected Rawlins' views and encouraged him to speak his 
mind around headquarters, whether on matters of strategy or 
office business. Rawlins' outspoken nature makes it 
probable that Grant knew full well his chief's opinions of 
the other staffers. But Grant was the West Point-trained 
general around headquarters, not Rawlins, and he knew how 
to run an army. Grant could spot an inefficient staff 
officer as well as Rawlins could. But Grant also had deep-
seated loyalties, especially to men who had been nice to 
him, such as Hillyer in pre-war st. Louis. That was 
206 
perhaps a burden for a man of war. Nevertheless, Grant's 
personality would win out over Rawlins'--and they were both 
men of strong, if opposite, personalities--in any effort to 
better the staff. In the end it would be Grant who would 
decide who left the staff, and when and how they went. 
Rawlins could only contain the trouble-makers and protect 
Grant from them as best he could. 
Rawlins soon got his wish~-at least temporarily, about 
Clark B. Lagow. Lagow fell ill in late November and on the 
twenty-fifth Grant wired the staffer's brother, David, in 
Evansville, Illinois, to come to Grant's headquarters and 
take the sick man home. On November 29 Rawlins issued 
special orders for Lagow to rejoin Grant's headquarters, 
''wherever the same may be,'' when he recovered. As late 
as March 27, however, Lagow was still sick. He was back in 
Memphis, though, within Grant's department and with staff 
colleague Williams. Hillyer, but Grant was not optimistic 
about the man's health. ''I am afraid it will be a long 
time before he gets strong again,'' he told Julia 
privately. 38 
In December 1862, however, Grant's main concern was 
his overland push toward Vicksburg, not his staff. Grant 
had created a supply depot at Holly Springs, Mississippi, 
to provision his thrust into Mississippi, left a garrison 
there, then moved twenty-five miles farther south to 
Oxford. There he gave new orders to General William T. 
Sherman, who had arrived with troops from Memphis to form 
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the right wing of Grant's invasion force. Grant now knew 
that John McClernand's foray down the Mississippi was 
definite, but Grant did not intend to sit back and let the 
political general pick the plum of his department. Grant 
sent Sherman back to Memphis with orders to take command of 
McClernand's recruits, already arriving there, integrate 
them with troops already present, and begin the expedition 
to Vicksburg. Grant said he ''doubted McClernand's 
fitness'' to command such an important campaign, and he 
wanted Sherman to hurry lest McClernand reach Memphis 
first, exercise his seniority in rank, and begin the trip. 
Once Sherman had stolen McClernand's thunder and shoved off 
from Memphis, Grant had in mind another pincers movement, 
with Sherman assaulting Vicksburg from the river while 
Grant kept the Rebel Pemberton occupied as far northeast of 
Vicksburg as he could. 39 
Soon Confederates under Earl Van Dorn stunned Grant 
with a raid that virtually ended Grant's overland campaign 
and nearly cost him one of his better staff officers. 
Raiders under Confederate cavalry leader Nathan Bedford 
Forrest had bedeviled Grant's supply lines in Tennessee 
ever since he had left that state . On December 20 Van Dorn 
compounded Grant's troubles when he led a column around 
Grant's left flank and dashed to the Holly Springs supply 
depot. Seeking to absolve himself of his loss at Corinth, 
Van Dorn easily overwhelmed the depot's small garrison. 
Grant's wife, Julia, and son Jesse, had just left Holly 
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Springs on their way to meet the general at Oxford, and so 
they escaped capture. Staff officer Theodore s. Bowers, 
Rawlins' helper, was not so lucky. 
Grant had sent Bowers to check on the strength and 
supply stores of every command in his department. Bowers 
finished checking the Holly Springs garrison late on 
December 19 and recorded his findings on a list. Bowers 
placed the document on the mantel of the fireplace in his 
quarters and went to bed. The next morning a noise outside 
awakened him. Wearing only his long underwear, Bowers 
stepped outside and saw two men threatening a Federal 
guard. 
''What the devil are you interfering with that guard 
for?'' Bowers asked. 
The Confederates cursed Bowers as a Yankee so-and-so 
and ordered him outside. Realizing Holly Springs had 
fallen to Rebels, Bowers stepped back inside and tossed on 
the fire the document containing unit strengths of Grant's 
command. The coals were nearly dead, though, and Bowers 
had to stall while the paper took fire. It finally 
flashed, and the Rebels, realizing they had lost something 
important, futilely tried to save it. They had Bowers, 
though, and took him to Van Dorn. The general ordered his 
men to parole Bowers, but the staff officer, realizing Van 
Dorn's small contingent could not stand against the Federal 
column that must surely be on its way, declined. When a 
Rebel officer threatened to drag him off behind a horse, 
Bowers replied, ''Very well, we can stand that kind of 
treatment to prisoners if you can. It is your turn today, 
but it will be ours tomorrow.'' 
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Many others in the Federal garrison of 1,500 men 
refused parole, and, when the Union column that Bowers 
expected arrived, the Confederates abandoned them and fled. 
Before they left, however, the Rebels destroyed more than 
one million dollars in ordnance and commissary and medical 
supplies. Bowers' conduct delighted Grant, who presented 
him with an inscribed sword to show his appreciation. 40 
The raid left Grant little choice but to withdraw to 
Tennessee. With his main supply depot gone and Forrest 
menacing his northernmost supply lines, Grant realized 
protecting such a line for a run at Vicksburg was 
impractical. He needed provisions to get home, though, and 
he ordered troops to fan out fifteen miles on either side 
of his route and take what they needed from Mississippi 
families. Federal troops easily garnered their needs, and 
the bounty of the countryside amazed Grant. It taught him 
a lesson about living off forage in Mississippi which he 
would not soon forget. 41 
The riverine phase of Grant's plan proceeded, though, 
for William Sherman had no way of knowing Grant had pulled 
back. Sherman and his army had boarded Navy transports, 
part of a sixty-four-boat flotilla under Admiral David D. 
Porter that would operate jointly with Sherman, and sailed 
from Memphis on December 19. That was a full ten days 
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before McClernand arrived and found himself without the 
special force Lincoln had promised. By Christmas Sherman 
was near Vicksburg and about ready to start his land 
campaign. Sherman planned to sail around Milliken's Bend, 
an abrupt bend in the Mississippi about ten air-line miles 
northwest of Vicksburg. Five miles beyond the bend he 
would have Porter swing the flotilla abruptly again, this 
time northeast and into the mouth of the Yazoo River. Five 
miles up that river he planned to unload his men and march 
them cross-country another five miles to the Walnut Hills, 
a high ridge that extended southwest to Vicksburg. If he 
could get a toehold on the ridge, Sherman would have a 
commanding position over the fortress city. The march from 
the Yazoo, however, was torturous, with bayous and swamps 
impeding the army's movements. When Sherman finally 
launched his assault on the ridge, near Chickasaw Bayou, on 
December 29, Confederate sharpshooters were on the ridge 
waiting for him. The battle quickly went to the Rebels, 
who could fire straight down on hapless Federals trapped at 
the base of the ridge. Sherman had no choice but to 
withdraw, having suffered 1,776 casualties; on New Year's 
Day he abandoned a plan to assault the ridge again, at 
Haines Bluff farther up the Yazoo, when river fog stalled 
naval support. Sherman's attempt at Vicksburg was as dead 
as Grant's. 42 
Grant did not give up on Vicksburg, of course, and he 
spent the next four months slogging toward the city. On 
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January 29, 1863, Grant arrived on the Mississippi to take 
command of his entire army. General John McClernand had 
arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo on January 2, the day 
after Sherman had cancelled his Haines Bluff expedition, 
and, as Grant had feared, taken command of Sherman's force. 
McClernand ordered the force back up the Mississippi to 
Memphis, but on the way Sherman encouraged him to make a 
side-trip up the Arkansas River to destroy a Confederate 
garrison known as Arkansas Post. Rebel prisoners had told 
Sherman that 5,000 men were garrisoned there, and Sherman 
realized that such a force could threaten any further Union 
efforts down the Mississippi. On January 11 McClernand and 
Sherman forced the surrender of Arkansas Post, capturing 
all 5,000 men. Then McClernand paused at the town of 
Napoleon, at the mouth of the Arkansas. There Sherman and 
Porter wired Grant, who had returned his headquarters to 
Memphis after withdrawing from Mississippi, and urged him 
to come down the river and take command himself. Grant 
visited Napoleon on January 17 and found subordinate 
commanders so wary of McClernand that their distrust gave 
the whole army an ''element of weakness.'' Grant decided 
quickly that he would take command. He sent McClernand and 
Sherman back down to Young's Point, just beyond Milliken•s 
Bend--the objective was toward the south, not north where 
McClernand had pointed the army--then he hastened to 
Memphis to arrange for his departure. He left General 
Stephen Hurlbut in charge at Memphis, ordered all troops 
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and guns not needed in Tennessee to move to Young's Point,. 
then he returned downriver himself. 43 
Arriving at Young's Point, Grant had much to conquer 
besides just Vicksburg; one was the weather, the other was 
Northern public sentiment. Unionist newspapers had been 
grousing about the apparent lack of activity in the 
Mississippi theater after the defeats of Holly Springs and 
Chickasaw Bayou. Grant also knew that November elections 
had gone against Republicans, indicating war weariness 
among voters. Grant could not long sit idle without 
jeopardizing his job, causing further disaffection among 
Northerners, and demoralizing his troops. But unusually 
heavy winter rains were stopping him. Grant knew that he 
somehow had to get his army on dry land east of Vicksburg 
before he could subdue the city, but the swollen bayous 
networking the region would not permit any overland 
movement, Grant feared, until March and perhaps April. To 
get east of Vicksburg immediately would mean going back to 
Memphis to start another long cross-country trek, but Grant 
believed that would look too much like a retreat for Union 
sentiment to bear. He would have to bide his time until 
the waters receded, but he would have to look busy all the 
while. 
To accomplish that, Grant turned to what he called ••a 
series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the 
attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public 
generally.'' The experiments largely involved creating 
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artificial shortcuts to Vicksburg, such as manmade canals 
or cuts in the bayou system northwest of the city. At 
places like Williams' Canal, Lake Providence, Yazoo Pass, 
Steele's Bayou, and New Carthage Grant committed men to the 
work for the rest of the winter and into spring. While 
Grant was prepared to exploit whatever success the efforts 
might produce, he ''never felt great confidence that any of 
the experiments would prove successful.'' He was right; 
none did. 44 Meanwhile, Grant sought a truly viable plan 
for taking Vicksburg. 
One discussion Grant had with subordinates shows how 
interested chief of staff Rawlins had become in operations 
and the extent Grant was willing to listen to the ideas of 
staff officers. It also marked the first time Grant 
received advice from a trained staff officer--James 
Harrison Wilson, who, although assigned as an engineer on 
Grant's special staff, had become a quasi-personal staff 
officer by virtue of his new friendships with Grant and 
Rawlins. No doubt Wilson's input figured in Grant's later 
professionalization of his staff. 
Before leaving Memphis, Grant had sent Wilson ahead of 
him to Young's Point to scout the ground around Vicksburg. 
When Grant arrived to take command, he and generals 
Sherman, McPherson, Frank Blair, and Fred Steele rode 
across a neck of land immediately west of Vicksburg, where 
a proposed canal would give transports a way to slip below 
Vicksburg out of range of her guns. While the generals 
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reconnoitered, Rawlins and Wilson stayed behind and sat on 
the trunk of a felled cottonwood tree. Neither had 
confidence in the canal; ''This ditch will never wash out 
large enough in all the ages to admit our steamboats,'' 
Rawlins commented. But Wilson had another suggestion. He 
explained that Grant could march troops across the very 
neck of land on which they were sitting and down the 
Louisiana side of the river to a designated point. Then 
the navy could run its gunboats and transports past 
Vicksburg's guns, under cover of darkness, to where the 
infantry waited and ferry them to the east bank. The trip 
would place the army east of Vicksburg, which all of 
Grant's experiments .in one form or another were designed to 
do. And more, Grant could accomplish it without making any 
northerly move that might resemble a withdrawal. 
''Rawlins showed the deepest interest in my views,'' 
said Wilson, and the chief of staff wanted to know more, 
particularly about running the Vicksburg batteries, which 
most commanders considered impossible. Wilson had spent 
the first eighteen months of the war in the East, and he 
was present for operations at Port Royal, South Carolina, 
where he saw gunboats operate quite freely in front of 
Confederate-batteries comparable to those at Vicksburg. 
The operations ''thoroughly cbnvinced'' Wilson that ''our 
Mississippi fleet ... could run by the Vicksburg 
batteries •.. without serious loss.'' Wilson suspected 
Grant would listen to his idea, for he had already been in 
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discussions with Grant and Rawlins where the general had 
''treated Rawlins and myself as equals, and encouraged us 
to express ourselves with the utmost freedom.'' Grant, in 
fact, had already endorsed Wilson's recommendation to make 
most western armies part of a single military division; 
that recommendation led to the formation of the Military 
Division of the Mississippi in late 1863. Rawlins, 
convinced of the soundness of Wilson's Vicksburg plan, 
promised he would suggest it to Grant. 45 
Rawlins did not have long to wait; that evening the 
generals who had ridden with Grant earlier in the day dined 
with him aboard his headquarters steamboat the Hagnolia. 
Their conversation centered on the various plans to reduce 
Vicksburg, none of which were promising. Rawlins commented 
that he and Wilson had discussed a plan, but he was 
reluctant to mention it for it included a bold, dangerous 
maneuver. When Sherman and McPherson encouraged him to 
speak his mind, Rawlins detailed Wilson's plan. Sherman 
immediately protested it--''These boats ... wouldn't live 
a minute in the face of the enemy's guns,'' he said. But 
Grant said nothing, he merely listened to what Rawlins had 
to say.•• 
For the next six weeks, as experiment after experiment 
in the bayous failed, Grant studied his maps and plotted 
strategy in his room, the former ladies' cabin on the 
Magnolia. Ultimately he adopted the plan Wilson and 
Rawlins had forwarded. In his Memoirs Grant did not credit 
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Rawlins or Wilson with the plan; in fact he may have been 
considering it before Rawlins ever mentioned the idea. ''I 
had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land 
to a point below Vicksburg from which to operate,'' he 
said. Certainly no one close to Grant would have known 
what he was thinking, for he kept his thoughts to himself. 
The plan involved both daring and secrecy; it would not do 
to have Northern newspapers get wind of the plan and 
publish it, so Grant kept quiet until he was ready to 
proceed. While Wilson, in his Life of Rawlins, no doubt 
brags about his conception of the plan, and says Rawlins' 
advocacy of it was ''one of the most important factors in 
its adoption and execution,'' he admits that final 
responsibility for it rested with Grant. ''He was the 
chief commander and must have realized that if the plan 
failed it would ruin him, bring disaster upon the army, and 
jeopardize the Union cause,'' said Wilson. 47 
Whoever conceived the plan, and it seems probable that 
Grant was already looking at it before Rawlins and Wilson 
mentioned it, it reveals several things about Grant's 
attitude toward his chief of staff. He did not discourage 
Rawlins from thinking operationally; whether he knew it, 
European chiefs had been doing so for some time. He 
encouraged Rawlins and Wilson to speak their minds; in fact 
other generals, displaying Grant's open-mindedness, also 
encouraged their suggestions. And Grant took the staffers' 
advice, mixed it in his own mental brew of ideas, and 
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mulled it over until he decided on the final Vicksburg 
campaign. While Grant certainly expected Rawlins to 
maintain the military office, he had no objection to 
Rawlins stepping beyond that into an expanded role of chief 
of staff, 
Rawlins and Wilson may have been quite happy with 
themselves, Grant having adopted ''their'' plan, but soon a 
stranger at headquarters threw them into a tizzy. On April 
9, Charles M. Dana, a former newspaperman, arrived at 
Milliken's Bend as an official, and confidential, 
representative of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. Stanton 
wanted Dana to check on the status of affairs in Grant's 
department, but Rawlins and Wilson quickly perceived of 
Dana as a hostile spy. All of Grant's bayou experiments 
had failed, and he had halted active operations to prepare 
for his main Vicksburg campaign. Of course the public knew 
nothing of Grant's real plan, and Northern newspapers were 
again attacking him as either incompetent or drunk. The 
staffers quickly determined that one ill word from Dana to 
Stanton and Grant would be out. Rawlins put on his mantle 
as Grant's protector, and he and Wilson decided their best 
defense was to make Dana a de facto staff officer. They 
told Dana about Grant's actual plan to take Vicksburg and 
informed him about affairs at headquarters. The staffers 
welcomed Dana into their offices and mess tent, and they 
always had Dana's tent pitched next to theirs. Wilson even 
wrote reports for Dana when the latter found his eyes 
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overworked in the dim light of a lantern. Wilson said 
-----
Grant fully approved of their plan to handle Dana, which 
succeed~d beyond their expectations. ''A genuine 
friendship, free from concealment or reservation, grew up 
between [Grant and Dana]'' Wilson said. In fact, Dana 
became so close to Grant and his aides, particularly 
Rawlins and Wilson, that he ''did all in his power to 
remove prejudice against Grant'' from the minds of Lincoln 
and Stanton and replace it with ''respect and 
confidence.' 148 Dana became an astute observer of Grant's 
staff, and over the next two months would notice the same 
deficiencies that Rawlins had started complaining about 
months earlier. 
Meanwhile, Grant had a campaign to finalize. In doing 
so, he moved his route of march west several miles from the 
dry neck of land Wilson proposed. He would have troops 
march from Milliken's Bend, generally following Roundaway 
Bayou south to New Carthage on the Louisiana side of the 
river. By following the tops of levees and throwing 
bridges across otherwise impassable bayous, the men would 
have dry marching all the way. The navy, of course, had to 
be at New Carthage to transport them to the Mississippi 
shore, and to get there they had to run the Vicksburg 
batteries just as Wilson said. Admiral Porter was 
wholeheartedly behind the plan. By late March the winter 
rains had subsided, ground was drying out, and Grant was 
ready to go. On March 29, Grant ordered General McClernand 
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and his corps to move out first, preparing the route south 
for the other corps to follow. 49 
By April 16, Porter was ready to make the run. He had 
assembled on the Yazoo seven armored gunboats with coal 
barges lashed to their starboard sides, three army 
transports with supplies the army would need below 
Vicksburg, and a steam ram. Porter had banked the furnaces 
of his fleet's boilers to emit minimal smoke, doused 
lights, and covered windows to make the boats poor targets, 
and he had piled grain sacks on the decks and water-soaked 
cotton bails around boilers for protection from enemy fire. 
About 9:30 p.m., Porter began the run, sailing past Young's 
Point, where Grant, his wife, two sons, his staff, and 
Charles Dana watched aboard the anchored Hagnolla, and 
toward Vicksburg. Rebel gunners caught sight of them 
quickly and began firing. Porter's gunners returned fire, 
and after ninety minutes the river fell quiet again. 
Unable to await the outcome, Grant raced from the Hagnolla, 
mounted his horse and galloped down the road to New 
Carthage. When he arrived, Grant found the fleet riding at 
anchor. While all the boats were shot up, some badly, only 
one, a transport, was lost. No men died and only thirteen 
suffered wounds. The run was a success. 50 
Still, the troops below Vicksburg needed more supplies 
than Porter's flotilla had been able to carry. More boats 
would have to run the batteries. The army would handle 
this run, though, not the navy, and Grant assembled six 
220 
steamers and twelve barges to make it. Most of the 
steamers' civilian crews cowered from the trip, however, 
and Grant cast about in his own ranks for volunteers to man 
the boats. Fortunately, many of his soldiers had river 
experience; ''I found that volunteers could be found in the 
ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every 
call for aid,'' Grant commented. Lieutenant Colonel 
Williams. Oliver, of the Seventh Missouri Infantry, was 
master of transportation for the run, but Grant gave 
overall command of the army fleet to one of his staff 
officers, and an unlikely one at that--Colonel Clark B. 
Lagow.ai 
Lagow, who had been on sick leave just a few months 
ago, was apparently well enough to take the assignment. 
Grant did not mention Lagow in his Memoirs in connection 
with the second river run and offered no reason for giving 
Lagow the assignment. Julia Grant, however, said Grant had 
been ''much disturbed by the inefficiency of the officer 
who was ordered to make ready the boats.'' He relieved the 
man and assigned two of his staff officers to the duty. 
Julia did not say who the staff officers were; perhaps one 
was Lagow, and the command of the fleet was an extension of 
that duty. Regardless, Lagow took the job, and on April 21 
Rawlins issued Special Order 111 putting him in charge of 
the fleet. 52 
Lagow's river run began about 11:30 p.m. April 22; it 
was his most harrowing duty of the war. Lagow sailed on 
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Colonel Oliver's steamer, the flagship Tigress (which had 
been Grant's headquarters ship at Shiloh a year earlier). 
Five more steamers, lashed with barges, followed. The 
steamer Empire City soon passed the Tigress and was in the 
lead when the fleet reached Vicksburg at 12:20 a.m. April 
23. Rebel gunners were ready for this second flotilla. 
Confederates fired two buildings on the Louisiana shore 
opposite the city, and Oliver said ''it was as light as day 
on the river.'' Rebel fire became terrific, and Oliver 
commented that everything from Minie balls to 200-pound 
shot and shell rained on the fleet. Gunfire repeatedly 
tore away guy lines and ropes on the Tigress, splintered 
its crew cabins, and destroyed an extra tiller wheel. The 
Tigress endured thirty-four hits, and Oliver thought the 
steamer would clear Vicksburg's last battery intact. 
Suddenly a large shot knocked a four-foot hole in her hull 
near the stern, ••causing her to fill and settle fast,'' 
said Oliver. 
Oliver ordered the Tigress grounded on the Louisiana 
side, which she reached just before going to the bottom. 
01 i ver hurriedly assembl.ed his crew on the hurricane deck 
and hailed the steamer J. w. Cheeseman which was coming 
alongside. Lagow ordered Oliver to move his crew to the 
second vessel. However, the fleet had more batteries to 
run, at Warrenton, before they reached New Carthage, and 
Lagow put Oliver in command of the Cheeseman for the rest 
of the trip. Before they moved out, the Empire City, 
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crippled with a cut steam pipe, floated near. Oliver took 
it in tow and the fleet pressed on. 
At Warrenton, which the ships passed in daylight, 
Oliver discovered the Empire City was dragging the 
Chesseman out of control, and he ordered it cut loose to 
float. The Cheeseman took only three hits at Warrenton, 
none serious, and once out of range the crew waited for the 
free-floating Empire City to catch up. 
Rebels at Vicksburg fired more than 500 shots at 
Lagow's fleet, damaging all of the boats and barges but 
sinking only the Tigress. Artillery and small arms fire 
from the shoreline injured many men, two of them mortally. 
Nevertheless, Grant was pleased; ''I look upon this as a 
great success,'' he said. At New Carthage, Lagow took 
reports from the various steamer commanders and submitted 
them to Grant. The general, however, never commended Lagow 
for his work or mentioned him in connection with the run in 
anything other than a brief report to General Halleck on 
Apr i 1 25. 153 
Grant began the next phase of his Vicksburg campaign 
on April 30. Grant had shifted his infantry from New 
Carthage south to Hard Times, Louisiana, preparatory to 
crossing the Mississippi and landing at Grand Gulf, 
Mississippi. On April 29 Porter's gunboats had hammered 
Rebel batteries there, hoping to knock them out of 
operation before the crossing, but to no avail. Grant 
quickly shifted his debarkation point farther south to 
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Bruinsburg, and on the thirtieth McClernand's four 
divisions and one of McPherson's invaded Mississippi. On 
May 1 McClernand's men fought the Battle of Port Gibson, 
dispatching a Rebel contingent and strengthening Grant's 
toe-hold in the state. Grant then ordered a move to the 
north and east, with McClernand's corps taking the left 
wing of Grant's army, Sherman's the center, and McPherson's 
the right. Vicksburg defender John c. Pemberton had his 
army between that city and the Mississippi capital of 
Jackson, forty miles east, where an army under Joseph E. 
Johnston was his only help if Grant attacked. Grant 
intended to get between Vicksburg and Jackson, cutting 
Pemberton off from Johnston, and hopefully destroying 
Pemberton's force before he could fall back to the 
Vicksburg defenses. on May 12 a Confederate brigade from 
Johnston's army hit General John Logan's division of 
McPherson's corps near Raymond, fifteen miles from Jackson. 
Logan won, but the sharp fight prompted Grant to deal with 
Johnston outright before going on to Vicksburg. On May 14 
Sherman's and McPherson's corps entered Jackson, putting 
Johnston to flight. With Jackson, a Confederate railhead, 
secure and Johnston dispersed, Grant feared no real 
Confederate counter-offensive at his rear. He turned his 
full attention to Vicksburg and pointed his army westward. 
Pemberton made an attempt to slip north and join Johnston, 
but Grant blocked him at Champion's Hill. A savage fight 
erupted May 16, with Federals suffering 2,441 casualties, 
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Rebels 3,851. McClernand and McPherson handled the brunt of 
the fighting for Grant, but were unable to destroy 
Pemberton's force. The southern general began withdrawing 
toward Vicksburg. Grant's army made another attempt to 
stop Pemberton at the Big Black River, just east of 
Vicksburg, on May 17, but the Confederates were able to 
duck inside the fortress city. On May 18, Grant's troops 
began entrenching around Vicksburg. On May 19 and again on 
May 22 Grant attempted to take the city by storm. Both 
assaults failed, however, and Grant began the serious work 
of besieging the city. 54 
The key to Grant's campaign had been rapidity, and, in 
another expansion of staff function, he adapted Williams. 
Hillyer's staff duties to fit his needs. Grant, who made 
his headquarters with the forward elements of his army, 
left Hillyer behind at the Grand Gulf beach-head. Grant 
had essentially cut himself off from supply lines to the 
Northern states--his retreat from Holly Springs back in 
December had taught him Mississippi was rich in forage--but 
he still had something of a supply dump at Grand Gulf, full 
of ammunition, rations, and other provisions that had 
survived the battery runs in April. He needed someone 
there to get wagons from the Louisiana side, loaded 
quickly, and hurried to the front in good order. 55 
Grant's dispatches to Hillyer bristled with urgency. 
On May 5, from Hankinson's Ferry, Grant told Hillyer to 
''See that the [commissary] at Grand Gulf loads all wagons 
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... with great promptness.'' And, in an order growing 
from the necessities of the campaign, Grant drastically 
increased his staff officer's authority when he told 
Hillyer to, ''Issue any order in my name that may be 
necessary to secure the greatest promptness in this 
respect.'' The order even placed Hillyer above the 
commissary officers, who in fact were part of Grant's 
special staff. Grant was especially worried about getting 
plenty of ammunition to the front, and he told Hillyer, 
''Every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the enemy. 
Give this your personal attention.'' 56 Hillyer performed 
well at Grand Gulf, and Grant ultimately commended his 
decisions there. 57 
Ironically, in Hillyer, Grant was getting yeoman 
service from a man who had resigned his staff position. On 
April 27, Hillyer, who more than a year earlier had 
reported his war weariness, had submitted his resignation 
to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. He told Thomas he 
needed to attend to his law practice and real estate 
holdings in St. Louis, and to the estates of three of his 
in-laws. Grant reluctantly approved Hillyer's request, 
saying he had ''served [me] faithfully and intelligently. 
I am loathe to lose him.'' Thomas did not approve 
Hillyer's resignation until May 15, so Grant had the 
staffer's services for much of the early Vicksburg 
campaign. !u 
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If Grant was expanding staff officer duties by placing 
one in charge of supply transportation, then John Rawlins 
was expanding the role of chief of staff by taking the 
field with the spearhead of the invasion. Rawlins rode 
with his friend, staff engineer James Harrison Wilson, near 
the front of Grant's invasion force. After the battle of 
Port Gibson, troops of John McClernand's Thirteenth Corps 
occupied the town early May 2 then pushed on to the 
northeast. They stopped, however, at the South Fork of 
Bayou Pierre where Rebels had fired a suspension bridge. 
Wilson sent dispatches to McClernand, urging him to repair 
the bridge, but when the troops took no action, Wilson and 
Rawlins rode out to the bridge. They personally supervised 
its repair, but five miles ahead, at the bayou's North 
Fork, they found another bridge in flames. Troops had 
difficulty finding timber to repair the bridge, but Rawlins 
took the matter in hand, detailing and accompanying 
detachments to find the necessary wood. Wilson credited 
Rawlins' prompt action, and he believed Rawlins had a 
vested interest in keeping the campaign moving, having 
promoted it so vigorously to Grant. ''[Rawlins] made it 
his personal business to see that not a minute should be 
lost, either in the repair of the bridges or in sending the 
troops across them in pursuit of the enemy,'' Wilson said. 
He commented that Rawlins was not content to simply issue 
orders for the work to be done--''This was not Rawlins' way 
of doing business.' •~ 9 
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Rawlins stayed at the front with Grant for the entire 
push to Vicksburg. After the battle of Champion's Hill, 
May 16, Rawlins was riding across the field with his now-
constant companion Charles Dana and division commander 
General John Logan. The trio came upon a wounded and dying 
Confederate soldier, who looked at them and asked, ''For 
God's sake, gentlemen, is there a Mason among you?'' 
''Yes,'' said Rawlins, ''I'm a Mason.'' Rawlins, in 
fact, had been a leading member of the Masonic Lodge in 
Galena, Illinois. Rawlins knelt beside the man, who gave 
the adjutant a small token to send to his wife. Rawlins 
wept as he told the story to his friends.• 0 
Grant generated a large volume of orders on the 
campaign to Vicksburg, and Rawlins, fulfilling one of the 
prime duties of a chi~£ of staff, saw that copies of each 
reached its recipient in good order. But Rawlins' 
biographer, Wilson, implied that Rawlins also wrote the 
orders, a misconception that has lasted a century. ''Not 
one Corder] ... was badly expressed, or was in any degree 
uncertain in tenor or obscure in meaning,'' Wilson says. 
Historians have always regarded Grant's orders as some of 
the clearest in the war, rarely leaving room for 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation, and the credit for 
that belongs to Grant, not Rawlins. Civil War writer Bruce 
Catton notes a special clarity to Grant's orders during the 
Vicksburg campaign, and readers need only consult the 
Official Records to confirm that. William T. Sherman said 
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that Grant refused to let staffers write his orders. ''He 
would sit down and scribble off an order easier than he 
could tell another what he wanted. If anyone came along 
and remarked to him, 'That was a clever order Rawlins put 
out for you today,' Grant would say right out, 'I wrote 
that myself.''' Sherman said he had saved about 150 orders 
from Grant, all written in the general's hand. 
Furthermore, Rawlins.was a fine orator but a slow writer 
and poor grammarian. Charles Dana commented that in 
executing his duties as adjutant Rawlins was ''too slow, 
and can't write the English language correctly without a 
great deal of careful consideration.'' That would hardly 
enable a man to write quick, clear, and precise orders 
during a rapidly moving campaign. Grant had already shown 
a willingness to listen to Rawlins regarding strategy, and 
he may have listened to him again during the Vicksburg 
campaign; Wilson referred to Rawlins as Grant's 
''counsellor'' on the movement. Perhaps, but the many 
orders that came out of headquarters originated with 
Grant. 61 
Grant made the most of his staff by spreading them 
over a wide area--he had Rawlins with him and Hillyer at 
the Grand Gulf beachhead, and he left Theodore s. Bowers 
back at the starting point, Milliken's Bend, to handle 
affairs there. Vicksburg's batteries, of course, were 
still trained on the Mississippi River, and supply 
steamers, easy marks on moonlit nights, had to cease 
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operations. Instead, wagons hauled supplies forty-four 
miles south of Vicksburg where soldiers transferred them to 
riverboats for safe passage to Grand Gulf. But commissary 
and quartermaster officers told Bowers they did not have 
enough wagons and teams to keep the advancing army 
adequately supplied. On May 5 Bowers urged Major General 
Hurlbut, commanding the Sixteenth Corps at Memphis, to send 
down any wagons and teams he could spare. Grant may have 
given Bowers the same authority to act on his own volition 
as he had given Hillyer, for Bowers commented, ''General 
Grant is in the advance and cannot be consulted ... , but 
the great importance of keeping the army supplied induces 
me to present these facts for your consideration.' 162 
During the first week of the siege of Vicksburg, Grant 
sent another of his staff officers on a different kind of 
mission. General Nathaniel P. Banks, commanding at New 
Orleans, planned a campaign to move up the Mississippi 
River and capture Port Hudson, another river fortress about 
125 miles south of Vicksburg. Grant had first considered 
sending McClernand's corps to help Banks after securing the 
toehold at Grand Gulf. While there on May 3, however, 
Grant heard from Banks who said he would not be ready to 
start his campaign until May 10. Grant could not wait, and 
he pushed into Mississippi without telling Banks he had 
changed his plans. In front of Vicksburg, however, on May 
25, Grant began wondering if Banks might assist him. He 
sent staff officer John Riggin to find out. Grant did not 
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give Riggin authority to do any arm-twisting, though, and 
he had little luck with Banks. Banks, who had started a 
siege of his own at Port Hudson on May 23, was miffed that 
Grant had not come to his aid as he had earlier planned. 
He would not go to Grant, but he sent Riggin back to Grant 
with the suggestion that Grant send down 10,000 men to help 
invest Port Hudson. Grant would not go to Banks any more 
than Banks would go to Grant, so the two generals settled 
in to their respective sieges. 63 
Silent during the overland campaign was aide-de-camp 
Colonel Clark B. Lagow. After Lagow commanded the second 
river run on April 22, Grant gave him no other special duty 
until May 24. That day Rawlins issued Special Orders 
Number 139 assigning Lagow to escort Confederate prisoners 
of war to, Federal authorities up the Mississippi at Island 
Number Ten. Troops guarding the prisoners were to go as 
far as Memphis, then hurry back down to Young's Point while 
Lagow took fresh guards for the remainder of his trip. 64 
Lagow performed poorly in his role as commander of the 
guard, however. On May 29 Memphis commander General 
Hurlbut wrote Rawlins that Lagow had just arrived with 
4,408 prisoners. Hurlbut switched the guards and ordered 
Lagow to start them back to Young's Point immediately. 
But, Hurlbut said Lagow had apparently not ''paid any 
attention to this duty or ... taken any care of the 
officers and men under his charge nor even . [know] how 
many men constituted the Guard.'' He said the prisoners 
had also not had enough provisions. Hurlbut said Lagow 
insisted on loading all of the guard troops, 1,000 men he 
estimated, on one boat for the return to Vicksburg. 
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Hurlbut rebuked Lagow, though, for not splitting up the 
guard and sending them back on several steamers carrying 
supplies to Grant's army, all of which could have used 
guards. 6 ~ Neither Gr~nt nor Rawlins responded to Hurlbut's 
charges, but to be sure, the complaints went into Rawlins' 
own file against Lagow. 
Excitement soon gave way to tedium as Grant's army 
settled in for the siege of Vicksburg; it took its toll on 
Grant, and Rawlins picked up anew his mantel as Grant's 
protector. Grant had not lived up to his reputation as a 
drinker over the past few months. Planning the Vicksburg 
campaign had taken all his time and energy, and he had on 
occasion refused to join others who were drinking socially, 
opting instead to stay with his topographical maps. 66 Once 
in Mississippi~ though, Grant's resolve slipped. On the 
night of May 12, the day his troops had fought at Raymond 
and were poised to capture Jackson, Grant went to the tent 
of Colonel William L. Duff, chief of artillery on Grant's 
special staff, and asked for a drink of whisky. Grant was 
certainly relieved that the crossing into Mississippi had 
gone so well, 67 and the drink, which turned into two, then 
three, was perhaps a way to reward himself while easing his 
fatigue. Grant knew that Duff and reporter Sylvanus 
Cadwallader had with them half a barrel of whiskey that 
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Illinois Governor Richard Yates had left behind after 
reviewing Illinois troops some weeks before. Duff had also 
supplied Grant's habit before, much to the chagrin of 
Rawlins, who suspected but could never prove the deed. 
Reporter Cadwallader, in Duff's tent when Grant entered, 
commented that the general was not shy about asking for a 
drink, despite his reputation. Cadwallader watched as 
Grant and Duff drank and toasted the campaign. Then Grant 
left, but he was not drunk; perhaps the knowledge that more 
hard campaigning lay before him kept him sober. 
Cadwallader had become a favorite around Grant's 
headquarters, and he wisely reported nothing about the 
incident. 68 
Through early June, with nothing before him other than 
more siege warfare, Grant continued drinking, ultimately 
provoking Rawlins' wrath. The chief of staff had done his 
best to outlaw whiskey anywhere near Grant; ''Rawlins is 
death on liquor,'' was the word around camp, and officers 
found themselves sneaking drinks for fear Rawlins would 
catch them. Figuring that a night or two of insobriety 
now, with the end of the siege not eminent, would do little 
harm, Grant did as he pleased. Rawlins scolded him harshly 
for it. At 1:00 a.m. June 6, Rawlins sat in his tent at 
headquarters some miles behind the lines and drafted a 
letter to Grant. It began, ''The great solicitude I feel 
for the safety of this army leads me to mention, what I 
hoped never again to do, the subject of your drinking.'' 
233 
Rawlins wrote that he hoped he was wrong, but he thought it 
better to err '' on the side of the country's safety than in 
fear of offending a friend. I I Rawlins told Grant that he 
had the willpower to control his drinking and had proven it 
during the recent campaign. He also reminded the general 
of two pledges of abstinence he had made to the adjutant. 
But ''I find you where the wine bottle has just been 
emptied,'' Rawlins scolded, ''in company with those who 
drink and urge you to do likewise.'' Rawlins blamed drink 
for a sudden indecisiveness in Grant's behavior, and he 
closed his letter by stating again he hoped his suspicions 
were wrong. But, he said, if they were not and Grant kept 
drinking, then ''let my immediate relief from duty in this 
department be the result.' ' 69 
Rawlins gave the letter to Grant and was apparently 
satisfied with its results. On a copy of the letter, which 
surfaced years after both men had died, Rawlins scrawled 
the endorsement, ''This is an exact copy of a letter given 
to ... [Grant], about four miles from our headquarters 
in the rear of Vicksburg. Its admonitions were heeded and 
all went well.--John A. Rawlins.' 170 
In truth, Grant slipped at least one more good bender 
by Rawlins. Charles M. Dana recalled Rawlins riding to 
where Grant, Dana, and some other men were talking some 
distance from headquarters and giving Grant, as Dana called 
it, ''that admirable communication.'' Grant pocketed the 
letter and went about his business. Grant had planned a 
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steamer trip up the Yazoo River to Satartia, Mississippi, 
where units of his army were poised to fight Confederate 
General Joe Johnston's men if they appeared to relieve 
Vicksburg. Dana accompanied the general, and, in an 1887 
article in the New York sun, which Dana then edited, he 
said that Grant got ''as stupidly drunk as the immortal 
nature of man would allow.'' In his memoirs Dana referred 
to the incident more politely, saying simply that Grant was 
''sick.'' Nevertheless, Dana said the next day Grant 
''came out as fresh as a rose, without any trace or 
indication of the spree he had passed through.'' He added 
that Grant did the same thing on several more occasions. 71 
Reporter Cadwallader, in his own memoirs, embellished 
the story of the Satartia bender to include a drunken 
horseback ride across the Mississippi countryside. 
Cadwallader casts himself as the hero of the story, chasing 
down Grant and enticing him back to headquarters. There 
Cadwallader explained the drunken spree to Rawlins. Some 
historians doubt Cadwallader's veracity. Cadwallader dates 
the bender vaguely, and writer Bruce Catton maintains it 
could not have happened before Rawlins wrote the letter to 
Grant, or the chief of staff would have referred to it 
directly. Likewise, it could not have happened after, or 
Rawlins would not have penned such a positive endorsement 
on his copy. 72 
In truth, Grant did go on some sort of a spree on his 
Satartia trip, perhaps not as spectacular as Cadwallader 
reported, and Rawlins did not catch him. Cadwallader 
undoubtedly took liberties with the story. While a 
newspaper dispatch suggests Cadwallader may have been at 
Satartia about that time, Dana confirms he did not travel 
there with Grant's party. Cadwallader probably picked up 
parts of the story around camp, for Grant's binge was 
apparently the subject of gossip for some time. 
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Regardless, neither Cadwallader nor Dana, both of whom had 
found homes at Grant's headquarters, reported Grant's 
behavior to their respective bosses--the newspaper-reading 
public or Edwin M. Stanton--either of whom could have ended 
Grant's career. 73 
In reality, as much as John Rawlins would have hated 
to admit it, he had no true control of Ulysses s. Grant's 
behavior. Grant accepted Rawlins' frequently dramatic 
''protection'' from drink not because he could not control 
himself--in fact, for someone so frequently labeled a 
drunkard, he went on relatively few benders in his life--
but because he recognized he needed moral support in the 
matter from a trusted friend. ''That Rawlins helped in 
this matter is apparent,'' said historian E. B. Long, ''but 
that Grant was so defective a person that he had to have a 
constant caretaker is undoubtedly out of line.' 174 
In a sidebar to the story, historian Catton always 
questioned Rawlins' motive for keeping a copy of the letter 
he wrote to Grant. When Julia Dent Grant heard of the 
letter in 1892, she neither confirmed nor denied the tale 
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of her husband's drunkenness, but instead asked, ''How 
could Rawlins have kept this letter? To me, it looks very 
like making a record for the future.'' Catton agreed. He 
said Rawlins' training as a lawyer and ''headquarters 
bureaucrat'' gave him respect for the written record--a 
paper trail. Catton notes another time, in November 1863 
at Chattanooga, Tennessee, when Rawlins wrote a letter 
rebuking Grant for drinking. His charge turned out to be 
false, though, for Grant was in a strategy meeting when 
Rawlins thought he was drinking. Nevertheless, Rawlins 
kept a copy of that letter, too. Catton said Rawlins ''was 
known as the keeper of Grant's conscience, and he did what 
he could to build up his own reputation. With a defender 
like Rawlins, Grant had no need of any enemies.' 17 s 
Grant harbored no ill feelings toward Rawlins; he 
respected his adjutant's advice, even if he did not follow 
it. In fact, Grant frequently accepted public censure from 
Rawlins without letting it harm their friendship. ''I have 
heard him curse Grant when, according to his judgment, the 
general was doing something he thought he had better not 
do,'' recalled Charles Dana. Grant, of course, also 
respected Rawlins as a fiiend and a fine office 
administrator. Throughout the rest of the siege, Rawlins 
continued to run Grant's headquarters efficiently. Rawlins 
had little military bearing and ''a rough style of 
conversation,'' said Dana. While he insisted official army 
documents follow guidelines in the officer's handbook, he 
did not stand on formality. Wilson said Rawlins made 
officers and enlisted men alike feel comfortable at 
headquarters. Even though Rawlins still resorted to 
profanity if his booming voice was not enough to stress a 
point, he kept an air of cordiality around headquarters 
which Grant must have appreciated. 76 
On May 31, Grant sent Hillyer (who was acting as a 
favor to the general now, his resignation official since 
the fifteenth) to Memphis. Grant wanted Hillyer to tell 
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General Hurlbut to ''strip . Chis district] to the very 
lowest possible standard'' and send troops and supplies to 
reenforce Grant. Grant wanted to be sure the north end of 
his line near Haine's Bluff was secure in case the Rebel 
Joe Johnston attacked there. ''The quartermaster in charge 
of transportation, and Col. Hillyer are specially 
instructed to see that this direction is fully enforced,'' 
Grant told Hurlbut. 77 
Hurlbut was a testy man, though, and something about 
Hillyer irritated him. Acknowledging receipt of Grant's 
orders, Hurlbut told Rawlins, ''Col. Hillyer reported to me 
with orders ... to assist in expediting movements of 
troops.'' Then he commented, ''I am not aware of any 
assistance rendered by him, although his society was very 
agreeable ... I am satisfied that his forte is not in 
Quarter Master's duty.'' Hurlbut also commented that 
colonels Duff, the artillerist, and Lagow had been in 
Memphis but had ignored protocol by not reporting to him. 78 
238 
Duff and Lagow both drank, and Hillyer probably did as 
well, from William R. Rowley's earlier comments. The 
thought of the three of them loose in Memphis is certainly 
grist for the imagination and probably set Rawlins' mind 
spinning. 
In mid-June, however, Hillyer finally left Grant's 
staff and retired to St. Louis. When he departed, Hillyer 
did so without saying good-bye to Grant. He blamed a 
terrible pain in his right arm, rheumatism he called it, 
for his discourtesy, and he said medicine had eased the 
pain but left the arm virtually paralyzed. After ten days 
in st. Louis, Hillyer regained the use of his right hand, 
and he drafted a farewell letter to Grant. ''I could not 
express to you. the day I left my heartfelt 
appreciation of your uniform kindness to me,'' Hillyer told 
Grant. But rumor had gone ahead of him that he left 
Grant's headquarters because of internal trouble there. 
Grant had always stood by Hillyer, notwithstanding his 
later comment that Hillyer was not cut out for staff work, 
and Hillyer had, in fact, rendered good service to Grant. 
Rawlins and his Galena friend Rowley had had it in for 
Hillyer, though, because of his apparent tendency toward 
drink. Nevertheless, Hillyer took ''every occasion to make 
known the fact that there never had been an unkind word, 
thought, or expression between us.'' Hillyer told Grant 
that, ''I have never had a truer, firmer, friend than 
you,'' and that if he ever rejoined the army, he would like 
to do so on Grant's staff. 79 In his comments Hillyer had 
struck a nail on the head; if any man on his staff was a 
troublemaker, incompetent, or inefficient, Grant, who 
regarded friendships as for life, would rather let 
attrition take care of the problem than fire him outright. 
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Lagow was soon gone, although temporarily again, as 
well. He fell ill and Grant sent him back home. on June 
15 Grant wrote Julia, telling her about conditions on his 
staff. He told her Hillyer had resigned and everyone else 
was well except Lagow. He ''has gone home sick and I 
expect never to recover,'' said Grant. ''He may get up so 
as to return but will never be well. 1180 
Grant may have lost some staffers during the Vicksburg 
siege, but he gained two as well, neither well-qualified 
for headquarters work. One was young Lieutenant William 
McKee Dunn, Jr., who became an aide on Grant's staff. 
Young Dunn, like so many others, had made it on Grant's 
staff not by his own qualifications, but by Grant's 
kindheartedness. D.unn was the son of Judge Advocate 
General William McKee Dunn. Sixteen years old when the war 
started, Dunn had run away from home, joined the army, and 
served several months until his father found him and 
secured his discharge. The boy ran away again. Finally, 
Grant learned that Dunn had joined his army. When Grant 
questioned him, the boy admitted his identity, but warned 
that he would simply run away again if Grant sent him home. 
Grant thought the least he could do for the boy's safety 
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was transfer him from a combat command, and he made a place 
for him on the personal staff. Dunn primarily carried 
orders and messages. 81 
Dunn does not surface frequently in any examination of 
Grant's headquarters; neither does Peter T. Hudson, whom 
Grant brought aboard early in the Vicksburg campaign. 
Hudson was a brother of Silas Hudson, who himself was a 
cousin of Julia Dent Grant. In January 1863 Silas queried 
Grant about a staff job for Peter. Grant, noting that it 
was his privilege to nominate whom he wanted for his staff, 
agreed for no other apparent reason than his familial ties 
to the man. Grant urged Silas to send Peter on, and 
advised him that everything he needed in the way of 
equipment he could find at Memphis. 82 
Grant's stranglehold on Vicksburg continued until July 
4, 1863, when Rebel commander John c. Pemberton surrendered 
his 29,000-man garrison. Lieutenant Dunn carried news of 
the surrender to the nearest telegraph office at Cairo, 
Illinois. Despite Rawlins' objections, Grant paroled the 
Confederate prisoners rather than use part of his army to 
transport them north and oblige the Union to care for 
them. 83 
For all the wonderful clarity of his orders, Grant in 
July 1863 was not known for extensive battle or campaign 
reports. After Shiloh, Grant had submitted only a brief 
letter to General Halleck informing him that a fight had 
occurred and Federals had won. Grant claimed that when 
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Halleck superseded him after the battle, he did not allow 
Grant access to the reports of his subalterns. ''For this 
reason I never made a full official report of this 
engagement,'' said Grant. 84 
But after Vicksburg fell there came from Grant's 
headquarters a lengthy, detailed report of the campaign and 
siege; its composition reveals something about the way 
Grant's adjutants worked. Throughout the siege, Grant had 
been working on a draft of the report, covering events from 
the running of the Vicksburg batteries in mid-April to the 
investment of the city in May. Grant turned that draft 
over to Rawlins and Bowers for copy-editing. They verified 
facts, added names and dates, and checked figures. In that 
manner the trio had completed by July 6 the official report 
of the Vicksburg campaign. 8 ~ 
In late July, Grant assigned Rawlins to personally 
deliver the report and rolls of Confederate parolees to the 
adjutant general's office in Washington D. c. He intended 
the trip to be something of a vacation for the chief of 
staff who had worked so diligently for Grant the past two 
years. He also sent with Rawlins a letter introducing him 
to President Lincoln. Grant said he would be pleased if 
the president would grant Rawlins an interview, noting that 
Rawlins could give Lincoln any information he wanted about 
affairs in the Department of the Tennessee. Grant ended by 
saying he thought Lincoln would be relieved to know that 
Rawlins had no favor to ask. ''Even in my position it is a 
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great luxury to meet a gentleman who has no 'axe to grind' 
and I can appreciate that it is infinitely more so in 
yours,'' said Grant.•• Lincoln must indeed have been 
relieved, recalling the visits of McClellan's chief of 
staff and father-in-law, Randolph Marcy, in 1862 when Marcy 
most certainly had an ''axe to grind.'' 
But Grant was shading the truth a bit, for in fact he 
wanted Rawlins to test the political waters on a decision 
he had made a month earlier. Throughout the Vicksburg 
campaign, Grant had been wanting to fire his rival, Major 
General John McClernand. Grant well understood the man's 
incompetence, but he wanted solid grounds for the man's 
removal. He got them in mid-June when McClernand, without 
Grant's approval, published in a Northern newspaper 
congratulatory orders to his Thirteenth Corps. His corps 
had performed nobly, as Grant pointed out, but McCletnand's 
orders, and his subsequent official report of operations, 
exaggerated their role in the campaign and denigrated the 
efforts of other units. ''The publication of his order .. 
. was in violation of War Department orders and of mine,'' 
said Grant, and on June 17 he canned McClernand, sending 
him home to Springfield, Illinois. Rawlins had earlier 
tried to heal the rift between Grant and McClernand, 
thinking it best for his boss since McClernand and Lincoln 
were old friends from Springfield. But the political 
general's congratulatory orders angered Rawlins so that he 
was wholeheartedly in favor the man's dismissal. 
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McClernand was still in the volunteer army, though, subject 
to recall, and still a close friend of Lincoln's. Grant 
wanted Rawlins to fully explain the facts of McClernand's 
performance to Lincoln and ascertain if Grant could expect 
ramifications. 87 
What started as a vacation became a harrowing trip for 
Rawlins. Rawlins took a steamer up the Mississippi, then 
boarded an Illinois Central train for Chicago. But one 
hundred miles from that city, the train ran off the track. 
Rawlins wrote to Grant that he was on the most heavily 
damaged car and ''came nearer being killed than ever before 
in my life.'' He commented that the wreck scared him 
nearly speechless, and he recognized how Grant must have 
appreciated that. Rawlins arrived at Washington after, as 
he called it, ''one of the hardest trips one ever 
experienced I reckon.'' 88 
Rawlins met with Major General Henry Halleck and 
Colonel John c. Kelton, assistant to Adjutant General 
Lorenzo Thomas, and he found them entirely solicitous. He 
said Grant should make a trip to Washington just to ''see 
how delighted they are over your successes.'' He also 
found Halleck eager for Grant to submit names for 
promotions. Halleck explained that the nearby Army of the 
Potomac usually ate up all the vacancies on the promotion 
list, but three brigadier general spots in the regular army 
were now open. Seizing the opportunity, and using the 
authority he knew Granted had vested in him, Rawlins 
recommended Sherman, McPherson, and Major General George 
Thomas for the spots. He urged Grant to hurry along his 
recommendations and make it official. 89 
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Rawlins' interview with Lincoln also went well. On 
July 31 Rawlins met with Lincoln and some of his cabinet 
members, giving details of the Vicksburg campaign and the 
people involved. Rawlins' ''honest, unpretending, and 
unassuming manners'' impressed Secretary of the Navy Gideon 
Welles. No doubt Rawlins spoke in the same straightforward 
style he used around camp, minus the cursing, but ''the 
unpolished and unrefined deportment of this earnest and 
sincere man ... pleased me more than that of alm6st any 
officer whom I have met,'' said Welles. That same earnest 
manner also convi.nced Lincoln and the cabinet that General 
McClernand was, as Welles put it, ··an impracticable and 
unfit man.'' Welles said it was clear that Grant wanted 
the president on his side in the matter. ''In this I think 
. [Rawlins] has succeeded,'' said Welles, ''though the 
president feels kindly toward McClernand, Grant evidently 
hates him, and Rawlins is imbued with the feelings of his 
chief.'' 90 
Rawlins had impressed the Washington high command, but 
they soon got word that other members of Grant's staff were 
not as competent. The Vicksburg campaign afforded Charles 
Dana plenty of opportunities to see Grant's staff in 
action. After Vicksburg surrendered, Dana penned his 
impressions of Grant's staff in a lengthy letter to Edwin 
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M. Stanton. Dana started with general comments. ''Grant's 
staff is a curious mixture of good, bad, and indifferent.'' 
Dana said Grant was ''neither an organizer nor a 
disciplinarian himself,'' and ''his staff is naturally a 
mosaic of accidental elements and family friends. It 
contains four working men, two who are able to accomplish 
their duties without much work, and several who either 
don't think of working or who accomplish nothing no matter 
what they undertake.'' 
Dana then got specific. In the same letter in which 
he criticized Rawlins' writing of the English language, 
Dana also had praise for the man. ''Rawlins ... is a 
very industrious, conscientious man, who never loses a 
moment and never gives himself any indulgence except 
swearing and scolding.'' Dana said Rawlins had ''a great 
influence over [Grant].'' He said he watched over the 
general ''day and night.'' Dana also praised Rawlins' 
assistant, Theodore Bowers, as ''an excellent man ... 
[who] always finds work to do.'' 91 
Dana was not so generous with the rest of Grant's 
staff. Dana said Lieutenant Colonel William L. Duff, the 
artillerist on Grant's special staff who supplied the 
general with whiskey, was ''unequal to [his] position,'' in 
part because he was ill, but largely because ''he does not 
sufficiently understand the management of artillery.'' 
Dana said the siege of Vicksburg suffered for his 
incompetence, but he noted that Grant's personality had 
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shaped his staff. ''General Grant knows that he is not the 
right person; but it is one of his weaknesses that he is 
unwilling to hurt the feelings of a friend, so he keeps him 
on.1192 
Dana reserved his harshest words for Grant's aides-de-
camp. He said three captains serving as aides were 
virtually useless, but the colonels in that position, 
namely Lagow and Riggin, were worse. ''[LagowJ is a 
worthless, whisky drinking, useless fellow. [Riggin] is 
decent and gentlemanly, but neither of them is worth his 
salt so far as service to the government goes. Indeed, in 
all my observation, I have never discovered the use of 
Grant's aides-de-camp at all. On the battlefield he 
sometimes sends orders by them, but everywhere else they 
are idle loafers.' 193 
Dana closed with this observation. ''If . Grant 
had about ·him a staff of thoroughly competent men ... the 
efficiency and fighting quality of his army would soon be 
much increased. As it is, things go too much by hazard and 
by spasms; or when the pinch comes, Grant forces through, 
by his own energy and main strength, what proper 
organization and proper staff officers would have done 
already. 1194 
Dana had verbalized what Rawlins, Rowley, and even 
Grant, although he was quiet about it, already knew. Grant 
had tried using his aides as his operational proxy at the 
battle of Iuka, and he had put them in a variety of jobs 
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including provost marshall, transportation boss, and 
liaison with other department commanders. Still, Grant's 
early policy of giving staff jobs to friends and men who 
had been kind to him left him with an untrained staff that 
his tender-hearted loyalty prevented remedying. As Dana 
noted, Grant had accidentally brought aboard good men, such 
as Rawlins and Bowers, but in general the staff was 
inefficient. An abundance of drinkers on the staff, 
perhaps the norm at most headquarters but a particular 
problem where Grant and Rawlins were concerned, only 
created tension and impeded work. Dana's criticisms of 
Grant's staff were correct, but by the close of the siege 
of Vicksburg, changes at Grant's headquarters were already 
underway. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GRANT: A .PROFESSIONAL STAFF 
1863-65 
After the siege of Vicksburg, Ulysses s. Grant's 
personal staff underwent a subtle change, from civilian 
amateurism to military professionalism. Deadwood officers 
on his staff began to leave, albeit largely by attrition. 
Grant did not, however, make the same mistake in replacing 
them as he had made when first organizing his staff. 
Instead of bringing in untrained friends to fill the 
vacancies, Grant chose military professionals. Their 
effect on the staff was far-reaching. By the time he began 
the Wilderness campaign in Virginia in May 1864, Grant's 
use of his staff officers resembled, crudely and 
unintentionally, Prussian staff usage. 
Soon after Vicksburg fell, Grant sought a reward for 
his chief of staff, John Rawlins--a promotion to brigadier 
general. Grant, in his letter of recommendation to the War 
Department, said, ''I can safely say that he would make a 
good corps commander.'' Grant was gilding the lily, for 
Rawlins had done nothing in his short military career to 
support that claim. Rawlins had spent all his time on the 
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staff, not the line, and had never commanded so much as a 
company. In truth, Grant wanted the promotion for his 
friend as ''a reward of merit.'' The army gave Rawlins a 
star, but the Senate did not confirm Rawlins' commission 
until mid-1864, and then only after Grant's repeated 
urging. Summing up his opinion of Rawlins, Grant told the 
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, ''He comes nearest 
being indispensable to me of any officer in the service. 111 
Rawlins was also about to get a promotion of a more 
personal sort. While his army occupied Vicksburg, Grant 
and his staff took as their headquarters the plantation 
home of a Mrs. Lum, widow of a wealthy planter. 
Confederate General John Pemberton had also used the place 
as his headquarters. Several young women of the family and 
one, a governess named Mary Emma Hurlbut, from Connecticut, 
naturally attracted Federal soldiers, so much so that Grant 
assigned Rawlins to protect the women from unwanted 
attentions. James Harrison Wilson said Rawlins, a widower 
for two years now, was ''singularly shy and restrained in 
the presence of ladies.'' His new headquarters job caught 
him unawares, however, for he and Emma Hurlbut became 
acquainted and fell in love. They planned their wedding 
for the following December in Danbury, Connecticut. 2 
Despite his newfound happiness, Rawlins could still 
take his boss to task. Trade restrictions in Grant's 
department forbade speculators to buy and ship Southern 
cotton to the North. When a relative of Grant's came to 
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visit the general, and in the process bought cotton to send 
home, Rawlins, without Grant's knowledge, ordered the man 
expelled from the department. When Grant asked Rawlins to 
repeal his order, Rawlins flew into a rage. He cursed and 
suggested Grant's relative should be hanged rather than 
expelled. The outburst embarrassed everyone .within 
earshot, and Rawlins rushed from the tent leaving Grant 
stunned. 
Wilson followed Rawlins and told him to apologize to 
Grant immediately. Rawlins, mortified at his action, 
agreed, and he quickly begged Grant's pardon. He noted 
that, since meeting Emma he had been trying to curb his 
foul language. ··1 resolved to quit cursing and flattered 
myself that I had succeeded,'' he said. 
Grant had not let Rawlins' temper sour their 
friendship before, and he would not now. Unphased, Grant 
explained that Rawlins was not cursing, just expressing his 
''intense vehemence on the subject matter.'' Grant let 
Rawlins' expulsion order stand. 3 
Grant showed just how much he trusted Rawlins when he 
left the chief of staff in virtual command of the whole 
army in September 1863. After Vicksburg fell, Grant was 
eager to move his army south and capture Mobile, Alabama. 
From there he could attack the interior of the Confederacy, 
force General Braxton Bragg to disengage from operations in 
eastern Tennessee, and wreck supply lines that were feeding 
Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. General Henry Halleck 
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disagreed, and instead ordered Grant to disperse the 
elements of his army to various theaters and prepare to 
cooperate with General Nathaniel Banks on the lower 
Mississippi River. To that end, Grant made a trip to New 
Orleans to confer with Banks, and he left Rawlins in charge 
of the army remaining at Vicksburg. Either General Sherman 
or General McPherson should have taken command in Grant's 
absence, but both declined in favor of Rawlins. Sherman 
suggested for anyone but Rawlins to take charge would 
confuse headquarters records. Of course, Grant expected 
nothing major to occur in his absence, and none of his 
staffers issued an important order without first consulting 
Sherman ... 
The Vicksburg area did indeed remain quiet, but 
affairs in eastern Tennessee were about to impact on Grant 
and his staff. Throughout the summer and early fall, Major 
General Williams. Rosecrans, who had departed Grant's army 
for an independent command after the battles of Iuka and 
Corinth in October 1862, had maneuvered Confederate General 
Braxton Bragg's army out of central Tennessee to near the 
Georgia border. On September 19, however, Bragg turned and 
engaged Rosecrans in the bloody two-day Battle of 
Chickamauga. Bragg's army put Old Rosey's men to flight, 
but the Confeder.ate victory was hollow; Rosecrans retreated 
to the important railroad junction of Chattanooga, which 
joined the Confederacy's two major east-west rail lines and 
linked Georgian war industries with the rest of the 
breakaway nation. 5 
259 
Bragg could not leave Rosecrans in such a threatening 
position, and he moved to trap the Federals in the city. 
Chattanooga sat on the south bank of the twisting Tennessee 
River in a gap in the Cumberland Mountains. Just west of 
Chattanooga the river took a sudden turn south for about 
two miles before turning abruptly north again to swing wide 
around Raccoon Mountain west of the city. South of 
Chattanooga, where the Tennessee swung back north, mighty 
Lookout Mountain sat astride the Tennesee-Georgia border, 
and Missionary Ridge dominated the landscape east of the 
city. Bragg got his men atop Missionary Ridge and Lookout 
Mountain, then he let geography do th~ rest. With the 
Tennesee at his back and mountains beyond that, Rosecrans 
was effectively under siege. Ros~crans had but one supply 
line, winding through the mountains to the north, and the 
weather or Rebel raiders could close it in a moment. By 
mid-October horses in the garrison were starving to death 
and the men were on quarter rations.• 
Abraham Lincoln turned to Grant to relieve 
Chattanooga. In October, the War Department consolidated 
Grant's Army of the Tennessee, Ambrose Burnside's Army of 
the Ohio, and Rosecrans' Army of the Cumberland into,one 
command, the Military Division of the Mississippi. On 
October 16, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton personally 
gave Grant command of the new division, making him head of 
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all Federal armies between the Alleghenies and the 
Mississippi. Stanton also gave William T. Sherman command 
of the Army of the Tennessee, and he fired Rosecrans from 
command of the Cumberland army, replacing him with General 
George H. Thomas, who had saved the army from annihilation 
at Chickamauga. 7 
On October 20 Grant gathered up his staft and sta~ted 
for Chattanooga. They took a circuitous route, first to 
Nashville, then by train to northern Alabama, then on 
horseback over muddy, nearly impassable roads to 
Chattanooga. Grant had been on crutches since his trip to 
New Orleans when his horse, frightened by a locomotive, 
collided with a carriage, and his companions had to carry 
him over several rough spots on the last leg to 
Chattanooga.a 
Grant and his staff arrived at Chattanooga during a 
rainstorm after dark on October 23. Wet and tired, Chief 
of Staff John Rawlins' quick temper ignited over what he 
perceived as discourtesies at George Thomas' headquarters. 
Grant and his staff officers went straight to Thomas' place 
to discuss the situation at Chattanooga, but neither Thomas 
nor any of his staff officers offered Grant's party warm 
drink or dry clothes. Rawlins fumed until James Harrison 
Wilson, who had been out inspecting units, arrived and 
broke the ice, asking if someone couldn't feed Grant and 
his men and offer them dry clothes. Thomas complied, but 
Rawlins never forgot the slight. He privately suspected 
that Thomas was angry that Grant had arrived to supersede 
his command. 9 
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Thomas had 45,000 men in Chattanooga, and the War 
Department was sending him reinforcements--17,000 men under 
Sherman from the Army of the Tennessee and 20,000 from the 
Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker. But 
Grant realized the reinforcements would do no good if they 
were starving, and he set about opening a new supply line 
into Chattanooga. 10 
Grant found that Thomas' chief engineer, William F. 
''Baldy'' Smith, a former engineer in the Army of the 
Potomac, already had a plan to open a new supply line if 
someone would let him use it. The Tennessee River, when it 
turned south and then abruptly north again, formed a 
peninsula just west of Chattanooga, and a crossing on the 
far side of that point of land, known as Brown's Ferry, was 
the key to Smith's plan. The crossing was out of range of 
Bragg's artillery, but Rebels held it. Smith would have 
three columns--one coming from the reinforcements 
approaching Chattanooga from the west, one marching across 
the neck of the peninsula from Chattanooga, and one 
floating silently down the Tennessee from Chattanooga--
converge on Brown's Ferry under cover of darkness. Once 
they secured the ford, engineers would span it with pontoon 
bridges. Then the soldiers would brush Confederates away 
from Kelly's Gap in the south end of Raccoon Mountain and 
the new line would be open. Smith's plan called for swift, 
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daring action, and Grant liked it. Early October 27 
Federal soldiers went into action. Smith's plan met 
resounding success and the ''Cracker Line,'' as soldiers in 
Chattanooga called the new supply route, was open. Grant 
could now turn his attention to Bragg's army on the high 
ground south and east of Chattanooga.ii 
When Sherman's troops arrived in mid-November, Grant 
began planning an offensive to rid Chattanooga of Bragg. 
The Confederacy had sent General James Longstreet and 
15,000 men of .the Army of Northern Virginia to help Bragg 
with the siege, but on November 4 Bragg sent Longstreet's 
force to drive Ambrose Burnside's Army of the Ohio out of 
Knoxville, Tennessee. Grant feared Longstreet would make 
short work of Burnside, and he wanted to dispatch Bragg 
before Longstreet could return. Nevertheless, having seen 
two frontal assaults fail at Vicksburg, Grant thought 
rushing Bragg's high positions would be a waste of Federal 
soldiers. 
He devised a more complex plan. Sherman's army would 
get across the Tennessee northeast of Chattanooga and 
secure a foothold on the northeast end of Missionary Ridge. 
Meanwhile, Hooker and his men from the Army of the Potomac 
would move southwest of Chattanooga, either capture or 
bypass Lookout Mountain, then step across a valley to the 
southwest end of Missionary Ridge. With Thomas' men 
attacking the center of the ridge, diverting Confederates 
from reinforcing either flank, Sherman and Hooker could 
sweep across the top of Missionary Ridge and destroy 
Bragg's army. 1 2 
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Grant had hoped to begin the offensive November 21, 
but Sherman's men had not reached Chattanooga yet. Harsh 
weather and harsher terrain delayed them so they were not 
ready to cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga until the 
twenty-third. In the meantime, Rawlins, at Grant's 
headquarters, passed on orders information about the 
military situation at Chattanooga to Sherman. At one point 
he told Sherman that Grant wanted him to leave his baggage 
trains behind and hurry on to the river ford. 13 
On November 24 everyone was in position and Grant 
ordered the show to begin. In a spectacular engagement 
atop fog-shrouded Lookout Mountain, Hooker's men captured 
that summit then moved on to the valley separating it from 
Missionary Ridge. They bogged down there so that it was 
early November 25 before they reached Missionary Ridge. On 
the other end, Sherman had a rougher time. Rocky ground 
slowed the Westerners, but not as much as a hard group of 
fighters under Confederate general Pat Cleburne. Sherman 
never secured the northeast end of the ridge. 
Hooker was in position to sweep the ridge, though, and 
Grant ordered Thomas to begin a diversionary attack on the 
center. Blue lines swept fotward, taking a line of 
Confederate trenches. Then, emboldened by their success 
and eager to avenge their loss at Chickamauga, the Federals 
264 
rushed on without orders. The shock of the attack knocked 
Bragg's men rearward then toppled them from the ridge. 14 
The Chattanooga campaign was Grant's first large 
unified command effort. Even though it ended in a great 
Federal victory, the Battle of Chattanooga virtually 
proceeded out of Grant's hands. Yes, Grant had labored to 
craft a complex offensive to relieve the city, but his 
plans went awry almost as soon as they began. Sherman, 
whom Grant had intended to be the star of the show, got 
held up on the Federal left and never got into the act; Joe 
Hooker delivered a fine initial performance, but stumbled 
trying to cross the gap between sky-high Lookout Mountain 
and Missionary Ridge. In the center, Thomas' men, whom 
Grant envisioned only as reserve players, stole the show. 
And they did it, much to Grant's chagrin, without orders. 
Grant wanted Thomas' Cumberland men to move up the ridge 
only when Sherman and Hooker were headed along its crest, 
keeping Bragg's men from swooping down on the attackers 
coming up the center. After noon, though, with Sherman and 
Hooker delayed, Grant could see through his field glasses 
men of Pat Cleburne's unit drifting back from the fight 
with Sherman to Bragg's main defenses. Suspecting Bragg 
was about to make a counterattack, Grant asked Thomas, who 
was staring through his own binoculars next to Grant, if he 
did not think it was time for his men to attack. Thomas 
ignored the remark, waiting instead for a direct order. 
Grant gave it a short while later, but even then he had to 
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personally give the order to the attack's lead commander 
before it rolled forward. Even then, Grant ordered that 
the attackers stop and reform after taking the first of 
three Rebel entrenchments. The Federals easily pushed the 
Rebels out of the way, though, and, flushed with battle, 
rushed on up the hill, taking the second and third 
entrenchments quickly. Grant angrily quizzed his 
subordinate, ''Thomas, who ordered those men up the 
ridge?'' ··r don't know,'' replied Thomas, ''I did not.'' 
Grant knew full well that the battle had proceeded without 
him; ''Damn the battle!'' he reportedly said soon after it 
ended. ''I had nothing to do with it. 11 He still had 
something to learn about coordinating the efforts of three 
major armies.is 
John Rawlins' biographer, James Harrison Wilson, 
attempted to credit Rawlins and himself, not Grant, with 
spurring Thomas' men into action on the afternoon of the 
twenty-fifth. Perhaps, but Wilson was a great self-
promoter and Grant mentions nothing of it in his Memoirs. 
Rawlins was actually very quiet during the.Chattanooga 
campaign. Theodore Bowers and William R. Rowley handled 
more routine, day-to-day correspondence ·and order writing' 
than did Rawlins.is 
Rawlins' had good reason for remaining low-key during 
the Chattanooga campaign, for in truth, he was sick. His 
friends at headquarters suspected Rawlins, fatigued after 
the year's campaigning, had taken cold in the rainy 
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Tennessee autumn. His illness was more serious. Rawlins' 
first wife had died of tuberculosis at the beginning of the 
war. The onset of his cold, which did not abate with time, 
struck Rawlins with fear that he, too, had contracted the 
disease. Doctors with Grant's army, unsure about the 
communicability of the disease, assured Rawlins, however, 
that he was not consumptive and that his symptoms would 
fade. Rawlins ultimately took leave of absence in 
December, not only to recuperate but also to marry his 
sweetheart, Emma. 17 
Before he left, Rawlins made sure he fulfilled the one 
task he had assigned himself, protecting Grant. on 
November 17, Rawlins wrote to Emm.a that drink was flowing 
around headquarters, and he feared for Grant's sobriety. 
Apparently suspecting that Grant's injury in New Orleans 
resulted more from alcohol than a horse accident, Rawlins 
told Emma that he had hoped that ''experience would prevent 
him ever again indulging with this his worst enemy.'' 
Nevertheless, Rawlins thought himself indispensable in the 
matter; ''I am the only one here (his wife not being with 
him) who can stay it ... and prevent evil consequences.'' 
That same day Rawlins drafted a lengthy letter to Grant, 
imploring him to ''immediately desist from further tasting 
of liquors of any kind.'' Rawlins thought better of giving 
Grant the letter, and he talked to him instead. In an 
endorsement on the letter Rawlins said his discussion with 
the general ''had the desired effect. 111 • 
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Rawlins' accusation of November 17 was the same one 
historian Bruce Catton said was unfounded because Grant had 
been planning strategy, not drinking. But Rawlins had good 
cause for concern. A few days before Rawlins drafted his 
letters, a drinking party erupted at headquarters causing 
Rawlins' Puritan blood to chill. Though he could not abide 
the debauchery, it led to the resignation of a staff 
officer Rawlins could abide even l~ss. 
Colonel Clark B. Lagow threw the drunken fest, and a 
relative of Grant's chronicled it in his diary. William 
Wrenshall Smith, a first cousin of Julia Dent Grant's, was 
visiting the general and got a firsthand look at the battle 
of Chattanooga. He also saw Lagow's shenanigans. On 
Saturday, November 14, Smith penned in his diary, ''Quite a 
disgraceful party-~friends of Col. Lagow, stay up nearly 
all night playing &c. Gen breaks up the party himself 
about 4 oclock in the morning.'' The next day Smith wrote, 
''Lagow don't come to table today Che habitually dined with 
Grant]. He is greatly mortified at his conduct last night. 
Grant is much offended at him and I am fearful it will 
result in his removal.'' 19 
In truth, Grant had already decided to fire Lagow; the 
party sealed his decision. On November 1, Charles M. Dana 
had written to Secretary of War Stanton recommending 
Lagow's dismissal. Describing Lagow as a ''worthless 
fellow ... '' who earned ''no part'' of his pay, Dana 
said Grant wanted ''rid of him.'' After his drunken spree, 
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Lagow saw that he had about worn out his welcome at 
headquarters. Both Rawlins and Grant treated him cooly, 
and on November 18 Lagow tendered his resignation to 
Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas. Grant endorsed it and 
asked the War Department to disregard his request for 
Lagow's dismissal in view of the man's resignation. Grant 
tried to keep Lagow busy until his resignation became 
effective December 1. On November 26, however, Lagow 
misdirected a scouting party, which Grant accompanied, by 
erroneously reporting the existence of a bridge over 
Chickamauga Creek. The next day the aide caused a six-hour 
delay in the departure of a relief column bound for 
Knoxville, where Ambrose Burnside still faced Confederate 
James Longstreet, by failing to promptly deliver orders. 
Lagow fell into such disgrace that, as William Wrenshall 
Smith recalled, he slunk out of headquarters on November 
30, one day before scheduled, in ''sore, depressed 
spirits. 1120 
Lagow's resignation no doubt delighted Rawlins, 
Rowley, and Bowers. His departure virtually rid them of 
the staff undesirables they had complained about more than 
a year earlier. Hillyer had left during the Vicksburg 
campaign, and now Lagow was gone. The third man they 
despised, John Riggin, Jr., had left a month before Lagow. 
On October 12, 1863, in a letter to Emma, Rawlins said 
flatly, ''Col. Riggin has tendered his resignation and 
gone; General Grant has approved it.'' In an 
understatement belying his pleasure, Rawlins said of 
Riggin's departure ''I have no regret ... and shall 
~xpress none. 1121 
269 
The resignations were part of major changes taking 
place on Grant's staff, changes that were coming just in 
time. Upon assuming command of the Military Division of 
the Mississippi, Grant faced more complex problems of 
combined operations than he had before, and he needed a 
more professional personal staff to help him. The victory 
at Chattanooga fixed Grant's fame with the public and 
Abraham Lincoln, and the following March, Congress revived 
the grade of lieutenant general specifically for Grant. On 
March 9, 1864, Lincoln commissioned Grant lieutenant 
general and gave him command of all United States armies. 
That further compounded his need for a more professional 
staff. The resignations of Riggin, Lagow, and Hillyer cut 
some unprofessionals from Grant's staff. But more 
important than the resignations were additions. 
The first three additions were on the clerical side of 
Grant's personal staff. Back on May 2, the day after the 
battle of Port Gibson, James Harrison Wilson approached 
Grant with the idea of augmenting his staff with a military 
secretary. -Orant agreed he should have one, and Wilson 
suggested Adam Badeau, whom he had known on the Port Royal, 
South Carolina, campaign. Badeau, a New York native, was 
an established newspaper writer and publisher, as well as a 
clerk in the State Department before the war. He joined 
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the Port Royal expedition as a reporter for the New York 
Express, and while there he started a newspaper for 
soldiers called the Port Royal New South. He served 
unofficially as a volunteer aide-de-camp to General Quincy 
Gilmore during the bombardment of Fort Pulaski, then joined 
the army as an aide to General Thomas w. Sherman. Grant 
ordered Badeau to report to his headquarters, but before he 
could do so Badeau suffered a foot wound at Port Hudson. 
He underwent a lengthy recuperation in New York City, and 
did not join Grant until Febiuary 1864. 22 
Badeau was a competent choice to be Grant's military 
secretary, but he was a comical sight. He was short and 
heavy, with a red face, red hair, and glasses. He was so 
stoop-shouldered that Grant recalled he looked like a 
''bent fo'pence.'' He once tried to ride his horse between 
two trees, but he misjudged the space between them and 
found himself and his saddle on the ground. Grant laughed 
at the incident for days. 23 
In late September Grant and Rawlins also petitioned 
the adjutant.general's department in Washington to promote 
Private George K. Leet to captain and add him to Grant's 
staff as an assistant adjutant general to help Rawlins. 
Leet had served with the Chicago Mercantile Battery, and 
had been present at the battles of Chickasaw Bayou, 
Arkansas Post, Port Gibson, Champion Hill, Black River 
Bridge, the siege of Vicksburg, and the investment of 
Jackson. In late July Rawlins detached the man for duty at 
Grant's headquarters. ''By his industry and ability [he] 
has shown himself eminently fitted for the position,'' 
commented Rawlins. The adjutant general's office made 
Leet's promotion official on October 3. 24 
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Grant also added Tonawanda Seneca Indian Ely s. Parker 
to his staff. Born in 1828 in New York state, Parker was, 
by age eighteen, petitioning congressmen in Washington to 
repeal a treaty that would have moved the Senecas off their 
land. Parker studied law and passed his board exam, but in 
1849 he switched careers to engineering, finding it more 
interesting. He obtained an engineering degree from the 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York. Parker 
worked on various engineering projects before becoming 
construction engineer for the federal government at the 
Lighthouse District around lakes Michigan, Huron, and 
Superior. 2 s 
Parker soon got an assignment that put him on an 
indirect course to service on Grant's staff. He met 
another federal engineer, William F. Smith, who secured 
Parker an assignment to Galena, Illinois, to build a 
customs house and marine hospital. There Parker became 
active in Galena's Masonic Lodge, and he made lasting 
friendships with two of the Lodge's top members--John 
Rawlins and William R. Rowley. Parker also met Grant in 
1859, who was by then working in his father's leather goods 
store. 26 
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When the Civil War began, Parker tried to enlist, but 
the federal government denied his request because, as an 
Indian, he was not a citizen. Finally, in 1863, another of 
Parker's Masonic friends, John E. Smith, who had become a 
brigadier general in Grant's Army of the Tennessee, 
recommended Parker to become his assistant adjutant 
general. The adjutant general's office delayed, and Grant, 
probably with Rawlins' and Rowley's support for their old 
friend, wrote an endorsement for Parker. Grant said Parker 
was ''highly educated and very accomplished,'' and was 
··eminently qualified for the position.'' Parker received 
a captain's commission and served Smith from July to 
September, 1863. 27 
Parker then received orders to join the staff of his 
friend William t. smith, now a general. Parker fell ill, 
however, and when he recovered he found that Grant wanted 
him on his staff. By the end of October Parker was on 
board with Grant as an assistant adjutant general. 28 
Badeau, Leet, and Parker were all competent men, more 
so than some men Grant had selected earlier in the war. 
They were all well qualified for clerical duties, but they 
were not professionally trained soldiers. Others joining 
Grant's headquarters, however, were. 
First among them was Cyrus B. Comstock. Comstock was 
as professional a soldier as one could find in Grant's 
army; a colleague once said, ''He had somewhat the air of a 
Yankee schoolmaster, buttoned in a military coat.'' A 
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Massachusetts native, Comstock graduated from West Point in 
1855. He served in the Corps of Engineers, then as an 
assistant professor at West Point. When the Civil War 
began, Comstock helped construct defenses around Washington 
D. c. Then, as a first lieutenant, Comstock was an 
assistant to Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, chief 
engineer of the Army of the Potomac. 29 
Comstock received a promotion to captain on March 3, 
1863, and on June 8 he got orders to report to Grant's 
army. Working under Grant's chief engineer, Captain F. E. 
Prime, Comstock immediately went to work on the siege lines 
at Vicksburg. His industry and intelligence quickly won 
him a staunch supporter in Charles M. Dana, who, of course, 
had Secretary of War Stanton's ear. In late June 1863 Dana 
sent Stanton a series of brief messages about Comstock's 
work. ''Captain Comstock takes general charge of the siege 
works on the lines of both [generals] Lauman and Herron,'' 
he wrote on June 19. On June 25 he commented that siege 
works were ''going forward well'' under Comstock's eye. 
Finally, on June 28, Dana reported that Prime had gone 
north sick,·and Grant had made Comstock chief engineer. 
Later Dana told Stanton that Comstock was ''an officer of 
great merit.'' He said Comstock had a quality that Prime 
had lacked--''a talent for organization. His accession to 
the army will be the source of much improvement. 1130 
Grant also praised Comstock. After Vicksburg fell, 
while Comstock was destroying the siege approaches he had 
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helped build, Grant commented that he had ''ably filled'' 
Prime's spot. What's more, Grant said Comstock, along with 
Wilson and Prime, had passed on to his army experience such 
as ''would enable any division. hereafter to conduct a 
siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular 
engineer officers.'' 31 
Comstock remained as Grant's chief engineer until 
October 19, 1863, when he took the same position at St. 
Louis. Grant wanted him back, though. A month later he 
notified Comstock that he wanted him for assistant 
inspector general, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, on 
his special staff. Comstock told Grant another general had 
made him a similar offer, but he chose to return to Grant. 
Although still on Grant's special staff, Comstock was 
working his way to the personal staff; the next March, 
after becoming lieutenant general, Grant announced Comstock 
as his senior aide-de-camp. 32 
Comstock would become pre-eminent on Grant's newly 
professionalized staff. In January 1864, b~fore Grant 
became lieutenant general, Comstock, along with General 
William F. Smith, submitted to Grant a plan to land 60,000 
men at Norfolk, Virginia, or New Bern, North Carolina, and 
invade the North Carolina interior. 33 Grant ultimately 
used a similar plan, perhaps based on Comstock's. 
Regardless, the fact that Comstock submitted such a plan 
reveals a strategic initiative never before present on 
Grant's personal staff. 
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In the midst of the Chattanooga campaign, Grant 
requested that another professional soldier, Captain Horace 
Porter, join his staff. Porter, a Pennsylvania native, 
graduated from West Point in 1860 and went immediately into 
the ordnance department. Porter made it onto the staff of 
General Thomas w. Sherman and became friends with James 
Harrison Wilson. Like Wilson, he participated in the 
campaign against Fort Pulaski, Georgia, winning praise from 
General Quincy Gillmore. Gillmore said Porter acted as 
chief of ordnance and artillery, and ''he directed in 
person the transportation of nearly all the heavy ordnance 
and instructed the men in its use.'' On September 29, 
1862, Porter became chief of ordnance for the Army of the 
Ohio, and on January 28, 1863, he took over that job for 
the Army of the Cumberland. He became a captain on March 
3. When Grant entered Chattanooga as head of the Division 
of the Mississippi, he found the officers around George 
Thomas' headquarters had everything good to say about 
Porter, but they were distressed that the War Department 
had called him to Washington to help with a reorganization 
of the ordnance department. 34 
Porter found the assignment ''distasteful,'' but Grant 
tried to intervene on his behalf. He called Porter to his 
headquarters and told him theft, while he had to obey his 
current call to Washington, he should take along a letter 
Grant had drafted to Henry Halleck. In it Grant told 
Halleck that Porter ''is represented by all officers who 
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know him as one of the most meritorious and valuable young 
officers in the service.'' He requested the War Department 
move Porter to his staff and make him a brigadier general 
in the process. 3 ~ 
Grant thought his strong comments on Porter's behalf 
would allow him to return to the field, but General Halleck 
and Secretary of War Stanton surprised him. Upon arrival 
in Washington, Porter could not obtain an audience with 
Halleck. He settled for giving Grant's letter to Halleck's 
adjutant but he never received acknowledgement of its 
receipt. Porter even met with Stanton to protest his 
retention in Washington, but the secretary insisted he stay 
with the ordnance department. Porter did not see Grant 
again until the general arrived in Washington in March 1864 
to receive his commission as lieutenant general. Grant 
continued to petition for Porter's assignment to his staff, 
and on April 27 the War Department relented, making Porter 
an aide-de-camp of Grant's. 36 
The next professional soldier whom Grant added to his 
personal staff was Orville E. Babcock. A Vermonter, 
Babcock graduated from West Point in 1861, going directly 
into the Corps of Engineers as a first lieutenant. He 
served in the Department of Pennsylvania the first summer 
of the war, then, along with Cyrus B. Comstock, he was an 
engineer in the Army of the Potomac. Babcock became a 
lieutenant colonel of volunteers January 1, 1863, and the 
next month joined Major General Ambrose Burnside's Ninth 
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Army Corps as chief engineer. He became a lieutenant 
colonel in the regular army on March 29, 1864. By April 6, 
Grant had picked Babcock to join his staff as an aide-de-
camp. Grant biographer William McFeely calls Babcock 
··another of those totally unexceptional men whom Grant 
trusted;'' nevertheless, he added more West Point 
experience to Grant's staff and soon became very close to 
the general. 37 
Finally, Grant selected his brother-in-law and old 
West Point roommate, Frederick Tracy Dent, to join his 
personal staff as an aide-de-camp. Dent's appointment was 
not just a case of nepotism. ,Dent had made a life-long 
career of the army, and was a major in the regular Fourth 
United States Infantry when Grant called him to his 
staff. 38 
Between 1861 and 1864, Grant had matured in his 
selection of staff officers. While many of the new men on 
the staff may have been Grant's friends, they also had 
military educations and wartime experience vital to Grant's 
new role as overall United States army commander. An 
exchange between Grant and Abraham Lincoln on March 29, 
1864, shows just how adamant Grant was that his new 
staffers be well qualified. Lincoln had recommended a 
friend, a Captain Kinney, for a position on Grant's staff. 
Grant, mistakenly calling the man Kennedy, refused. ''I 
would be glad to accommodate Capt. Kennedy but in the 
selection of my staff I do not want any one whom I do not 
personally know to be qualified for the position assigned 
them.' t3s 
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By April 6, 1864, the composition of Grant's new staff 
was set. Brigadier General John A. Rawlins remained as 
chief of staff, with Lieutenant Colonel Theodore S. Bowers, 
assistant adjutant general, retaining his role as Rawlins' 
principal assistant. Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock 
was Grant's senior aide-de-camp, with lieutenant colonels 
Orville E. Babcock, Horace Porter, and Frederick Tracy Dent 
also serving as aides. Lieutenant colonels William R. 
Rowley and Adam Badeau were Grant's military secretaries, 
and captains Ely s. Parker and George K. Leet were 
assistant adjutants general. Lieutenant Colonel William L. 
Duff, the hard-drinker who had been Grant's chief of 
artillery at Vicksburg, became an inspector general, and 
Grant retaineq Captain Peter T. Hudson and First Lieutenant 
William McKee Dunn, Jr., as aides-de-camp. Even though 
Hudson and Dunn were aides-de-camp, Grant never considered 
them equal to West-Pointers Comstock, Babcock, Porter, and 
Dent. Hudson and Dunn would be little more than couriers, 
and in fact Grant had confided to Comstock that he should 
probably get rid of Hudson, along with William L. Duff. 40 
The professionalism of this .new staff was readily 
apparent. Newspaper reporter Sylvanus Cadwallader, who had 
ridden with Grant for over two years, saw the change 
immediately. Grant's personal staff was ''divided on the 
line of the regular and volunteer service,'' said 
Cadwallader. ''Porter, Babcock, and ... Comstock were 
sticklers for military authority. Duff, Rowley, Bowers, 
and others manifested their feelings by ominous shrugs of 
the shoulders rather than words. West Point training was 
quite apparent.' 141 
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Grant and his new staff had a massive job before then. 
When Grant pinned on his third star, he became commander of 
not just one army, as he had been at Vicksburg, or even 
three armies, as at Chattanooga, but of all the armies of 
the United States. Grant could count no less than nineteen 
military departments and seventeen distinct commanders 
under his charge, and his new job was to move all of them 
in concert toward one goal--the destruction of the 
Confederacy. Two major Confederate armies stood in Grant's 
way. Grant saw that the real key to victory was Robert E. 
Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, guarding Richmond. The 
South's other major army, that under General Joseph E. 
Johnston, in Georgia, Grant considered but an obstacle to 
the first, guarding as it did supply lines and industries 
that fed Lee's army. In designing his grand strategy for 
1864, Grant decided to send Sherman, now commanding Grant's 
old, massive Division of the Mississippi, smashing against 
Johnston in Georgia. At the same time, Major General 
George G. Meade's Army of the Potomac would engage Lee in 
northern Virginia, and, moving from Fortress Monroe on the 
eastern tip of the Virginia peninsula, political general 
Benjamin Butler and his Army of the James would demonstrate 
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against Richmond and the important transportation junction 
of Petersburg, about fifteen miles south of the Rebel 
capital. The independent Ninth Army Corps, under Major 
General Ambrose Burnside, would be a reserve at Annapolis, 
Maryland, ready to swing left or right to reinforce either 
Butler or Meade as Grant saw fit. Grant would leave 
skeleton commands on scattered fields to guard Union-held 
territory, such as the line of the Mississippi River, 
western Tennessee, and some beachfront toe-holds in the 
Carolinas, but he would rob as many soldiers as necessary 
from those commands to reinforce the three major thrusts. 42 
It was well that outside observers like Sylvanus 
Cadwallader could readily spot the new professionalism of 
Grant's personal staff, for the general would soon be using 
its members in a manner untried in an American army. Grant 
knew that coordinating the campaign he had designed would 
be a monumental task, and he knew he needed help. He no 
doubt realized, as Charles Dana had commented to Secretary 
of War Stanton, that things often got accomplished through 
force of his own will. He also realized that the various 
commanders now under him, whether in army or corps command, 
might not have the same view of the campaign as he had. 
Grant said as much to Horace Porter when he commented on 
the difficulty of finding generals with ''sufficient 
breadth of view and administrative ability to confine their 
attention giving a general supervision to their 
commands, instead of wasting their time upon details,'' he 
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said. 43 But he could no longer be present at every army 
headquarters to drive forward his plans. Grant did not 
have to worry about Sherman; his red-headed friend was 
fighter enough to accomplish any objective and then some. 
He also did not have to worry about Meade, for he planned 
to make headquarters right next to Meade's, not to take 
command of the Army of the Potomac, but to nudge it the way 
he wanted it to go. He did have to worry about some other 
generals who were crucial to the campaign--Ambrose Burnside 
in particular, who had led the Army of the Potomac to 
disaster at Fredericksburg eighteen months earlier and whom 
Grant had had to bail out of a siege at Knoxville, 
Tennessee, and Ben Butler, whom neither Grant nor Rawlins 
trusted. 44 He needed someone at the headquarters of those 
generals to act with the knowledge, strategic 
understanding, and authority of Grant himself. He turned 
to the men of his personal staff to do the job. 
Grant intended the grand campaign to begin in early 
May 1864. The Army of the Potomac sat on the north side of 
the Rapidan River in northern Virginia facing Lee's well-
entrenched army on the south side. Grant wanted to cross 
the Rapidan on the night of May 3-4; Butler would start up 
the Virginia peninsula as soon as the Army of the Potomac 
got across the Rapidan; Majo~ General Franz Sigel, with a 
small command, would attack down the Shenandoah Valley to 
keep Lee from pulling reinforcement from there; and down at 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, Sherman would head for Georgia on 
May 5. 
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On the night of May 3, Grant called all the members of 
his personal staff into the front room of a little house at 
Culpeper, Virginia, which he had taken for his 
headquarters. He was writing instructions when the men 
came in, and when he finished, he lighted a new cigar and 
turned to his staffers. He explained to them again the 
plan. He wanted to destroy Lee's army, or at least wound 
it mortally before it could crawl into Richmond's defenses. 
··1 shall not give my attention so much to Richmond as to 
Lee's army, and l want all commanders to feel that hostile 
armies, and not cities, are to be their objective points,'' 
he told the men. Then, in a few sentences that elevated 
Grant's staff officers from office bureaucrats and couriers 
to members of a strategic body, Grant said, ··1 want you to 
discuss with me freely from time to time the details of the 
orders given for the conduct of a battle, and learn my 
views as fully as possible as to what course should be 
pursued in all the contingencies which may arise. l expect 
to send you to the critical points of the lines to keep me 
promptly advised of what is taking place, and in cases of 
great emergency, when new dispositions have to be made on 
the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessary to reinforce 
one command by sending to its aid troops from another, and 
there is not time to communicate with headquarters, I want 
you to explain my views to commanders, and urge immediate 
action, looking to cooperation, without waiting for 
specific orders from me.'' 4 ~ 
Grant had moved into the realm of modern staff usage. 
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In a small way, he was asking his staff officers to perform 
much as Prussian General Helmuth von Moltke had been asking 
his staff officers to perform for years. In Prussia, of 
course, the Great General Staff trained staff officers in 
every facet of strategy and government objectives, then it 
attached them to field headquarters to direct commanders 
toward a common goal. In Culpeper, Virginia, the method 
was crude and simple, but the theory was the same. Grant, 
acting as his own ''Great General Staff,'' imparted his 
views of the campaign to this staff officers, then sent 
them out to work alongside field commanders. Historian 
Richard J. Sommers called these men ''liaisons,' 146 but 
they were much more. They did not just facilitate 
communications between headquarters and field commands. 
They carried with them full authority to act in Grant's 
stead, to make critical spot decisions and issue orders in 
his absence. They were Grant's representatives, his 
proxies. They embodied all of the general's plans, ideas, 
and hopes for the campaign. They were to be, in effect, 
Grant himself. 
Grant, of course, had hit on this enlightened bit of 
staff usage as a way to fill a need which his new command 
created, not by studying staff advances in other countries. 
Grant had been an indifferent student at West Point. He 
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had gotten through his studies easily enough, but he did 
not like to study. It is doubtful that his study habits 
had improved much over the past two decades. West Point 
French classes presented him a great deal of trouble, 
however, and he never learned to speak or read it well, so 
it is equally doubtful that he ever read Paul Thiebault's 
Manuel des Adjutants Generaux et des Adjoints dans les 
Etats-Hajor Divisionaires des Armees. Grant's senior aide, 
Comstock, was friends with former West Point instructor 
William J. Craighill, who wrote the staff officers' manual 
all the men carried in their saddle bags. While Craighill 
had concerned himself most with order writing in his book, 
he had highlighted French staff organizations. 47 If that 
influenced Grant, he never said. More likely, Grant's new 
contribution to staff work did not come from the books. 
Growing from necessity and experience, it was what Civil 
War historian Edward Hagerman has called a ''mechanistic,'' 
or ''practical if not theoretical,'' 48 response to new 
combat conditions. Grant had tried something similar on 
the Iuka campaign in September 1862, but Clark B. Lagow had 
not been staff officer enough to help Grant much. Grant 
had also seen the large unified attack at Chattanooga, 
victorious though it was, stumble in its execution for lack 
of staff coordination. The armies under his command now 
were even larger--the Army of the Potomac had 115,000 
troops, Butler's Army of the James had 30,000 49 --and the 
scope of the cooperative operations Grant planned 
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necessitated he rely on staff officers to help coordinate 
them. The duties Grant handed his staff in May 1864 were 
also born of common sense and experience. But as most good 
military plans are born of just those elements, it is no 
wonder Grant's view of staff usage suddenly coincided with 
that of the Prussian Army's. 
Grant's staffers may have seen the general's 
intentions coming, for he had been hinting at them by his 
actions. Grant had been corresponding with Sherman, in 
Chattanooga, in preparation for the spring campaign. On 
April 19, Grant sent Comstock personally to Sherman with 
some final instructions. ''Colonel Comstock •.. can 
spend a day with you, and fill up many a little gap of 
information not given in any of my letters,'' Grant wrote 
Sherman. Sherman had expected Grant to begin the campaign 
by as early as April 27, but Comstock told Sherman it would 
probably be May 2 at least. Comstock also needed to judge 
the preparedness of Sherman's troops, information no one 
wanted to send across the telegraph wires, so.Grant would 
know more exactly when to begin. Comstock left Sherman's 
camp on April 24, and Sherman sent with him a letter to 
Grant saying Comstock had the ''facts and figures,'' about 
his armies. ''As soon as you see them make your orders,'' 
said Sherman. 50 
Grant had also sent Orville Babcock to Franz Sigel's 
headquarters at Cumberland, Maryland, to help the German 
general iron out plans for his Valley campaign. Grant had 
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recommended that Sigel start his campaign from Beverly, but 
Sigel soon reported that rains had made roads around that 
place impassible. He submitted another plan of attack, 
which Grant sent Babcock to check out. ''Confer freely 
with Col. Babcock,'' Grant told Sigel, ''and whilst he 
remains with you, let us settle, unalterably, the line to 
be pursued by your forces.'' Grant had not yet, however, 
given Babcock fully authority to issue orders in his name. 
Babcock soon reported back that Sigel's plan was 
satisfactory. 51 
On May 3 Grant issued orders for the great campaign to 
begin the next day, and soon after midnight, May 4, the 
Army of the Potomac began crossing the Rapidan at Germanna, 
Ely's, and Culpeper Mine fords. Burnside's Ninth Corps 
began moving down from Annapolis, for Grant had ordered it 
to support Meade, not Butler, who that same day put his 
army on transports at Hampton Roads and began sailing up 
the James River toward Richmond. Immediately south of the 
Rapidan, and extending about seven miles farther south, was 
the dense area of trees and undergrowth known as the 
Wilderness. Travel through the Wilderness other than by 
the few roads that coursed through it was nearly 
impossible. Many soldiers of the Army of the Potomac had 
been there before, for exactly one year earlier Joe Hooker 
had engaged Lee near the crossroads landmark of 
Chancellorsville. At the same time as Grant was slicing 
through Mississippi far to the west, Lee was whipping 
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Hooker soundly. The soldiers, retracing their steps a year 
later and occasionally stumbling across the uncovered bones 
of comrades killed in Hooker's fiasco, feared Bobby Lee was 
about to do the same to them. But Grant had other plans. 
He knew the tangled woods negated his numerical strength, 
and he wanted to get through the Wilderness quickly, moving 
around Lee's right to keep his supply lines as short as 
possible, and fight Lee in the open.s 2 
Lee, encamped near Orange Court House and 
Gordonsville, also had other plans. The Army of the 
Potomac marched southeast via the Germanna Plank Road and 
Brock Road, and had to cross intersections with the Orange 
Turnpike, near Wilderness Tavern, and the Orange Plank Road 
about a mile farther south. Lee sent his Second Corps, 
under General Richard Ewell, pouring eastward on the Orange 
Turnpike and General A. P. Hill's corps along the Plank 
Road to catch Grant. On May 5 the armies collided. Major 
General Winfield Scott Hancock's Second Corps was leading 
the Army of the Potomac through the Wilderness; behind him 
was the Fifth Corps of Major General Gouvernor K. Warren, 
and behind him was the Sixth Corps of Major General John 
Sedgwick. When the Confederates approached, the Army of 
the Potomac faced west, Hancock fanning his forces out 
either side of the Orange Pl~nk Road to meet Hill, and 
Warren deploying across the Turnpike to meet Ewell. 
Sedgwick took his men off the Brock Road and into the 
Wilderness to come in on Warren's right to fight Ewell. 
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The Battle of the Wilderness was on, and the fighting 
quickly became fierce. The thick woods destroyed unit 
cohesion and hid the action from commanders. Soon Warren's 
corps veered into the tangled growth between the turnpike 
and the plank road. Rifle and artillery fire ignited the 
dry leaves that carpeted the Wilderness, and fire trapped 
wounded soldiers and roasted them to death. Soldiers, 
fighting amid the screams of their burning friends, could 
rarely see their enemies and had to fire at muzzle 
flashes. 53 By the end of May 5, the fighting had decided 
nothing. 
On May 6, Grant ordered the fighting renewed, and he 
began dispatching his staff officers to help field 
commanders. Sedgwick and Warren drove back down the Orange 
Turnpike against Ewell, and Hancock down the Orange Plank 
Road against Hill. All the previous day, from Grant's 
headquarters near Wilderness Tavern, Cyrus B. Comstock and 
William R. Rowley had sent Burnside orders regarding his 
order of march and troop dispositions. Now he had come up, 
and at 6:20 a.m. Comstock sent orders for him to join the 
battle. Grant wanted Burnside to leave a division to guard 
the junction of the turnpike and Germanna plank road and 
use the rest of his Ninth Corps to fill a dangerous gap 
between Hancock's right flank and Warren's left. But 
Burnside, keeping in character with his past military 
accomplishments, got lost. South of the Germanna Plank 
Road, his men wandered about the Wilderness between and to 
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rear of both Hancock's and Warren's flanks, never 
connecting with either. Hancock fumed at Burnside's 
absence, but at 9 a.m. he got news that Grant had sent 
Comstock to personally show Burnside where to place his 
army. Within an hour Comstock sent word to Grant that 
Burnside was nearing Hancock's position; they could hear 
the Second Corps firing less than a mile away. Grant was 
not content with Comstock holding Burnside's hand, and at 
11:45 a.m. John Rawlins sent Burnside orders to ''Push in 
with all vigor so as to drive the enemy from General 
Hancock's front . Hancock has been expecting you for 
the last three hours.'' 54 
Hancock, in fact, had gained some ground even without 
Burnside. He had pushed Hill's men back to near a clearing 
where Lee himself had made camp. Lee tried to personally 
lead a counterattack, but his men demanded he go to the 
rear. At that moment, Lee's best fighter, General James 
Longstreet, whose corps had been ten miles away when the 
fighting started on the fifth, got his corps on the field 
and began battering Hancock back to his starting place. 
Longstreet then took the initiative, driving on Hancock's 
exposed left flank. In an accident that resembled the 
shooting of Stonewall Jackson by his own men a year 
earlier, Longstreet's men mistakenly shot him. The wound 
incapacitated Longstreet for five months. 
Meanwhile, Cyrus B. Comstock remained at Burnside's 
headquarters throughout the swirling fight. He kept Grant 
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abreast of events there and in Warren's corps to the 
right. 55 At 3:30 p.m., Grant ordered Hancock to plan 
another assault for 6 p.m., and he sent word to Burnside to 
assist Hancock. Burnside's men got into position, and 
Grant sent word that Burnside's reserve division was on its 
way as reenforcements. Later, however, Grant cancelled the 
attack. 56 
On the right, near Grant's headquarters, the 
lieutenant general almost lost his army. Confederates 
under General John B. Gordon found themselves on the 
extreme right flank of the Union line, and they swept down 
upon it. The attack captured two Federal generals and very 
nearly rolled up the whole Union line, but Sixth Corps 
commander Sedgwick rallied his men and averted a 
Confederate victory. The fight in the confused underbrush 
sputtered to a halt, with Hancock still astride the Orange 
Plank Road in earthworks, Burnside to his right, and Warren 
and Sedgwick's line still astride the Orange Turnpike but 
bent back almost ninety degrees so it touched the Germanna 
Plank Road 
Back at headquarters, Grant, the dense trees blinding 
him to the battle, had sat on a stump most of the day 
whittling while couriers brought him news of the fight. 
Lee had stopped him from getting through the Wilderness 
like he wanted, and in fact, his army was in a good deal of 
danger. When Sedgwick and darkness halted the fighting, 
Grant issued a few orders then went inside his tent. 
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Rawlins followed him inside and saw a scene the likes of 
which he had not witnessed in the war. Face down on his 
cot, General Grant was crying. He had very nearly lost the 
day and he knew it. Rawlins, who had seen the general in 
many situations, allowed him his privacy and told only an 
intimate few people of the incident. Within a few minutes, 
much relieved, Grant was back outside, conversing and 
planning with his staff.~ 7 
Lee may have whipped Grant in the Wilderness, but 
Grant was not prepared to retreat as his eastern 
predecessors had done. Instead, he planned to keep moving 
south. On May 7, as the Army of the Potomac divisions 
pulled out of line, Grant, Meade, and their staffs 
clattered down the Brock Road in that direction trailing 
some cavalry troopers. Coming to a fork in the road, Grant 
and Meade chose the right path and started down it. Soon 
Comstock, ''with the instinct of the engineer,'' Grant 
said, suspected they were on the wrong road and spurred his 
horse ahead of the generals. Up ahead he spotted Lee's 
army on the move; had he not scouted the road, Grant and 
Meade would soon have been prisoners.~ 8 
Grant plotted a march to Spotsylvania Court House, a 
crossroads town in a clearing southeast of the Wilderness. 
There, between Lee and Richmond, he would force Lee into an 
open fight. Grant start~d his march by evening, May 7, but 
Lee, guessing Grant's intentions, got his men there first. 
Early May 8, Confederates scrambled behind rough earthworks 
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and turned back a Federal assault. Grant regrouped, and on 
May 10 he threw his men at the Confederate works twice 
more. Both attempts failed. Grant sent his men against 
the works again on May 12, touching off one of the 
costliest battles of the war; no real territory changed 
hands, but Federal casualties were 6,800 while Confederates 
lost 5,000 men. The fight on May 12 was the last major 
battle at Spotsylvania, but Grant spent another week trying 
to maneuver Lee out his trenches there. When those tactics 
failed, Grant set marched by Lee's flank to the North Anna 
River. Again Lee beat Grant to his objective. Rather than 
start another fight, Grant kept marching south. At 
Totopotomy Creek, Grant found Rebels again entrenched 
before him, so he slid around Lee's flank in one last 
attempt to get between the Grey Fox and Richmond. On June 
1 Grant arrived at a crossroads about ten miles northeast 
of Richmond known as Cold Harbor. Lee's men were arriving, 
too, but they were not fully entrenched, and Grant ordered 
an assault on their unfinished works. The Army of the 
Potomac men were tired, though, and not all of them had 
arrived yet, so Grant had to postpone the attack. By the 
time the assault was ready, on June 3, the Rebels were 
secure behind new works. Grant's assault was as disastrous 
as the ones at Spotsylvania; he lost more than 7,000 in 
less than an hour. Confederates lost only 1,500 men. 59 
Before the spring campaign started, Grant had told 
Army of the James commander Ben Butler that, if Lee evaded 
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him and slipped back into Richmond's defenses, Grant would 
pull the Army of the Potomac into line next to Butler's 
army and together they would handle Lee. Grant was 
assuming, of course, that Butler would take his first 
objective--Petersburg. On May 5, Butler had sailed his 
troops up the James River to City Point, within ten miles 
of Petersburg. The next day his generals made a tentative 
attempt to take the town, but Confederate defenders drove 
the Federals back. To Grant's chagrin, Butler made no 
other serious attempt to take his objectives, but instead 
got himself so trapped by a few Rebel units and Virginia 
terrain that he was of use to no one. 
Now, in mid-June, with the Army of the Potomac at Cold 
Harbor, Petersburg was still a prize for the taking. One 
more time around Lee's right flank, Grant saw, and 
Petersburg could be his; if Petersburg fell, Richmond would 
have to follow, and the Army of Northern Virginia would be 
stranded. On the night of June 12 Grant and Meade secretly 
slipped the 100,000 men of the Army of the Potomac out of 
their Cold Harbor defenses and across the James River. For 
three days, Lee did not know they had gone. Southern 
General P. G. T. Beauregard, a hero of First Bull Run and 
Grant's old nemesis from Shiloh, was defending Petersburg 
with 2,500 men; the Federals now bearing down on him 
outnumbered his force greatly. Grant had borrowed Major 
General William F. Smith's Eighteenth Corps from Butler's 
army to spearhead the attack, and Smith went in motion 
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while Hancock's Second Corps was coming up. On June 15, 
Smith's men carried some of Beauregard's outer defenses, 
and Petersburg lay virtually open to Federal occupation. 
But Smith inexplicably became convinced that Rebel 
defenders outnumbered him. At first he thought to wait on 
Hancock before mounting an attack, then, despite a moonlit 
night, he cancelled any attack at all. Grant was sorely 
vexed. When he got on the field, he and Meade ordered 
attacks on the Petersburg lines on June 16, 17, and 18. 
All failed. Lee, who had been holding his army north of 
the James to protect Richmond from an enemy that was no 
longer there, finally discovered his mistake and joined 
Beauregard in the Petersburg lines. If Grant wanted 
Petersburg now, he would have to resort to something he 
knew well--siege warfare. The siege of Petersburg began on 
June 18. 60 
The spring campaign had certainly not gone as Grant 
had hoped. Critics said Lee had whipped him, and in fact 
the Confederate general had outmaneuvered Grant time and 
again. Others called Grant a butcher; the Army of the 
Potomac had suffered 64,000 casualties since May 5. Still, 
Grant had refused to admit defeat, and he had placed two 
Federal armies before Richmond where he intended to keep 
them--two things no Federal general had yet done in front 
of Lee. And, even though their usage had not insured 
victory for Grant, he had, through the six weeks from the 
Wilderness to Petersburg, stuck to his plan of putting 
staff officers at ''critical'' spots of the battlefields. 
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Colonel Comstock had stayed with Burnside at Ninth 
Corps headquarters throughout the second day of the 
Wilderness fight, and, on the march to Spotsylvania, Grant 
had placed Orville Babcock with Burnside to hurry the slow-
moving general along. To ensure that Burnside speeded up 
his pace, John Rawlins, at Grant's headquarters, fired 
message after message to Burnside urging rapidity. Even 
so, Burnside did not arrive at Spotsylvania until after the 
fight on May 8, 61 
Remembering how Burnside had gotten lost trying to 
link up with Hancock's corps in the Wilderness, Rawlins 
wanted to make sure it did not happen again at 
Spotsylvania. No fighting occurred May 9, but Rawlins 
urged Burnside to prepare for a fight the next day. He 
wired the mutton-chopped general to carefully examine all 
roads near Spotsylvania and know positively where they led. 
Then, anticipating that one of Burnside's divisions would 
have to help Sedgwick's or Warren's men during the fight, 
Rawlins told Burnside to have staff officers of that 
division learn exactly what roads led to those other units. 
''When the division receives orders to move it must be 
conducted by one of those staff officers that there 
may be no delay,'' admonished Rawlins. 62 
When Grant ordered the general attack at Spotsylvania 
on May 10, Orville Babcock was at the headquarters of 
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Brigadier General Horatio G. Wright, who had assumed 
command of the Sixth Corps the day before when a 
sharpshooter had killed Major General John Sedgwick. 
Babcock kept Grant's headquarters informed of the situation 
at Wright's front. During the fight, one of Wright's 
divisions broke through Confederate lines, but a 
counterattack forced them back. 63 
On May 11, planning to attack at Spotsylvania again 
the next day, Grant sent Comstock to reconnoiter a spot 
between the Sixth and the Ninth Corps designated as the 
point of attack. Comstock took three officers from 
Hancock's Second Corps and, riding for hours in a driving 
rain, the men tried to check the situation as close to 
enemy lines as they dared. Comstock, however, misled the 
quartet so that it was nearly nightfall before they had an 
accurate survey of the attack point. 64 
That same day Grant told Burnside that he and Hancock 
would attack ''jointly and precisely at 4 a.m. May 12.'' 
Grant also told Burnside that he would be getting more help 
from headquarters to help him execute the attack. ''I send 
two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock, in 
whom I have great confidence, to remain with you and 
General Hancock,'' Grant said. He added that they were 
acquainted with ''the direction the attack is to be made 
from here, [and had] ... instructions to render you every 
assistance in their power. 116 ~ 
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Burnside did not like having the staff officers join 
his command. In his diary, Comstock noted that he and 
Babcock joined Burnside on May 11 ''with orders to stay all 
night.'' Upon arrival, Comstock and Babcock discovered 
Burnside, for no apparent reason, had moved his troops back 
some distance from their prescribed line. ''He [returned] 
them at once without difficulty, but with some grumbling at 
the change,'' Comstock wrote. 66 
During the fight the next day, May 12, Comstock and 
Babcock stayed at Burnside's headquarters, keeping Grant 
abreast of the battle's progress. At one point during the 
fight, Grant telegraphed Burnside that he wanted his orders 
obeyed. Burnside, remembering how Grant's headquarters had 
prodded him the whole way to Spotsylvania, suspected that 
Comstock had been complaining to Grant about Burnside's 
slowness. When he challenged the staff officer, Comstock 
denied it, saying he had only informed Grant about what was 
actually happening along Burnside's line. According to 
Comstock, at another instant, apparently chaffing under the 
staff officer's watchful eye, Burnside snapped that he 
would ''command his own divisions.'' Then, perhaps 
thinking better of it, he asked Comstock for advice. In 
his diary May 12 Comstock summed up his attitude toward 
Burnside: ''Rather weak and not fit for a corps 
command. ' ' 67 
If Burnside had problems working with Comstock, he was 
not alone. Back at Grant's headquarters, Chief of Staff 
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Rawlins disliked the man as well. Rawlins, the Galena 
lawyer, had done his best to learn military matters in the 
three years he had been with Grant, and he may have felt 
uneasy among the army professionals who had arrived on 
Grant's staff in the last six months. Of course they did 
not interfere with his running of the office, but Rawlins 
began suspecting Comstock was exerting more and more 
influence over Grant. In fact, he blamed Comstock for the 
way Grant was conducting the spring campaign. Rawlins 
recalled the finesse and fluidity with which Grant had 
dropped below Vicksburg, then up to its rear. Now Grant 
was using a sledgehammer, it seemed, exhausting men's lives 
in the same kind of attacks that had failed at Vicksburg. 
James Harrison Wilson was no longer part of Grant's special 
staff, but as a cavalry commander he had plenty of 
opportunity to visit his friend Rawlins. He noticed 
Rawlins' agitation over the ''slipshod'' way Grant was 
conducting operations. He said Rawlins pointedly blamed 
Comstock for Grant's insistence on frontal attacks. 
Comstock's ''advice and constant refrain was 'Smash 'em up! 
Smash 'em up!''' Wilson said. The words haunted Rawlins so 
much that he repeated them himself, turning pale and 
shaking with anger as he did so. 68 If Rawlins was as 
vociferous about Comstock as he was about Grant's drinking, 
the general certainly knew his chief's opinion of the staff 
officer. 
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Nevertheless, Grant continued using Comstock, and 
other staff officers, in the field, and he gave Comstock, 
at least, a great deal of latitude. On June 16, near 
Petersburg, Comstock wrote orders to Fifth Corps commander 
Major General Gouvernor K. Warren. ''General Grant 
directed that you should get up to the enemy on the 
Jerusalem road,'' Comstock wrote, but then he explained 
that such a move would put a large swamp between Warren's 
corps and the rest of the army. Then Comstock gave his own 
idea. ''I think General Grant, if he knew the circumstance 
(he is now at Bermuda Hundred), would desire you to get up 
on Norfolk and Petersburg road instead. I would so 
advise.'' In those orders Comstock had done just as Grant 
had wanted; he had acted on his own in the absence of 
Grant, without wasting time getting the general's 
approval. 69 
As Grant slipped from the North Anna down to Cold 
Harbor and Petersburg, he sent his staff aides from command 
to command. Grant began dispatching them to help the Army 
of the James, and Comstock, Babcock, and Horace Porter 
worked with Benjamin Butler and his Eighteenth Corps 
leader, William F. Smith. The work largely involved 
reconnoitering lines and transmitting orders, but Grant 
especially wanted Comstock to check the safety of Butler's 
lines. Grant was about to send the Army of the Potomac 
across the James River, and he knew that if Lee discovered 
the movement, the Confederates could pounce on Butler while 
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Grant's troops were astride the river. Before ordering the 
move, he first wanted Comstock to see if Butler needed 
reenforcements. Grant also sent aide Frederick Tracy Dent 
to round up river transportation for William F. Smith's 
assault on Petersburg. 70 
By the start of the Petersburg siege, Grant's 
subalternate army and corps commanders were used to the 
general's staff officers frequenting their headquarters. 
And, perhaps grudgingly or because they were scared to make 
a move without the approval of Grant's headquarters, they 
even began requesting staff assistance. Meade was the 
first. Back on May 20, when the army was pulling away from 
Spotsylvania, General Wright's Sixth Corps was to hold the 
right flank while the rest of the army moved out. Meade 
was worried about his position, though, and wrote Grant, 
··1 think it would be well if you should send either 
Comstock or Babcock to consult and advise with him.'' 
Grant agreed and sent Babcock, who helped Wright establish 
his defensive line. 71 Later, on June 21 in the growing 
siege lines around Petersburg, Meade called for help again. 
Consulting a map that Comstock and engineer General J. G. 
Barnard had drawn, Grant told Meade to position artillery 
on his left to hold Confederates in place while he moved to 
a better location. Meade sent to Grant, ••1 do not fully 
understand your views. Can you not send Barnard and 
Comstock here to explain them?'' 72 
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Even crusty Ben Butler called for help from Grant's 
headquarters. On June 20 Butler's chief engineer, Major 
General Godfrey Weitzel, had been reconnoitering a bridge. 
Butler told Grant that Weitzel considered the problem ''of 
the most difficult solution,'' which he did not think 
himself capable of making. ''He does not feel justified to 
decide what to recommend, and suggests that Colonel 
Comstock be sent over and look at the position with him.'' 
said Butler. Grant wanted to oblige, but Comstock was busy 
elsewhere. ''I think General Weitzel had better give the 
problem the best solution he can,'' advised Grant. 73 
The West Point professionals on Grant's staff had 
plenty of work during the spring 1864 campaign, but Grant 
kept his staff clerics busy as well. He had left George K. 
Leet behind in Washington, D. c., to run a liaison 
headquarters office there. Theodore S. Bowers and Ely 
Parker traveled with the field headquarters, both devoting 
much of their time to writing special orders. Parker 
drafted orders for Grant easing supply and transportation 
problems and assigning J. G. Barnard as chief engineer for 
all armies in the field. Bowers handled assignments to 
command, and on May 24 he issued Special Orders Number 25 
attaching Burnside's independent Ninth Corps to the Army of 
the Potomac. 74 When military secretary William R. Rowley 
went on sick leave in late June, Ely Parker took his place. 
He wrote Rowley frequent letters keeping him abreast of 
events at headquarters. 7 ~ 
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Chief of Staff John Rawlins, even though still 
suffering the initial symptoms of tuberculosis, continued 
to manage Grant's headquarters. During battles, he spurred 
generals on with urgent missives. At other times he 
facilitated communications between Grant and unit 
commanders. He also issued orders designed to ease and 
protect the many marches that characterized Grant's thrust 
toward Richmond. 7 • 
Rawlins also remained alert for signs that Grant was 
drinking. On June 30, Major General William F. Smith, of 
Butler's army, told Rawlins that Grant had taken a drink at 
his headquarters and gone away drunk. Rawlins thanked 
Smith for the information and said ''thus timely advised of 
the slippery ground he is on, I shall not fail to use my 
utmost endeavors to stay him from falling.'' While he 
reported the incident to his wife# Rawlins apparently did 
not challenge Grant over the accusation as he had in times 
past. Indeed, Smith's charge against Grant may have been 
slanderous. Grant had lost faith in Smith when the latter 
failed to follow up his advantage in the initial assault on 
Petersburg. Smith had also publicly criticized Grant and 
Meade for their handling of the campaign. Grant had 
determined to fire Smith, and on July 19 he relieved him 
from duty. 77 
Whether relations between Grant and Rawlins had cooled 
after Comstock joined the staff, Rawlins remained dedicated 
to the general. He traveled with Grant between their 
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headquarters at City Point and Meade's headquarters near 
the Petersburg front. He served as a communication link 
between Theodore S. Bowers and Ely Parker, who stayed at 
City Point handling special orders and other mundane office 
work, and he helped iron out problems of supply and 
transportation between army units. 78 
Rawlins' health was deteriorating, however. The 
''cold'' he had contracted at Chattanooga in November 1863 
lingered, and his friends at Grant's headquarters feared 
for his well-being. Grant wrote to Julia from City Point 
in July 1864, that Rawlins was ''as well as he ever will 
be.'' Even though a leave of absence from the army in late 
September and early October would temporarily rejuvenate 
Rawlins, Grant's prognosis would ultimately prove 
correct. 79 
Perhaps to get his friend away from the stresses of 
the front line, much as he had done after Vicksburg fell, 
in late July 1864, Grant sent Rawlins to Washington, D. C. 
The trip had an official side, as well. Grant sent Rawlins 
to discuss with President Lincoln a plan the general had 
for reorganizing forces in the East. Grant had in mind 
creating a military division of four armies, much like his 
old Division of the Mississippi, and giving its command to 
George Meade. Winfield Scott Hancock, Meade's Second Corps 
commander, would take charge of the Army of the Potomac. 
In a note to Lincoln, Grant said he had ''many reasons,'' 
none of which he wanted to ''commit to paper,'' for 
suggesting the change. ''Rawlins . . will be able to 
give more information of the situation here than I could 
give you in a letter.'' Rawlins met with Lincoln on July 
26, but the president wanted to meet with Grant later. 
Ultimately, nothing came of the reorganization plan. 80 
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Even though the presence of Grant's personal staff 
officers had not insured success in the campaign from the 
Wilderness to Petersburg, he continued the practice 
throughout the summer. When Grant's chief of engineers, 
Major General J. G. Barnard, temporarily left the army in 
July, Cyrus B. Comstock took his place in addition to 
remaining as Grant's senior aide-de-camp. Comstock 
continued to shuttle between Grant's and Meade's 
headquarters, explaining to Meade just how Grant wanted 
siege approaches constructed, and he examined intelligence 
gleaned from Confederate deserters. Grant also sent 
Comstock to Washington, D. c., on July 14 to give Major 
General Henry Halleck an overview of the military situation 
at the front. 81 
When soldiers in Ambrose Burnside's Ninth Corps dug a 
500-foot-long mine shaft under the Confederate lines 
southeast of Petersburg, intending to pack it with 
explosives and blow an exploitable breech in the Rebel 
works, Grant had high hopes for the plan. He left the 
planning to Burnside and his men, however; none of Grant's 
staff officers lent expertise or advice to the plan. By 
the end of July, soldiers had the end of the shaft--just 
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twelve feet below a Rebel fort--loaded with 8,000 pounds of 
explosives. Burnside set the blast for 3:30 a.m., 
Saturday, July 30, and Grant and all his staffers were 
present near Burnside's headquarters to watch the show. 
The appointed time came, but the blast did not, and 
courageous miners venturing into the shaft found the match-
lit fuse had gone out. They relighted it, then sprinted 
for safety. The resulting explosion sent a mushroom cloud 
of fire and dirt billowing into the air, stunning both 
Confederates and Federals alike. Burnside had trained a 
Black division to lead the attack through the gap, but 
Grant, fearing abolitionists would charge him with 
butchering Blacks if the attack failed, had ordered 
Burnside to change his plans. Now the lead division was 
disoriented, not only by the blast, but by unfamiliar 
terrain, and they lurched ahead. Burnside had failed to 
clear their path of enemy abatis, however, and the men had 
only a ten-foot wide opening in the works through which to 
reach the smoking crater in the ground. Grant had planned 
for the other corps of the Army of the Potomac to help 
Burnside exploit the gap, but Burnside's men, instead of 
going around the edges of the crater where they could 
fight, went into it. As Rebels, recovering their senses, 
returned to the hole, they began shooting Federals like 
fish in a barrel. Cyrus B. Comstock watched from Fifth 
Corps headquarters, and Grant and Horace Porter watched 
from horseback, riding close to the crater when they 
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realized the attack was fizzling. About 9:30 a.m., having 
seen enough, Grant had Burnside withdraw his attackers. 82 
Grant's staffers may not have been involved in 
planning and executing the attack, but they all roundly 
criticized Burnside, whom they blamed for the debacle. 
Theodore Bowers said, ''The chances of success were so 
great--the failure so utter.'' Ely Parker said, ··1 have 
had the biggest kind of disgust on and dare not express 
myself on the Potomac Army.'' George K. Leet said the 
staffers were generally ''gloomy.'' He suspected that, in 
Burnside's army, at least, if not within the whole Army of 
the Potomac, ''There were screws loose somewhere and the 
machine would not work.'' The Battle of the Crater, in 
which Federals lost 4,000 men, made Grant physically sick, 
and he took to his bed. ''His illness is real,'' said 
Bowers, recalling times when friends had labeled Grant sick 
when he was really drunk, ··and I think resulted from his 
grief at the disaster of Saturday.'' 83 
Since the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant had 
practiced an enlightened, more modern approach to staff 
work by placing his staff officers with different commands. 
Prior to the mine explosion, Grant could have stepped up 
staff work again, but he did not. Grant planned for two 
extra corps to help exploit the gap in the Confederate line 
which the crater would create, and he lined up 144 pieces 
of artillery to support the attack. The whole thing, from 
digging the mine to assaulting the crater, required a 
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degree of coordination every bit as complex as Grant's 
overland run to Vicksburg or the march south from the 
Wilderness. Yet Grant assigned none of his own people to 
it. While Grant understood that he could, and should, get 
more work from his staff officers than just writing and 
carrying orders, he still could learn much about truly 
efficient staff work. 
As the summer of 1864 wore on, Grant used his personal 
staff members less to help him manage the siege of 
Petersburg and more to act as his representatives with 
expeditions farther afield. After Sherman's armies 
captured Atlanta on September 2, Grant wanted to talk with 
him. Grant had some ideas of his own for new campaigns, 
and he wanted to know what Sherman planned after occupying 
Atlanta. Grant trusted neither the army mails nor the 
telegraph for such a lengthy discourse, so he sent staff 
officer Horace Porter to Atlanta to visit Sherman. Porter 
found Sherman relaxed after his victory hut fully possessed 
of the nervous energy with which friends frequently 
described Sherman. Grant's intention in sending Porter to 
Sherman was not to suggest operations, but learn Sherman's 
plans so Grant could incorporate them with his own and 
draft the appropriate orders. In a lengthy letter which 
Sherman gave Porter to deliver to Grant, Sherman outlined 
his tentative plans for a march across Georgia. He said he 
would discuss all the ramifications of such a campaign with 
Porter before he left. Porter left for Grant's 
headquarters on September 21. 84 
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Next, in October, Grant sent his most trusted aide, 
Chief of Staff John Rawlins, on a far-flung mission of his 
own. Grant had determined that Confederate resistance in 
far-western theaters had deteriorated so much that Federal 
troops there could move to support armies still actively 
engaged in the East. Grant instructed Rawlins to go to st. 
Louis, Missouri, meet with Major General William S. 
Rosecrans, who had taken command of the Department of the 
Missouri, and draw from that department as many troops as 
possible. Their destination was at Rawlins' discretion, 
depending on the most urgent need when Rawlins issued his 
orders. Grant would liked to have had them in the siege 
lines before Petersburg, but, in southern Tennessee, Major 
General George Thomas' Army of the Cumberland faced 
invasion by General John Bell Hood's Confederates. Sherman 
had just tossed Hood out of Atlanta, and the Rebel general 
reckoned that an invasion of Tennessee would force Sherman 
to withdraw from Georgia. To expedite his mission, Grant 
gave Rawlins full ''authority to issue orders in the name 
of the ... 'Lieut General.''' Grant's old friend and 
former aide, William S. Hillyer, wrote the general a letter 
about the time of Rawlins' trip, commenting that he had 
read in a newspaper that the chief was in st. Louis. ''I 
thought that Rosecrans had a tough customer to deal with in 
John,'' said Hillyer. But Rawlins met with Rosecrans' full 
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cooperation. In fact, Major General Henry Halleck, from 
his office in Washington, had sent a telegram ahead of 
Rawlins saying the situation in Tennessee had worsened, and 
Rosecrans should direct troops there. Old Rosey already 
had them headed for Tennessee when Rawlins arrived. 
Rawlins made sure all the details of their departure were 
arranged, then he returned to City Point in mid-November. 85 
Meanwhile, Grant had decided to send an expedition to 
capture Fort Fisher, at the mouth of the Cape Fear River in 
North Carolina, then sail up that river and capture 
Wilmington. Wilmington was one of the last harbors where 
Rebel blockade runners could deliver foreign supplies to 
the Confederacy, and Grant wanted it shut down. His plan, 
to send 6,000 to 10,000 men against Fort Fisher, 86 sounded 
much like the one staff aide Cyrus B. Comstock had 
submitted to Grant earlier in the year. Whether it was 
Comstock's plan, Grant never said. Regardless, he chose 
Comstock to accompany the expedition. 
Grant gave command of the Fort Fisher expedition to 
General Ben Butler, who was to cooperate with navy Admiral 
David D. Porter. Butler fitted out 6,500 troops for the 
trip, then left Fortress Monroe on December 18. Comstock 
went along to help Butler in any way possible, both as a 
member of Grant's staff and as an engineer. Bad weather 
slowed the flotilla's progress, but the transports arrived 
off Cape Fear on December 23. Butler planned to devastate 
Fort Fisher by loading an old boat with explosives, 
floating it near the fort, and exploding it. He exploded 
the boat, but the blast had no impact on the fort. 
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Porter's boats then laid down a barrage on the fort, which 
also had little effect. On Christmas day, Federal troops 
landed on the peninsula north of Fort Fisher and made great 
headway, some troops even getting close enough to the fort 
to capture a flag. Butler had suffered few casualties and 
taken many prisoners, but those prisoners told him that 
1,600 Rebels were about to hit him from the north. Butler 
paled and decided to withdraw his men from the peninsula. 
Porter urged him to change his mind, saying his gunners 
could step up their covering fire, but Butler would not 
relent. By December 28 his expedition was back at Fortress 
Monroe. 87 
Butler's cowardice enraged Grant. He had told Butler 
that, if he should effect a landing, he must hold the 
ground at all costs and begin a siege of Fort Fisher. On 
January 8 Grant relieved Butler of command of the Army of 
the James, sending his staff officers Horace Porter and 
Orville Babcock to break the news to Butler. 88 Grant put 
Major General E. O. C. Ord in command of the Army of the 
James, then he began forming another Fort Fisher 
expedition. 
The new expedition, consisting mostly of veterans of 
Butler's debacle, gathered at Bermuda Hundred under 
Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry. Admiral Porter would 
again supply transportation, marines, and sea firepower for 
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the mission. Grant again assigned Comstock to help the 
expedition. The expedition left Virginia on January 6, 
1865, and reached the North Carolina shore a few days 
later, but rough seas again held up the operation. On 
January 13, Porter began one of the heaviest bombardments 
of the war, laying 20,000 projectiles on Fort Fisher over 
two days. Terry landed his men and guns north of Fort 
Fisher, and marines went ashore on the sea-coast side of 
the fort. On January 14, under cover of Porter's barrage, 
Terry and Comstock led a reconnaissance expedition to 
within 600 yards of the fort. Terry said the 
reconnaissance, along with the temperamental seas off the 
cape which made landing supplies risky, convinced him that 
a siege of Fort Fisher was impractical. He ordered the 
combined army and navy forces to assault the works the next 
day. On January 15 at 3 p.m., the attack began. By 
evening Terry's army had taken the fort. Terry had nothing 
but praise for Comstock. ''For the final success of our 
part of the operations the country is more indebted to him 
than to me,'' said Terry. The second Fort Fisher 
expedition confirmed Terry as a major general of volunteers 
and brigadier general in the regular army, and it earned 
Comstock a brevet to brigadier general. 89 
In February 1865, Grant sent Comstock to another 
theater that needed a staff officer's attention; the 
assignment, however, would keep Comstock out of the final 
act of the Civil War in the East. In Alabama, Major 
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General E. R. s. Canby, who had helped drive Confederates 
out of New Mexico three years earlier, had been planning to 
capture Mobile for weeks. But Grant had grown impatient. 
After all, Admiral David G. Farragut had captured Mobile 
Bay back in August 1864, negating the city of Mobile's 
importance as a gulf port. Canby had an expedition against 
Mobile planned, though, and Grant consented as long as 
Canby got moving. Grant wanted his troops cut loose so 
they could move against the industrial city of Selma, 
Alabama, and create a diversion from Sherman's push through 
the Carolinas. But Canby stalled, and Grant sent Comstock 
west to spur him on. 
Comstock was in Washington, D. c., testifying before 
the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War when 
he got Grant's orders on March 1. He caught a train to 
Cairo, Illinois, then dropped down to New Orleans. He then 
traveled east, arriving at Canby's headquarters on March 
15. In the meantime, Grant had written to Canby, 
instructing him to keep Comstock until he had captured 
Mobile or had determined a lengthy siege was the only way 
to reduce it. 90 
Canby finally began moving on March 17. He should 
have easily taken the city, considering he had 32,000 
troops facing only 2,800 Confederate defenders. 
Nevertheless, he was over-cautious. He finally laid siege 
to the city on March 25. He did not occupy the place until 
April 12, and then only after the defenders had evacuated 
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Mobile the night before. Canby finally relieved Comstock 
to return to Grant on April 15, almost a week after Lee had 
surrendered at Appomattox. 91 
Back in Virginia, Grant's final campaign had begun on 
March 25. Since going into the trenches at Petersburg, 
Grant had continuously had soldiers lengthening the Federal 
lines to the west, trying to flank Lee's right. on the 
morning of the twenty-fifth, Lee staged an attack on 
Grant's right, hoping to make the Federal leader pull 
support troops from his left, opening an escape route for 
Lee to the west and south. The Confederate attack captured 
a fort in the Union line and seized a mile of trenches, but 
a vigorous Union counterattack knocked the Rebels back. 
Sensing Lee's desperation, Grant quickly sent 12,000 
cavalry troopers and two infantry corps west to again try 
to get around Lee's right flank. 92 
Grant gave command of the flanking movement to Army of 
the Potomac cavalry leader Major General Phil Sheridan. 
When Sheridan arrived at Grant's headquarters on March 26, 
he found Rawlins, true to form, giving the lieutenant 
general a piece of his mind. Part of Sheridan's orders 
intimated that he might turn his cavalry south and meet 
Sherman's troops coming through North Carolina. Rawlins, 
who had been opposed to ''Sherman's March,'' was equally 
opposed to Sheridan going to Sherman's aid, and he told 
Grant so in ''vigorous language ... [that] left no room 
to doubt'' his meaning, said Sheridan. Sheridan was 
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concerned, too, but Grant soon told both men he intended to 
modify that part of the orders. Rawlins quieted on the 
point, but something else bothered him. Rains had settled 
in, and Grant had wondered aloud about postponing the move 
to the left. Rawlins disagreed, and he told Grant so. 
Grant, who had had enough, quietly said, ''Well, Rawlins, I 
think you had better take command.'' Grant, of course, 
decided to go despite the rains, and Sheridan headed 
west. 93 
A few days later, Grant, continuing his policy of 
placing staff officers at critical points, sent Horace 
Porter to be with Sheridan. After months in the trenches, 
Grant saw the opportunity to fight Lee on open ground. He 
trusted Sheridan, who had lain waste to the Shenandoah 
Valley last year in support of Grant's 1864 campaign, to 
get the job done. Still, he wanted Sheridan to have 
headquarters assistance if he needed it. ''You know my 
views,'' Grant told Porter, ''and I want you to give them 
to Sheridan fully.'' Grant told the staffer to ''send me a 
bulletin every half-hour or so,'' updating the general on 
Sheridan's progress. 94 
Porter caught up with Sheridan April 1 at a crossroads 
called Five Forks. Sheridan had been pressing the Rebels 
all day and wanted to deliver a final blow before 
nightfall, but delays in getting the infantry of the Fifth 
Corps placed irritated him. Finally, though, the battle 
was on, and it quickly became a rout. Sheridan hit the 
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10,000 Confederates before him hard, inflicting fifty 
percent casualties. Porter, elated, raced back to Grant's 
headquarters with the news. Night was falling and Porter 
found Grant and most of his staff sitting outside 
headquarters by a fire. Porter began shouting the news 
before he dismounted, causing, he said, ''boisterous 
demonstrations of joy'' among the officers. Porter was so 
excited that, when he dismounted, he ran to Grant and 
started clapping him on the back. Grant listened to 
Porter's full report, then he ordered a general assault on 
the Petersburg lines for the next morning. 9 ~ 
That assault, on April 2, pushed Confederates into 
retreat. Lee's army escaped to the west, leaving 
Petersburg and Richmond open to the Federals. The 
Confederate government quickly abandoned the Southern 
capital, and Union troops occupied it April 3. Federals 
raced west trying to get ahead of Lee, delivering another 
costly blow to the Confederates at Sayler's Creek on April 
6. By April 8, Sheridan's left wing of the Union army had 
flanked Lee, stopping the Grey Fox near Appomattox Court 
House about 100 miles west of Petersburg. 96 
John Rawlins used his lawyer's intellect to help Grant 
in a pre-surrender dialogue with Lee. On April 7, Grant 
wrote Lee that he thought further resistance was futile. 
Lee sent a note asking what terms Grant offered, and the 
Northern general replied that, as his goal was ''peace,'' 
he wanted Lee's men disqualified from service until 
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properly exchanged. Lee seized upon Grant's use of the 
word ''peace'' in an effort to trap Grant into treating for 
peace for the entire South. Rawlins recognized the Rebel's 
snare and alerted Grant. ''He wants to entrap us into 
making a treaty of peace . ,'' said Rawlins, 
''something to embrace the whole Confederacy if possible. 
No sir,--no, sir!'' Rawlins reminded Grant that President 
Lincoln had the only legal authority to treat for a general 
peace; Grant could only take the surrender of Lee's army. 
After discussing the situation with Rawlins, Grant, early 
on April 9, penned another note to Lee, saying that he had 
''no authority to treat on the subject of peace.'' He 
reminded Lee that the South could have peace by ''laying 
down their arms.'' Grant's letter returned the focus of 
the dialogue to Lee surrendering his army. 97 
Throughout the correspondence, a terrible headache 
plagued Grant. Staff aide Horace Porter blamed it on 
''fatigue, anxiety, scant fare, and loss of sleep.'' His 
staffers, recognizing his agony, tried to get Grant some 
relief with hot foot baths, mustard plasters on the wrists 
and neck, and sleep. But the latter Grant could not do. 
When Rawlins went to deliver Lee's ''peace'' message to 
Grant early April 9, he did not want to wake the general if 
he had fallen asleep. He opened the door of the general's 
room in the double house they had taken for headquarters 
and listened quietly. ''Come in, I am awake,'' said Grant. 
''I am suffering too much to get any sleep.'' Grant's pain 
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did not abate until later that day when he received another 
note from Lee, this one asking to discuss the surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. 98 
Grant was riding along his lines when the letter came, 
and he sent aide Orville Babcock to find Lee and tell him 
where they could meet. Babcock found Lee and escorted him 
and his aide, Colonel Charles Marshall, to Appomattox Court 
House. There they occupied a room in the home of Wilmer 
McLean until Grant, other members of his staff, and 
generals Sheridan and Ord arrived. 
Grant and Lee discussed terms of surrender, and Grant 
wrote a rough copy for Lee to read. When they had agreed 
on conditions, Grant called Theodore S. Bowers to write a 
copy for signing. Bowers was nervous, however, and turned 
the job over to Ely Parker ''whose handwriting,'' said 
Porter, ''presented a better appearance than that of anyone 
else on the staff.'' Lee, in the meantime, had Marshall 
draft a short letter acknowledging his acceptance of 
Grant's terms. While the letters were being copied, Grant 
introduced the generals and staff officers with him to Lee. 
Lee said nothing, but Porter noticed his expression change 
when he met Parker, the Seneca Indian. ''What was passing 
through his mind no one knew,'' said Porter, ''but the 
natural surmise was that he at first mistook Parker for a 
negro, and was ... [astonished] to find that ... 
[Grant] had one of that race on his personal staff.' 199 
318 
While Lee had attempted little with his personal staff 
during the war, Grant had attempted much. Now, as the 
generals faced each other in the McLean house, their staff 
officers had the final act of the war in Virginia. Horace 
Porter said, ··colonel Parker folded up the term$, and gave 
them to Colonel Marshall. Marshall handed Lee's acceptance 
to Parker. 11100 
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Major General William T. Sherman had a narrow vision 
of personal staff work. His staff ''theory'' had three 
parts: a personal staff should be small; it should perform 
limited duties, but perform them well; and the chief of 
staff should not be preeminent at headquarters. Sherman 
practiced those ideas during the Civil War, and in 1875 he 
formalized them in his memoirs. However, writing a half-
century after staff advances had started in Europe, four 
years after the Prussian Great General Staff had 
orchestrated victory over France in the Franco-Prussian 
War, and a decade after his friend Ulysses S. Grant had 
made tentative personal staff advances, Sherman's ideas 
were the antithesis of contemporary staff thought. 
Sherman insisted that his staff remain small. ''A 
bulky staff implies . slowness of action and 
indecision,'' but a small staff equaled ''activity and 
concentration of purpose,'' he wrote. 1 In fact, Sherman 
said that the ''smallness of Grant's staff throughout the 
Civil War forms the best model for future imitation.'' 
Sherman, of course, did not recognize the advances Grant 
attempted with his staff. The size of Sherman's staff 
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varied little during the war, whether he was commanding a 
division at Shiloh or three armies at Atlanta. Sherman 
thought division, corps, and army commanders should have 
staffs of similar size. ''The great retinues of staff 
officers with which some of our earlier generals began the 
war were simply ridiculous,'' he said. After the Atlanta 
campaign he proudly commented that his staff was ''small, 
but select. 112 
Sherman was so convinced that a large staff would 
hinder his operations that, when he launched his Atlanta 
campaign in May 1864, he did so with half the staff 
assigned to him. He took only aides Major J.C. McCoy and 
Captains Lewis M. Dayton and J.C. Audenried, and three 
inspectors-general, Brigadier General John M. Corse, 
Lieutenant Colonel Willard Warner, and Lieutenant Colonel 
Charles Ewing. The inspectors were, in fact, part of 
Sherman's special staff but frequently performed on the 
personal staff, delivering messages for the general. 
Sherman left a group of aides and his chief of staff behind 
at his divisional headquarters in Nashville, Tennessee. 3 
Never during the Civil War did Sherman attempt to 
expand staff duties as Grant had done, but he expected 
diligence and efficiency in the limited work he gave his 
staff officers. He received it, too. War Department 
observer Charles M. Dana once praised Sherman's division 
when it was fighting with Grant. Dana said Sherman had 
''no idlers'' on his staff. He said no one held a 
''sinecure of office,'' for Sherman found plenty of work 
for everyone. 4 
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Central to Sherman's headquarters was a good adjutant 
general, who, Sherman thought, should be able to do the 
work of chief of staff. ''[The] adjutant general . 
[should be able to] comprehend the scope of operations, and 
to make verbally and in writing all the orders ... 
necessary to carry into effect the views of his general, as 
well as to keep the returns and records.'' Aides-de-camp 
could shoulder the rest of the headquarters work. Sherman 
wanted his aides to be ''good riders'' and possess the 
intelligence to ''give and explain the orders of his 
general.' ' 5 
Within those guidelines, Sherman habitually selected 
efficient men for his staff. Sherman's staff grew to its 
largest in late 1863 when he took command of the Army of 
the Tennessee, succeeding Grant who had assumed command of 
the Division of the Mississippi. Sherman's staff officers 
included McCoy, Dayton, Audenried, Corse, Warner, Ewing, 
Montgomery Rochester, William McKee Dunn, Jr. (who later 
served on Grant's staff), and William D. Sanger. The men 
were primarily clerks and couriers. 6 
One among them, Audenried, stood out as a Sherman 
favorite. Sherman said he was ''one of the most polished 
gentleman in the army, noted for his personal bearing and 
deportment.'' Sherman met Audenried during the first Bull 
Run campaign in July 1861. Sherman, a colonel, commanded a 
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brigade in Brigadier General Daniel Tyler's division of the 
Army of Northeast Virginia. Lieutenant Audenried was on 
Tyler's personal staff. Audenried served briefly on 
Ulysses S. Grant's staff in 1863, but by October of that 
year he was an aide-de-camp on Sherman's personal staff. 
Over time, Sherman became good friends with Audenried, and 
indeed the staff officer's entire family. Long after the 
war, in fact, when both their spouses were dead, Sherman 
had a flirtation--if not a full-fledged affair--with 
Audenried's widow. 7 Audenried's special friendship with 
Sherman, however, did not earn him special duties; his 
tasks for the general were mainly that of a courier. 8 
If Sherman limited the use he made of his adjutants 
and aides-de-camp, he did no more for his chiefs of staff. 
He had three of them during the war, and none of them had 
the preeminence around Sherman's headquarters that John 
Rawlins had around Grant's. Sherman thought chiefs of 
staff were redundant to his own position as general. ''I 
don't believe in a chief of staff at all,'' Sherman wrote, 
''and any general ... that has a staff officer who 
professes to know more than his [commander] is to be 
pitied.'' Sherman's comments are a far cry from those of 
Henri Jomini, who said ··woe to an army'' whose commanding 
general and chief of staff did not work in concert. 9 
Still, the men who became Sherman's chiefs were able 
men. The first of them was John Henry Hammond, who started 
with Sherman as a captain and assistant adjutant general. 
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Charles Dana called Hammond a ''restless Kentuckian,'' who 
''kept everything in a row'' at Sherman's headquarters. 
Hammond had firmly established himself at Sherman's 
headquarters by the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862 when 
Sherman commanded a division in Grant's army. When Grant 
was massing troops at Pittsburg Landing in March, 
preparatory to a march on Corinth, Mississippi, Hammond 
helped Sherman establish camp near the Shiloh church. He 
issued orders placing the brigades of their First Division 
(Sherman took command of the Fifth Division on April 2) in 
position. He cautioned, "each brigade must encamp looking 
west, so that when the regiments are on their regimental 
parades the brigades will be in line of battle.'' Hammond 
also drafted instructions to regimental and brigade 
commanders to follow in case of attack. They should, 
Hammond wrote, form up and await orders in ''case of 
alarm,'' but ''if attacked, the immediate commanders 
must give the·necessary orders for defenses.'' Hammond 
also issued another warning. In the spring of 1862, army 
uniforms were not necessarily uniform. Hammond told 
commanders not to allow troops to leave camp in anything 
but Federal blue. ''Gray flannel shirts •.• at a 
distance of 100 yards resemble the secession uniform,'' he 
said. Hammond wrote so much for Sherman in 1862 that, if 
any order emanated from Sherman's headquarters, it 
invariably bore Hammond's signature. 10 
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Quite literate and efficient at writing orders, 
Hammond, however, was not just a headquarters clerk; he was 
in the thick of the fight at Shiloh. Sherman's Fifth 
Division held the far right of Grant's line. The 
Confederate attack was savage up and down the line, but 
Sherman's end was in danger of collapse. Hammond rode from 
Sherman's headquarters to that of General John McClernand, 
whose First Division was in line next to Sherman's 
division, to warn him that Rebels were ''hovering'' on his 
left. McClernand borrowed Hammond for a time, ordering him 
to bring up a battery of artillery, which promptly knocked 
the Confederates back. McClernand later thanked Hammond 
for his ''prompt and valuable assistance.'' Later in the 
day, back with Sherman, Hammond ordered a battery into 
position on the right of the line, then sent the Fifty-
third Ohio Infantry to support the guns. Then, riding in 
search of ammunition, Hammond ordered the Forty-third 
Illinois Infantry ''advanced ... double-quick'' to the 
front. The regiment tried, but depleted in numbers and 
ammunition, had to stop. 11 
At another point during the fight, Sherman and Hammond 
had a near miss. While Sherman was trying to mount his 
horse, the animal began prancing, tangling the reins around 
its neck. Hammond gathered up the reins and handed them up 
to Sherman. When Sherman bent down to collect them, a 
cannonball shot between the two men, clipping the reins and 
carrying away part of Sherman's hat. 12 
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Sherman's other staff ofticers, McCoy, Dayton, and 
Sanger also got into the action. After holding off the 
Rebel attack for five hours, Sherman ordered his line to 
retreat. All of the staffers, including Hammond, rode 
about giving orders to fall back. Sherman praised his 
staff officers after the fight. ''I think they smelt as 
much gunpowder and heard as many cannon balls and bullets 
as must satisfy'their ambition,'' he said .... ''McCoy 
and Dayton ... were with .me all the time, and act[ed] 
with coolness, spirit, and courage.' 113 
That summer, although he did not change Hammond's 
duties, Sherman made Hammond his first chief of staff. 
When Henry Halleck led the army to Corinth, Sherman sent 
Hammond on an expedition with Brigadier General Morgan L. 
Smith's brigade. 14 Hammond continued to show a flare for 
combat. On June 18, 1863, during the Vicksburg campaign, 
Hammond, then a major, was with a cavalry company that got 
into a stirring little fight with Rebel cavalry. Hammond 
received a promotion to lieutenant colonel, and a few weeks 
later, on July 8, he was in a similar fight with units of 
the Third Iowa Cavalry and Fifth Illinois Cavalry. Colonel 
Cyrus Bussey, the Third's commander, said ''justice 
requires that I acknowledge the important service rendered 
me by ... Hammond.'' By December 1863, Hammond was 
serving Fifteenth Corps commander Major General John Logan, 
first as assistant adjutant, then as chief of staff. 
Hammond used his position as a staff officer as a stepping-
stone to his own command, for soon he was commanding 
cavalry himself. 1 ~ 
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Sherman found ample replacement for Hammond in Captain 
Roswell M. Sawyer. Sawyer was every bit as prolific at 
writing orders as Hammond, yet he did not have the 
warrior's bent of his predecessor. As assistant adjutant, 
Sawyer began writing special and general orders for Sherman 
in August 1863. At Sherman's instruction he issued orders 
regarding disposition of the divisions of the Fifteenth 
Corps, assignments to command, and orders of march. The 
duties might have been mundane, but he performed them to 
Sherman's satisfaction. On October 24, after Sherman had 
taken command of Grant's old Army of the Tennessee, he 
announced Sawyer, then a major, as his chief of staff. 16 
Sawyer's duties did not change with his promotion. 
Sherman continued to have Sawyer draft general and special 
orders, although many of them were quite important. Sawyer 
helped Sherman get the Army of the Tennessee in motion for 
Grant's Chattanooga campaign, writing marching orders, 
drafting command assignments, and detailing special 
commands. At Chattanooga on November 21, as Grant prepared 
to break Confederate general Braxton Bragg's hold on the 
place, Sawyer penned Special Orders Number Fourteen, 
alerting soldiers to the upcoming battle. ''Every 
available man fit for duty in the Fifteenth Corps, now 
present, will at once be prepared for an important 
movement,'' he wrote. He reminded men to carry a blanket 
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or overcoat, three day's cooked rations, and one hundred 
rounds of ammunition. On November 22 and 23, the first day 
of the fight, Sawyer prepared lengthy orders of march. 17 
In late December 1863, Sherman began moving his 
command. He proceeded ahead of Sawyer, who was to move 
headquarters to the new position. A lengthy letter Sawyer 
sent Sherman on December 30 reveals much about Sawyer's 
duties. Sawyer wrote, ''I left Bridgeport [Alabama] with 
headquarters on the road to Huntsville. Hearing that the 
roads were in a most terrible condition, I sent all the 
baggage belonging to headquarters, also all belonging to 
the Thirteenth infantry and Third Cavalry, by rail as far 
as the road is finished, and took the road, with the troops 
and wagons lightly loaded with forage and rations 
The wagons and the infantry are still behind, but I push 
forward with the escort to Flint River, and borrow wagons 
of the troops there to move the baggage from the cars to 
Huntsville. I do this as I am anxious to get the office 
open again as soon as possible. The work is very severe; 
accumulates rapidly. There is quite a package of 
inspection papers requiring action by the inspector 
general. Lieutenant Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's 
staff, is attempting to hurry them up. Will you please 
instruct me? Should not some officer be assigned to that 
duty? 
''Please instruct me as to what action I shall take on 
resignations and applications for leave . I send 
this by. one of the orderlies, with instructions to 
stay with you if you should want an orderly, as you have 
none with you.' ,ie 
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Sawyer's letter indicates that Sherman gave his chief 
of staff very little authority to act on his own. Where 
Grant trusted Rawlins to tend all the minutiae of 
headquarters, and indeed was glad to wash his hands of it, 
Sherman wanted Sawyer to consult him on virtually every 
matter. Such matters as inspection reports and leave 
applications were, in the overall scheme of Sherman's 
responsibilities, minor. Yet Sherman clearly wanted Sawyer 
to ask him about their dispensation. 
In March 1864, when Grant became lieutenant general 
and commander of all United States armies, Sherman ascended 
to command of Grant's old Division of the Mississippi. 
With his own promotion, Sherman made some changes in his 
personal staff. Sawyer reverted to the job of assistant 
adjutant general--no demotion, to be sure, for Sherman's 
headquarters now oversaw three armies.i 9 
Sawyer's change left Sherman's chief of staff position 
open, but he did not have to look far to fill it; he 
selected Brigadier General Joseph Dana Webster, Grant's 
first chief of staff. After leaving Grant's personal 
staff, Webster became superintendent of military railroads 
in Tennessee. As one of Grant's subalterns, Sherman, of 
course, had worked with Webster, and he liked the man's 
abilities. He had been eyeing Webster for a spot on his 
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staff since late 1863. ''When General Webster is done with 
the railroad,'' Sherman commented to a fellow general, ··1 
will put him on my staff.'' When he did so in March 1864, 
Sherman simply listed Webster, with no position, on his 
special staff. Within weeks, though, Webster was acting 
under the title ''chief of staff. 1120 
Soon Sherman was preparing to launch his assault from 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, against Atlanta. The campaign was 
part of Grant's simultaneous spring offensive, Grant 
himself grappling with Robert E. Lee's army in Virginia. 
As Sherman planned the campaign, he gave his staff an 
important, but characteristically small role. 
Pitching into enemy territory, Sherman needed to 
insure provisions for his three armies, which totaled more 
than 100,000 men. He intended to leave his base of supply 
far behind and well protected at Nashville, Tennessee. 
From there, supplies would move by railroad and the 
Cumberland River to Chattanooga where Sherman would 
establish a ··secondary base.'' Supplies would then move 
on to Sherman's army by a single rail. Sherman wanted 
supplies moving out of Nashville daily, and he wanted 
twenty days worth of supplies always on hand with his army 
in the field. The job was more suited to quartermasters 
and commissaries general, but Sherman left half of his 
personal staff, including Webster and Sawyer, in Nashville 
to oversee it. 2 i 
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From the outset, Webster had more than just supplies 
to worry about. Sherman wanted no private citizens 
following his army. That order went especially for 
newspaper correspondents. Sherman hated reporters, and he 
called them ''mere traders in news like other men, who 
would make money out of the army.'' He told Webster to 
stop them at Nashville. If they journeyed any farther they 
risked ''being impressed for soldiers or other labor.' 122 
Webster also had to contend with plantation lessees 
and freed blacks who wanted the Federal army to feed them. 
Sherman argued against it. ''If we feed a mouth except 
soldiers on active duty we are lost,'' he told Webster. 
'"Refugees and negroes of all sorts and kinds not in 
military use must move to the rear of Nashville, or provide 
food in some way independent of the railroad.' 123 
Webster was also a news censor. Sherman knew, as much 
as he hated the press, Northern newspapers would want 
information about his progress. Consequently, he let 
Webster dole out facts as they happened. For instance, on 
May 20, when Sherman's armies crossed the Etowah River in 
Georgia, Sherman told Webster, ''You may let all the papers 
announce us in possession of the line of the Etowah.'' 
Later, when the armies captured roads leading to Marietta, 
Georgia, Sherman said, ""You may give this publicity.'' He 
did not want Webster to elaborate too much, though. 
'"Minor descriptions of the events will gradually become 
known to the public from letters of officers and soldiers 
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to their families,'' said Sherman, and ''My official 
reports daily to General Halleck will in due time reach the 
public.' 124 
Webster also dispatched troops to critical spots, but 
Sherman told him exactly where to send them. When General 
Henry Halleck, in Washington, told Sherman he was sending 
20,000 militia troops to the Division of the Mississippi, 
Sherman decided he wanted 5,000 sent to Nashville, 5,000 to 
Louisville, Kentucky, 5,000 to Columbus, Kentucky, and 
5,000 to Memphis. Sherman told Webster to expect them soon 
and how to dispose of troops returning to the rear from the 
advancing army. Sherman said he was progressing well, and 
he told Webster to ''back us up with troops in the rear, so 
I will not be forced to drop detachments as road guard, and 
I have an army that will make a deep hole in the 
Confederacy. 112 s 
While Webster was dealing with hungry Tennessee 
natives, newspaper reporters, and wandering Federal troops, 
he had one other class of men to handle--Confederate 
raiders. Sherman's lengthy supply line, although it ran 
through Union-held territory, was a prize no Rebel cavalry 
commander could resist. During the summer of 1864 three of 
the best, generals Nathan Bedford Forrest, Joe Wheeler, and 
John Hunt Morgan targeted it. Sherman had already made it 
clear he did not want to detach soldiers from his invasion 
force to protect his rear, so, while Sherman might help him 
with advice over the wires, Webster was fairly on his own. 
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Forrest became a nuisance soon after Sherman began his 
invasion. On May 12 Webster told Sherman that Forrest had 
cavalry and infantry in position to cut the railroad link 
between Nashville and Sherman's armies. Webster wanted to 
act quickly. ''It seems reliable that the force is large 
enough to cut the railroad, unless we take the offensive at 
once,'' said Webster. He said General Lovell H. Rousseau, 
commanding the district of Nashville, was assembling a 
pursuit force. ''Is it not best ... to drive or capture 
Forrest at once?'' Webster asked again. ''There are so 
many trestles on that part of the road that we cannot hold 
there by acting solely on the defensive.'' Sherman agreed, 
adding that troops under Major General Frank Blair could 
clean Rebels out of the country before joining the Georgia 
invasion. Finally, in the face of a serious military 
threat, Sherman gave Webster a true measure of authority. 
''The offensive should be assumed at once,'' said Sherman, 
''and you may so instruct General Rousseau and General 
Blair in my name. '' 26 
The threat ended soon when the raiders retreated, but 
in August and September, Rebels mounted another raid into 
middle Tennessee. This time Webster feared a combination 
of Wheeler, Morgan, and Forrest. Sherman considered the 
threat great enough to send some troops back to 
Chattanooga, but he gave Webster authority to coordinate a 
defense. ''Use my name, and concentrate at Nashville all 
the men you can,'' said Sherman. Webster coordinated the 
efforts of Rousseau and General Stephen Gano Burbridge. 
Their skirmishing with the raiders, and Morgan's death on 
September 4, eventually ended the incursion. 27 
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While Webster covered his supply lines, Sherman's 
armies, from May through July 1864, slugged their way 
toward Atlanta. They first engaged Confederate General 
Joseph E. Johnston's 65,000-man army in an intricate war of 
maneuver, then fought Johnston's successor, General John 
Bell Hood, at the gates of Atlanta. Two weeks after 
occupying the city on September 2, Sherman, in his official 
report of the campaign, praised his personal staff, McCoy, 
Dayton, and Audenried, and inspectors general Corse, 
Warner, and Ewing. Sherman described the men as ''ever 
zealous and most efficient'' while delivering orders to 
distant units ''with an intelligence and zeal that insured 
the proper working of machinery covering from ten to 
twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the 
delivery and explanation of an order would have produced 
confusion.'' Sherman, often stingy with praise, credited 
his staffers further, saying ''owing to the intelligence of 
these officers, orders have been made so clear that these 
vast armies have moved side-by-side, sometimes crossing 
each other's tracks, ... [more than] 138 miles ... 
without confusion or trouble.' 128 
Inherent in Sherman's statement is the fact that his 
personal staffers spent time with the separated armies of 
Sherman's division. But they were only delivering orders. 
Unlike Grant, Sherman never gave the staff officers 
authority to issue orders on the spot in response to an 
urgent situation. Sherman believed that job was his, and 
his alone. 
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Sherman did not change his staff usage throughout the 
rest of the war. Sherman began his ''March to the Sea'' on 
November 16, cutting a swath across Georgia and occupying 
Savannah on December 21. Planning to strike north through 
the Carolinas, Sherman moved Webster and the staff officer 
in Nashville to Savannah. There they would perform the 
same task of keeping Sherman's lengthy supply line 
secure. 29 In the closing days of the war, Sherman 
leapfrogged his headquarters, with Webster still in charge, 
to New Berne, North Carolina, then to Alexandria, Virginia, 
on April 28, 1865. When the war ended, Sherman detached 
Webster from headquarters and sent him to inspect all 
railroads in the beaten Confederacy. 30 
Sherman was pleased with his personal staff 
arrangement, but at least one staff officer, Major Henry 
Hitchcock, was critical of Sherman's staff usage. 
Hitchcock had been a st. Louis attorney before the Civil 
War. Thinking he could better serve the Union in his home 
state, Hitchcock stayed in Missouri as part of the Missouri 
Convention until September 1864. Then he offered his 
services to the War Department. His uncle, Ethan Allen 
Hitchcock, an old soldier whom Sherman admired, asked 
Sherman if he had a place on his staff for Henry. Sherman 
answered with an enthusiastic ''yes.'' Hitchcock joined 
Sherman's staff on October 31, 1864, and Sherman 
immediately turned over to him much of his correspondence 
to answer. Other staff officers were impressed that 
Sherman should give such a confidential job to a 
newcomer. 31 
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Such a sudden and close relationship with Sherman 
allowed Hitchcock to quickly take the measure of 
headquarters, and he did not like what he saw. Yes, 
Sherman's staffers worked efficiently, but the general's 
insistence upon limited staff work, in Hitchcock's 
estimation, robbed him of valuable services that the staff 
could perform. Hitchcock said he could understand 
Sherman's desire to be his own chief of staff, for the 
general was, ''Farsighted, sagacious, clear, rapid as 
lightning,--personally indefatigable, but also something 
too impatient to see always to execution of orders in 
detail. He ought to have a first-rate AAG whom he fully 
sympathized with and trusted and liked personally, as well 
as officially, who would take it on himself sometimes to 
fill up this deficiency. Even then there would be occasion 
when he himself would have to act, and such an AAG would 
sometimes be in a delicate position. Dayton is not exactly 
he• I I 32 
Hitchcock described exactly what military historian 
John Vermillion outlines in his theory of corporate 
leadership, and what military theorist Antoine Henri Jomini 
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recommended in a relationship between a general and his 
chief-of-staff. Both agreed that a good chief, or, in his 
absence, assistant adjutant general, should supply his 
general with qualities the latter did not have. Hitchcock 
also, unwittingly, described the type of relationship 
Ulysses S. Grant and John Rawlins had. 
Sherman, however, was a tough soldier, and tough 
soldiers are often inflexible. Many times that is the key 
to victory--rigid adherence to a goal. But Sherman's 
attitude about staff work perhaps cost him efficiency on 
his march through the South. His campaign succeeded, to be 
sure, and Sherman was well pleased with his staff officers. 
But his limited staff usage at a time when most European 
armies were using enlarged, well-educated staffs--and even 
his friend, Grant, was experimenting with expanded staff 
duties--only shows the degree to which American personal 
staff work was unstructured in the early 1860s. In the 
end, the type of work a personal staff performed depended 
entirely on its commander. 
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CONCLUSION 
The improvements that Ulysses s. Grant made to his 
personal staff lasted only the duration of the Civil War. 
Rapid down-sizing of the army after the war, plus a 
''raiding'' style of fighting in the Indian Wars army, 
negated the need for efficient, modern personal staffs. 
Had Grant wanted to improve staffing throughout the army--
which is doubtful, for his improvements were an attempt to 
meet the immediate needs of combat, not overall reform--he 
had little time to do so. In the immediate post-war years, 
he wrestled with the problems of the Federal army during 
Reconstruction, then, in 1868, he was elected president. 
General William T. Sherman, the one general of this study 
most disdainful of staff work, took over Grant's job as 
general-in-chief in 1869. Staff advances languished under 
Sherman. Not until after the Spanish-American War, when 
the United States designed for itself an enlarged military 
presence on the world stage, did the three factors 
necessary for staff improvements again emerge: a large 
army; the need for assistance with combined operations; and 
commanders willing to use efficient personal staffs. Only 
then did army reformers and Congress pass legislation that 
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officially created personal staffs of the type Grant had 
experimented with in the Civil War. 
In 1866 the United States Army transferred thirty-
three-year-old Captain William J. Fetterman, a Civil War 
veteran, to Fort Phil Kearny, Wyoming Territory, where 
troops endeavored to protect the Bozeman Trail from Sioux 
Indians. Fetterman immediately began pressing post 
commander Colonel Henry Carrington to attack the Sioux. 
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''A single company of regulars could whip a thousand 
Indians,'' Fetterman said. ''A full regiment could whip 
the entire array of hostile tribes,'' he continued, finally 
boasting that, ''With eighty men I could ride through the 
Sioux nation.'' Ironically, Fetterman did take an eighty-
man command into battle against a combined force of Sioux, 
Cheyennes, and Arapahoes on December 21, 1866; the Indians 
massacred Fetterman's entire command. 1 
Fetterman's bold comments before the fight revealed 
more than just the impetU'Osity of a young army captain; 
they revealed a general philosophy of the post-Civil War 
American army. Soon after armed southern resistance ended, 
the Union Army dismissed its volunteers. The army that had 
grown to more than one million men in 1865 suddenly shrank 
to slightly more than 57,000. Civilian politicians would 
have made it even smaller--about 25,000 men-- had army 
brass not explained that garrisoning southern states 
required additional men. 2 Nevertheless, neither army high 
command nor officers in the field, like Fetterman, believed 
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they needed large armies to subdue western Indians, which 
was the post-war army's principal mission. Over the next 
few years, the army's size continued to dwindle: in 1871 
the entire force was down to 29,115 troops; in 1876, the 
year Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and most of 
the Seventh Cavalry died at the Little Bighorn, the number 
was at 28,565; by 1880 it had dropped to 26,594 where it 
would hover until the Spanish-American War in 1898 sent 
total enlistments to more than 209,000 men. 3 
Just as the size of the army shrank, the nature of 
campaigning changed. Campaigns against Indians were 
usually raids from fixed fortifications, unlike the complex 
combined strategic operations that characterized the final 
Civil War campaigns of Ulysses S. Grant and William T. 
Sherman. In part, the size of the army meant Indian-
fighting commanders could do little else. The small forces 
at their disposal were easy marks outside of their 
fortifications, so they would periodically sally forth from 
their forts, attack a target, then retreat to the safety of 
their defenses. Custer exhibited this tactic in November 
1868 when he led his Seventh Cavalry south from Fort 
Supply, Indian Territory, to attack Cheyennes on the 
Washita River. Marching through snow, Custer's men found 
and massacred Black Kettle's Cheyennes, then returned to 
Fort Supply. The entire campaign took less than a week. 
Size was not the only factor in the new style of 
campaigning, for in fact, large armies would have been a 
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detriment to operations in the West. Indian forces were 
typically small. Only rarely, such as the Fetterman fight 
or at the Little Bighorn, did combined forces number more 
than 2,000. They were extremely mobile, whether on 
horseback or afoot. They knew well the ground they covered 
and could easily take advantage of natural hiding places; 
the Palo Duro canyon in the Texas Panhandle proved an ideal 
hiding place for Comanches until Colonel Ranald Mackenzie, 
another Civil War veteran, found and destroyed a band of 
them there in 1874. Quite simply, large American armies 
could never hope to match the speed and maneuverability of 
the Indians. Only twice, during the Sioux campaign of 1876 
and the Nez Perce campaign of 1877, did combined U. s. 
forces total 3,000 to 4,000 men. Even then, in the case of 
the former, commanders had to separate the expedition to 
achieve mobility and speed; Custer's defeat well 
demonstrated the danger of doing so in enemy territory.• 
In general, if soldiers hoped to achieve victories, they 
would do it with small raiding forces. 
Using small, quick armies of regimental size or less 
negated a commander's need for a large personal staff, or 
any staff for that matter. He could communicate directly 
with his entire command with the wave of a hand or by 
dispatching a courier with a scrawled note. Buglers often 
doubled as couriers, making them cut-rate staff officers.~ 
Aides-de-camp, several adjutants, chiefs of staff, military 
secretaries, all were just excess baggage to an Indian-
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fighting command. Obviously, in such a hostile environment 
to staff development, personal staff functioning could do 
nothing but wither. 
In the 1870s, however, one officer took an interest in 
reforming the staff system, along with almost everything 
else about the United States Army. Emory Upton was an 1861 
graduate of West Point. He went straight into Civil War 
combat, first with a regular Federal artillery unit, then 
as colonel of a volunteer infantry regiment. He won a 
commission to brigadier general on May 12, 1864, during the 
battle of Spotsylvania. There, as commander of the Second 
Brigade, First Division, VI Corps, Army of the Potomac, 
Upton briefly gained Confederate works at the ''Bloody 
Angle'' but had to withdraw for lack of support. 6 
Even though Upton had a knack for handling troops, he 
could not credit most of his colleagues with the same 
skill. Upton fired the first gun at the Battle of Bull 
Run, July 21, 1861, and after that battle, a Union defeat, 
he commented, ''Our troops fought well, but were badly 
mismanaged.'' Three years later, after the battle of Cold 
Harbor, Upton further derided fellow generals. He said, 
''I have seen but little generalship during the campaign. 
Some of our corps commanders are not fit to be 
corporals.'' 7 Some of Upton's chagrin no doubt stemmed 
from the inability of other generals to exploit his push 
into the angle at Spotsylvania. After the war, Upton 
devoted himself to studying ways to improve the United 
States Army. 
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In 1874, General Sherman took Upton as his protege, 
and the next year he sent the young officer on a tour to 
inspect the world's major armies. In 1877 Upton published 
his findings in The Armies of Asia and Europe. The work 
offered Upton's assessments of the armies of Japan, China, 
India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France, and 
England. The German--nee Prussian--Army fascinated Upton 
most, and he advocated that the United States Army imitate 
many of its systems, including the Great General Staff. 0 
''In every military system which has triumphed in modern 
war,'' Upton wrote, ''the [staff] officers have been 
recognized as the brain of the army, and to prepare them 
for this trust, governments have spared no pains to give 
them special education or training.' 19 Implicit in Upton's 
recommendation was that the United States Army adopt a 
general staff that functioned efficiently both at the 
national level, developing plans for war, and in the field 
with trained staff officers helping commanders carry out 
operations. 
Upton went on to serve as commandant of cadets at West 
Point and commander of the Presidio in San Francisco. He 
began writing a history of American military policy from 
the Revolution to the Civil War, but he suffered a chronic 
illness, perhaps migraine headaches, that stopped his work. 
He also became despondent over the lack of progress he saw 
355 
in army reforms. On March 15, 1881, Upton shot and killed 
himself in his quarters. 10 
Only after Upton's death did his work begin to bear 
fruit, and then only minimally. In 1881 Upton's sponsor, 
General Sherman, followed one of his protege's 
recommendations and began a post-graduate school for army 
officers. That school, the School of Application for 
Infantry and Cavalry, ultimately became the United States 
Army Command and General Staff College. Sherman's motives 
for establishing the s~hool were dubious, however. The 
general-in-chief had never had much use for staff officers 
in the Civil War, and it seems that sixteen years did 
little to change his sentiments. He once told a friend 
that, ''I confess I made the order [establishing the 
school] as a concession to the everlasting demands of 
friends and families to have their boys detailed to signal 
duty, or to the school [of application for artillery] at 
Fort Monroe to escape company duty in the Indian Country. 
The school at Leavenworth may do some good, and be a safety 
valve for those who are resolved to escape from the 
drudgery of garrison life at small posts.' ,ii 
Each regiment of infantry and cavalry sent one 
lieutenant to the first class of the Leavenworth school for 
a two-year course of instruction, but the men attending may 
not have been the best choices. Many could barely read, 
write, or do simple math. Their education was probably 
little better, for one hundred percent of the first class 
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passed. That number dropped to seventy-five percent under 
a stricter commandant for the second class. 12 
While Sherman's school was off to a rocky start, 
Upton's writings were getting shoved aside in military 
archives. They did not come to light again until after the 
Spanish-American War in 1898. That summer the United 
states armies and navies defeated Spanish forces in the 
Philippines and Cuba. But the army of more than 200,000 
men operated inefficiently. Both the War Department and 
field commanders mismanaged mobilization, quartermasters 
botched supply duties, and commanders in Cuba suffered from 
poor intelligence of the enemy. 13 American military 
insiders realized that victory in the war was never 
certain. 
Elihu Root, a lawyer who became Secretary of War in 
President William McKinley's administration in 1899, 
realized, too, that the army needed reforms, but he 
considered himself too deficient in military knowledge to 
implement them. So he began to study military history and 
European armies, and he discovered Emory Upton's The Armies 
of Asia and Europe and British writer Spenser Wilkinson's 
The Brain of the Army, which also praised the German 
General Staff. Like Upton, Root realized that the United 
States needed a general staff functioning along the German 
model. 14 
Root saw that without a general staff to coordinate 
supply and logistics problems, plan for war, and help 
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generals execute plans, the army would continue to operate 
inefficiently. Such could not be the case, Root reasoned, 
if the United States was to become a world power as its 
interest in Cuba and the Philippines indicated. But Root's 
insistence on modeling a staff after the German General 
staff smacked too much of ''Germanization'' for most 
Americans, so he proceeded slowly. 15 
Not until 1901 did Root have the military and 
congressional support to push through Congress an act 
creating the War College Board. Root gave the board duties 
that made it a forerunner of an American general staff. 16 
Two years later Root convinced Congress to accept a limited 
general staff with the General Staff Act of 1903. The act 
provided for a general staff corps consisting of a chief of 
staff (replacing the general-in-chief as the army's top 
officer), two other general officers, and forty-two junior 
officers. Section Two of the act summarized the staff's 
responsibilities. It said, ''The duties of the general 
staff corps shall be to prepare plans for the national 
defense and for the mobilization of the military forces in 
time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions 
affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of 
preparation for military operations; to render professional 
aid and assistance to the secretary of war and to general 
officers and other superior commanders and to act as their 
agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the 
different officers who are subject under the terms of this 
act to the supervision of the chief of staff; and to 
perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned 
by law as may from time to time be prescribed by the 
President. 11 i 7 
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While Root's reforms and the General Staff Act 
targeted first the several special staff bureaus which 
handled army supply and transportation--headguartered in 
Washington they were mired in politics and power struggles 
that impeded their efficiency--they also affected field 
commanders' personal staffs. Military historian John 
Dickinson notes that, ''The general staff fell roughly into 
two parts, the War Department general staff, consisting of 
staff officers on duty in Washington, and the general staff 
serving with troops, i.e., staff officers assigned to duty 
with the commanders of various geographical divisions and 
departments.' ,is With the act of 1903, educated, trained, 
and professional staff officers would take their places 
alongside generals at field headquarters. Their jobs were 
to transmit national military policy, as set by the General 
Staff in Washington, on to combat commanders. With that 
knowledge, they would also help those men craft field 
operations. Thus, the War Department officially recognized 
what Ulysses s. Grant had known forty years earlier, that 
field commanders needed help getting large commands to 
operate efficiently, and staff officers were the logical 
men to supply it. 
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The four generals of this study--Grant, McClellan, 
Sherman, and Lee--are examples of both the problems staff 
reformers had to overcome and the vision they had to embody 
to enact personal staff advances. Two of the men, Sherman 
and Lee, had little use for personal staffs. McClellan 
periodically showed glimpses of insightfulness about his 
staff, while Grant showed every inclination to improve his 
personal staff, taking it from a group of amateur 
volunteers to trained professionals with expanded duties. 
Robert E. Lee's Civil War experience lacked two of the 
three factors that helped speed staff improvement--a large 
army and cooperative operations. It is impossible to know 
if a larger army, one nearing 100,000 men, would have 
changed Lee's mind about staff work or forced him to expand 
his personal staff's duties to help him manage the force. 
Compared to the Federal armies he fought, Lee's own Army of 
Northern Virginia remained small, hovering much of the war 
around 60,000 troops. With the smaller force, Lee could 
more easily rely on his own merits as leader rather than 
calling on his staff for help. Lee did at times split his 
force for cooperative operations, such as on the Maryland 
invasion or at Chancellorsville, but those occasions were 
usually of a limited tactical nature, not part of a large 
strategic plan, and within his own ability to control. 
But Lee also lacked the one factor absolutely 
necessary for advanced staff work--a tolerance of it. 
Historians can expect few long-term advances for the 
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Federal army to come from southern armies, but the fact 
that Lee got his training at West Point and served most of 
his military career with the United States Army makes him 
an example of the old army--the type of soldier reformers 
had to overcome forty years later. Lee consistently 
resisted the help of a personal staff. In part, he 
believed that the Confederacy's troop shortages precluded 
him from maintaining a large staff, but Lee also believed 
that upon his shoulders rested all the responsibilities for 
planning and executing operations. With the notable 
exception of Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville, Lee 
rarely took counsel from his junior commanders let alone 
staff officers. Lee considered himself his own chief-of-
staff. The fact that Lee did not use his titular chief, 
Robert H. Chilton, in a chief's role makes the general's 
thoughts about the job obvious--it was Lee's alone to 
perform. 
Lee did keep his small cadre of adjutants busy~ 
however. The task of sorting through the vast amounts of 
paperwork that deluged his headquarters fell to Walter 
Taylor, Charles Marshall, and Charles Venable. Lee hated 
paperwork because it kept him from his main job--
operational planning. He was quite content to have his 
staffers copy orders, keep track of muster reports, and 
sign leave requests. With those mundane office chores, Lee 
let his staff expectations end. 
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William T. Sherman proved that a general could command 
a large army and still be hostile to personal staff work. 
Sherman demanded efficiency of the staffers at his 
headquarters, but, like Lee, he asked them to do little 
more than handle paperwork. When Sherman took over the 
Division of the Mississippi in 1864 he became overall 
commander of three armies: the Ohio, Tennessee, and 
Cumberland. When Sherman led those armies into Georgia 
they totaled more than 100,000 troops. Cooperative 
operations were a hallmark of Sherman's advance, as he 
separated the armies and sent them via different routes 
toward Atlanta. While Sherman praised the efforts of his 
adjutants in drafting clear orders that kept the armies on 
the march and their lines of communication untangled, he 
never elevated them to more than clerks and couriers. In 
memoirs he wrote after the war, Sherman decried the 
necessity of a chief of staff, saying such an officer was 
extra baggage to an efficient general. Indeed, Sherman 
thought too many staff officers hindered the operations of 
his headquarters; during the march through Georgia he left 
half of his staff behind in Tennessee to oversee supply 
lines. Sherman's comments and actions prove that, even 
though a general might be utilizing large forces and 
cooperative operations, no staff advances would come from 
his headquarters if he held staff work in low regard. 
George B. McClellan, long a puzzle in Civil War 
history, remains so in the field of personal staff work. 
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McClellan had seen first-hand the various staff systems of 
Europe, especially Prussia, in the 1850s. Yet in his 
official report of his European tour, McClellan mentioned 
little about Prussian staff work and made no recommendation 
that the United States Army copy the Prussian staff system. 
Before the war, McClellan served for a time as a railroad 
executive. While railroads were beginning to work out 
centralized staff systems to help coordinate operations, 
McClellan apparently brought none of that expertise with 
him when he returned to the army in 1861. During the brief 
time he was general-in-chief of all Federal armies, in late 
1861 and early 1862, McClellan made no effort to have his 
headquarters function along the lines of a European general 
staff by attaching staff officers to various field 
commands. 
McClellan showed some respect for personal staff work 
when he began forming his own headquarters. He picked his 
father-in-law, West Point-trained Colonel Randolph B. 
Marcy, to serve as his chief of staff, and he named a 
variety of other West Point graduates to adjutant and aide-
de-camp jobs. But even though McClellan's Army of the 
Potomac ranged between 80,000 and 100,000 men during most 
his tenure as its commander, numbers that would seem to 
necessitate staff help in its operations, McClellan used 
his staffers only sparingly. Marcy's European counterparts 
were well versed in the objectives and desires of their 
commanders and had authority to issue orders to subalterns 
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based on that knowledge. McClellan, however, never gave 
Marcy that authority. Marcy often had to double-check with 
McClellan before he issued orders, and he frequently became 
just a conduit between McClellan and Washington, D.C., for 
the general's many requests for troops. McClellan's use of 
his chief indicates that, like Lee and Sherman, he 
considered himself his own chief of staff. 
Despite large numbers of staffers at his headquarters, 
McClellan rarely used them in any enlightened fashion. His 
staff appointments were sometimes only political, as in the 
case of John Jacob Astor, Jr. McClellan got excellent 
service from his primary adjutant, Seth Williams, however. 
Williams, through dent of his own organizational skills, 
created a reporting system for Army of the Potomac unit 
commanders that could have been the envy of Napoleon 
himself. 
Only briefly, at the siege of Yorktown during the 
Peninsula Campaign, did McClellan show a flash of modern 
staff insight. The siege constituted enough of a deviation 
to the overall campaign that McClellan could not give it 
his full attention. He designated Major General Fitz-John 
Porter as director of the siege--even calling him a 
''chief-of~staff'' for the operation--and assigned two 
staff officers from his own headquarters to help Porter. 
The siege marks the only time McClellan attempted such an 
expanded role for his staffers, and the experiment ended 
with the siege. While his command featured the three 
factors needed for staff advances--army size, cooperative 
operations (at Yorktown), and an apparent willingness to 
expand staff work--McClellan's staff usage proved as 
hesitant as his overall campaigning. 
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Only at the headquarters of Ulysses s. Grant did 
advanced staff work begin to bloom. Grant began the war 
with a personal staff of friends--men who had been nice to 
him during his ''hardscrabble'' years of the 1850s. Grant 
also chose men whom he simply felt comfortable with. For 
Grant, a melancholy man whom absence from his family had 
driven to drink in the early 1850s, the last quality 
mattered most. In 1861, John Rawlins, who was perhaps the 
best staff appointment Grant made, Williams. Hillyer, 
Clark B. Lagow, and Joseph D. Webster represented Grant's 
home on the battlefield. His wife, Julia, and his children 
could not be with him, but his staff could, and Rawlins did 
his best to make Grant's headquarters a home. Rawlins 
replaced Julia to the extent that he fought Grant's 
tendency to drink in times of great stress or boredom. 
But Grant needed more than a comfortable ''family'' to 
help him move armies and fight battles. Amateurs in 1861, 
the men at Grant's headquarters--including Grant himself--
learned warfare as they went. Grant's early battles, at 
Belmont, Missouri, and Forts Henry and Donnelson in 
Tennessee, taught John Rawlins the need for organization at 
headquarters. Shiloh, in April 1862, taught Hillyer and 
Webster the need for quick, independent thinking on the 
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battlefield. At both Donnelson and Shiloh Grant learned 
that he could not be two places at once; that, if he was to 
exert his presence on all parts of a battlefield at once, 
he would have to have help to do it. Gradually Grant 
learned that his personal staff could render such help. 
Victories, however, prohibited Grant and his staff 
from fully practicing the art of fighting with small 
armies. When he inherited command of the Department of the 
Mississippi in summer 1862 from Major General Henry 
Halleck, Grant suddenly had a larger, more complex army to 
use. Almost immediately, in September, he crafted a 
creative plan to split his force into separated, 
cooperating columns and send them against Confederate 
General Sterling Price at Iuka, Mississippi. Grant 
personally led neither column, opting instead to command 
indirectly from headquarters at the rear and let Generals 
E. O. C. Ord and William S. Rosecrans command the columns. 
That decision, however, mandated that Ord and Rosecrans 
thoroughly know Grant's desires and objectives for the 
campaign. Grant was close enough to Ord to communicate 
with him if necessary, but Rosecrans was too far south. 
When Rosecrans dawdled, destroying the element of speed 
Grant had built into the campaign, Grant sent two staff 
officers to further explain the campaign's objectives and 
hurry Rosecrans along. The action marked Grant's 
realization that he could extend his personal authority by 
placing staff officers at a subaltern's headquarters. The 
effort was brief and inefficient, but Grant had taken his 
first step toward an advanced staff usage. 
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Throughout the campaign around Vicksburg, Mississippi, 
and the siege of that Mississippi River fortress, May 
through July 1863, Grant further took the measure of his 
staff officers and his own expectations of their work. 
While John Rawlins fretted over Grant's drinking, he also 
agitated to remove inefficient officers from headquarters. 
Grant, too, began to realize that some of his early staff 
appointments had been poor, but, loyal to old friends, he 
preferred to let attrition solve the problem. William S. 
Hillyer had no stomach for war and, though he rendered 
Grant good service in the push toward Vicksburg, he 
voluntarily left headquarters. Grant only summoned the 
will to dismiss Clark Lagow after that staff officer shamed 
himself in a drunken spree at headquarters near 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, in the fall of 1863. Even then 
Lagow resigned before Grant officially fired him. 
As Grant's commands grew, so did his need for more 
efficient staff work. Troops under Grant's personal 
command at Shiloh numbered only about 40,000 the first day 
(reinforcements under General Don Carlos Buell arrived the 
second day making Grant's force temporarily 60,000 
strong). When he took command of the Department of the 
Mississippi, he theoretically had 75,000 troops scattered 
throughout the department, but effectively about 45,000 men 
at his disposal for the Vicksburg campaign. Victory at 
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Vicksburg catapulted Grant into command of the vast 
Division of the Mississippi, with three armies and about 
60,000 men under his command at Chattanooga. Those numbers 
are not large compared to European--or even eastern 
American--armies, but they were large enough for Grant to 
seek more efficient ways of handling them. The Vicksburg 
and Chattanooga campaigns illustrated to Grant the power 
that quick-moving, separated, and cooperating forces could 
exert on enemy positions. But Grant also knew that he had 
to have help coordinating such campaigns. That need became 
even more pressing when Grant became general-in-chief of 
all United States armies in March 1864, and he crafted a 
cooperative plan requiring the huge Army of the Potomac, 
with 100,000 troops, the Army of the James, with 30,000, 
and some smaller independent commands to crush Robert E. 
Lee's army in Virginia. He turned to his personal staff 
for the help he needed. 
Grant also realized that a staff of the caliber he 
created in 1861 could not efficiently help him in 1864. He 
needed professionals in Virginia, and instead of putting 
friends in empty staff positions, Grant chose West Point-
trained men like Cyrus B. Comstock, Orville Babcock, and 
Horace Porter. Before launching the Battle of the 
Wilderness in May 1864, Grant told his staff officers that 
he wanted them to well-verse themselves in his plans and 
objectives. Then, he would place them with the varied 
independent and cooperating armies in Virginia so they 
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could help sub-commanders make quick decisions without 
having to constantly consult Grant. They were true 
extensions of Grant's authority; they were the fruition of 
the plan he had attempted two years earlier at Iuka. While 
Rawlins, as Grant's chief of staff, remained an able office 
administrator and Grant's close confidant, Comstock, 
Babcock, and Porter rode to the headquarters of generals 
like Ambrose Burnside and Benjamin Butler. They helped 
those generals craft operations to conform to Grant's 
wishes. In this system, Grant had created a small, crude 
model of the Prussian General Staff, which versed staff 
officers in military theory and objectives, then sent them 
with that information to help field commanders. 
Grant's staff achievements do not fit into an 
organized plan to modernize staff work throughout the 
United States army during the Civil War. His efforts were 
just a practical--Edward Hagerman would say 
''mechanistic' '--response to complicated command 
situations. When the war ended, so did Grant's vision of 
personal staff work. But such only reinforces historian 
Mark Neely's assertion that the Civil War was something 
less than ''total'' or completely modern. 19 
It is impossible to know if Grant's staff system 
hurried the end of the Civil War, but that is not the 
thrust of this study. Of more importance is that the Civil 
War w~s not a static period of American staff work. It 
proved that, if the War Department would not take the lead 
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in expanding personal staff duties, individuals would have 
to. Of the four generals examined--Lee, Sherman, 
McClellan, and Grant--only the last sought to truly use his 
personal staff in an expanded role. Grant proved himself 
as much an innovator within his headquarters as he was on 
the battlefield. 
Grant did not set out to model his staff after any 
European system. Necessities of war forced him into the 
advances he created. In Grant, all of the factors 
compatible with staff advancement came together: large 
armies, cooperative operations, and a definite willingness 
to experiment with staff improvements. Grant was not a 
staff reformer, per se; he was a competent, intelligent 
general looking for more efficient ways to fight a 
complicated war. As such, he spent no time talking or 
writing about staff work. He did not promote his 
innovations as a model for the whole United States Army. 
When the war ended, so did the need for efficient staffing. 
The factors that would usher it into mainstream American 
military thought would not exist again until after the 
Spanish-American War. 
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